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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“It is important for us to be meeting now because we are currently at a critical turning-point, in so far 
as the European Union finds itself compelled to redefine its policy for border management with regard 
to receiving migrants and refugees, while remaining faithful to the values of the Union which define 
us as the European Union. Europe wants to remain open and faithful to its values” (the Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg and the then head of Luxembourg presidency in the European 
Council, Xavier Bettel, during the 2015 Valletta Summit)1. 
 
“I believe that the time when we had the illusion of managing migration flows only through border 
management is gone. We have now finally understood, not only that we need to act as Europeans, all 
together, but also that we need to act on what we all usually define as the root causes: poverty, climate 
change, lack of democratic spaces, violations of human rights, opportunities for life.” (High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, 2017). 
 
1.0 Background  
The EU is changing its course of African irregular migration management from control 
measures to ‘addressing the root causes.’ In 2015, during the EU-Africa Valetta Summit on 
irregular migration control, the EU took an unprecedented migration management course: it 
established the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (ETFA), with a specific aim to address the 
root causes of migration in Africa. The move signified a reenergized effort by both the African 
and European partners to reconstruct and redefine African irregular migration (Castillejo, 2016, 
2017; McKeon, 2018; Parshotam, 2017). First, the EU-Africa partnership agreement signed at 
the Valletta summit acknowledged the root causes of irregular migration in African countries. 
 






Secondly, it recognized that the right approach to managing African irregular migration flows 
is addressing those root causes (European Commission, 2015f; European Commission, 2020). 
Such a policy shift appears to run against the conventional knowledge in migration studies, that 
since the 1990s, when the process of integrating migration and asylum issues at the EU level 
begun, the EU had always capitalized on border protection and migration control measures 
(Celata and Coletti, 2016; Chou, 2012; Guiraudon, 2000; Guild, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Guild and 
Bigo, 2010; Lavenex, 2001; Parkes, 2017; Van Criekinge, 2008). It hence remains puzzling as 
to why and how the EU took such an unprecedented policy shift to tackle the root causes of 
African irregular migration.   
Even though the EU had always engaged African countries in irregular migration management, 
the concept of the root causes (and the need for addressing the root causes) remained entirely 
absent in the EU policy documents in the 2000s. Throughout this period, there lacked a concrete 
policy on irregular migration management that could be connected to addressing the root causes 
(Castles and Van Hear, 2011; Carling and Talleraas, 2016). Moreover, during this time, 
“migration policy-making was packaged into the ‘technocratic’ language of ‘policy transfer’ 
and ‘adaptation’ to existing norms, specifically in the area of human rights and humanitarian 
migration” (Weinar et al., 2018:2). Unlike in the scholarship in the 2000s, in recent years, and 
most significantly since the 2015 Valletta Summit, there has been an invigorated focus on 
addressing the root causes of African irregular migration (see Castillejo, 2016; Crawley and 
Skleparis, 2017; Fulvio, 2016; McKeon, 2018; Trauner, 2016; Parshotam, 2017; Vătăman, 
2016). Even then, a few scholars, such as Guiraudon (2018) and Scipioni (2017), suggest there 
was no major turning point in EU policy development in 2015. While these scholars criticize 
the EU's actions of empowering external border control in maintaining fortress Europe, they 




However, Carling (2017) terms the move to address root causes of African irregular migration as 
intuitive but problematic and misleading. 
Some studies have suggested that the 2015 migration crisis triggered the EU policy change 
(Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019; Falkner, 2016; Paul and Roos, 2019). They hold this argument 
since the EU-Africa Valletta Summit (where the EU policy migration change was initialized) 
was held when the European migration crisis peaked. However, I argue contrary to what these 
studies suggest: that the 2015 migration crisis on its own was not a trigger for the EU policy 
change. First, the crisis did not offer a policy direction. The EU had the option to empower its 
existing structures of irregular migration control or would have taken any other alternative 
rather than taking a new policy shift. As explained by Nohrstedt and Weible, “even if many 
crises are followed by struggles over the dominant interpretation of causes and implications, 
the proximity of crises in relation to policy subsystems (in terms of policy and geographical 
distance) remains critical in order to clarify the nature, evolvement, and effects on policy 
debates” (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010:3; see also, Weible at al., 2012). I advance my argument 
that the process of influencing the EU actors to refocus on addressing the root causes of African 
irregular migration started as early as 2008, but the policy shift was actualized through the 2015 
EU-Africa Valletta Summit. The 2015 migration crisis, therefore, can only be understood as a 
catalyst for policy change (see the conceptual framework and operationalization of variables 
in the theory chapter for a detailed analysis).  
The concept of the root causes of African irregular migration was not new and did not emerge 
with the 2015 migration crisis. It was first mentioned in the 1999 Tampere Convention but ever 
since, it was not embraced into the EU migration policy (Boswell, 2002, Lindstrøm, 2005). 
“By the 2000s, the root-causes doctrine had become engrained in European policy thinking 
about migration and development. It has partly been a dormant idea, however, and re-emerged 




2015” (Carling and Talleraas, 2016:6; Carling 2017:20). The intensification of the need to 
address the root causes of migration originated from the debates between the European and the 
African partners that, first, the causes of African irregular migration ought to be understood 
from a historical perspective (Andersson, 2015; Baldwin-Edwards, 2009; Eskinazi, 2011; De 
Haas, 2014; Ogu, 2017; McKeon, 2018). Secondly, the root causes were structural and 
systematic (Boswell, 2002; Crush, 2015; Carling and Talleraas, 2016; Docquier et al., 2014; 
McKeon, 2018; Mwangi & Cirella, 2020). In these international debates, particularly within 
the EU-Africa partnership, Africa was viewed as an actor in a continuous struggle for 
decolonization and one which advocated for a change of norms of engagement with the EU 
actors (Staeger, 2016).  
This idea of root causes did not only pull attention to the role of ‘norms as structures’ but also 
the behavior of both the African and European partners in irregular migration governance. 
“Exploring the construction and change of norms within their socio-cultural contexts conveys 
one part of the story, while studying the role of norms as causing rule-following behavior 
conveys the other” (Wiener, 2007:51, see also Wiener, 2004). The persistent tension in 
irregular migration management between European and African partners indicated conflicting 
interests and partners’ attempts to reposition themselves to pursue their preferences by framing 
and counter-framing irregular migration management norms. The struggle over the norms of 
irregular migration management provided a platform where interventions and investigations 
met. As a result, the EU-Africa partnership almost drastically established a new form of 
legitimacy relating to addressing the root causes of African irregular migration. As Bano 
argues, “as new norms emerge through competition, decisions taken at the point of contention 
may appear to contradict or deviate from the prevailing interests and the previous known 




and African partners was a manifestation of a new norm formation process that established the 
2015 migration policy shift. 
Emerging migration studies suggest that the EU migration policy shift to address the root 
causes of African migration was influenced by African partner countries (Andersson, 2016; 
Fulvio, 2016). “Further, the export of a security model [by the EU actors] has given more 
powerful ‘partner’ states a perfect bargaining chip” in irregular migration control (Andersson, 
2016: 1063; see also Andersson, 2014:274ff). Additionally, it is suggested that African partner 
countries were the ‘exogenous agents’, and the root causes of irregular migration were the 
‘exogenous issue’ that influenced the EU to change its irregular migration management 
approach (Fulvio, 2016). But how? 
It is on this background that this study presents the question; how did the African partner 
countries participate in influencing the EU’s change of migration approach from purely 
control mechanisms to addressing the root causes of African irregular migration?  
1.2 Mapping hypothesis 
The labels ‘refugees’ and ‘irregular migrants’ have been re-conceptualized and redefined by 
political actors, in both historical and present contexts, to become a powerful discursive force 
for political mobilization in different spaces (Godin and Doná, 2016). Witteborn explains how 
actors make irrelevant issues become relevant in policymaking in migration. He defines such 
‘becoming relevant’ as “a process through which people shift between different moments and 
ways of being and relating while responding to historical, socio-political and economic 
realities, and moving towards new ways of experiencing and acting in the world” (Witteborn, 
2015:364). The politics of post-coloniality and that of Eurocentrism continue to dominate the 
EU-Africa relations on irregular migration control. As scholars assert, the Africa-Europe 




within the irregular migration control partnership. This indicates a heightened consciousness 
of coloniality and the ethical imperative of managing irregular migration (Adepoju, 2006; 
Staeger, 2016; Woolley, 2017; Philipps, 2018). To Andersson (2016), African partner countries 
have used irregular migrants as a tool of persuasion to redirect the EU’s external actions 
towards the historicity of coloniality. The root causes of irregular migration have been argued 
to link to the historical past and, in particular, colonialism (Baldwin-Edwards, 2009; De Haas, 
2014; Triulzi and McKenzie, 2013).  
The emergence and growth of the concept of root causes of irregular migration apparently has 
been part of Africa’s decolonization process. Staeger, for instance, argues that “Pan-African 
decolonization is an unfinished, normative project that will reshape Africa–EU relations toward 
a more equal, actual partnership of voluntary engagement.[..] As such post-colonial studies 
have gradually shifted from pure resistance to European colonialism to a re-problematization 
of post-colonial itself” (Staeger, 2016: 982, see also Kotsopoulos and Mattheis, 2018). Other 
scholars argue that African countries have always made an effort to reconstruct history which 
has primarily been written from a Eurocentric point of view and where Europe exerts 
unparalleled hegemony in constructing ideas around the African irregular migration (Garrido 
et al., 2019: 2-8).  
Irregular migration control is one of the areas where the ‘post-colonial others’ have equated 
the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) and that of Eurocentrism. “A postcolonial 
perspective on NPE explains why an EU foreign policy based on Eurocentric norms struggles 
to free itself of paternalistic discourse about Africa” (Staeger, 2016:981; see also Onar and 
Nicolaïdis, 2013). While acknowledging the increasing literature on Africa's effort to 
decolonize (Gikandi, 2010; Woolley, 2014; Gallien, 2017; 2018), this research study offers a 




hypothesis that African partner countries constructed a linkage between the root causes of 
African irregular migration and coloniality. In this regard, the construction of the root causes 
was both instrumental and norm-based in influencing the EU change of policy towards African 
irregular migration. This hypothesis presents an emerging perspective of the EU-Africa 
engagement in international affairs. The study aimed to fill a puzzling analytical gap - how did 
the African partners (African Union, regional blocs, and African countries) use coloniality to 
construct the root causes of African irregular migration to influence the traditionally dominant 
EU actors. 
In their study ‘Migrating towards minority status: Shifting European policy towards Roma,’ 
Guglielmo and Waters (2005) demonstrate that the EU migration policy change was influenced 
through a rhetorical action. This study brings the Africa-Europe colonial engagement at the 
center stage to examine how [de]coloniality and the framing of the African irregular migration 
reinforce each other to form a strong enough rhetoric to influence the EU’s shift of irregular 
migration management approach. As an argument, African countries generated persuasion 
towards the EU’s policy shift through rhetorical action. They constructed rhetoric that the 
European partners (the EU and the EU member states) were directly or indirectly part of the 
root causes of African irregular migration and therefore were obliged to take responsibility. In 
this respect, rhetorical action was the strategy of influencing the EU policy shift. From 
Andersson’s view, the effectiveness of generating influence depended on how African partner 
countries constructed irregular migrants and how successful that construction impacted the EU 
actors (Andersson, 2016). As such, the construction of irregular migrants and the root causes 
presented a progression of decolonization by African countries. In other words, the study offers 
a perspective of how African countries within the EU-Africa partnership used colonial rhetoric 




1.3 Framing irregular migration and the root causes 
The concept of root causes of irregular migration is dependent on how irregular migration itself 
is conceptualized. Hence, the root cause is a problematic, unclear and sometimes contradictory 
concept. It is also a term that is undergoing constructions and experiences political contestation 
and analytical uncertainty, making it even more complex (Düvell, 2009; Vollmer, 2011; 
Chadwick, 2017). The categorization of migrants as refugees, economic migrants, invaders, 
legal/regular or illegal/irregular is deeply embedded in both policy and social sciences, thus 
enabling the reconstructions of the social world in which root causes occur (Bakewell 2008a; 
2008b Crawley et al., 2016; Crawley and Skleparis, 2017). This categorization creates an 
opportunity for strategic use of constructions where “they offer a window into the migratory 
ecology of survival, whereby a morally ambiguous of ‘gray zone’ allows for the victim to 
become the victimizer and where, in fact, any clear-cut distinction between perpetrator and 
victim is often blurred and indiscernible” (Triulzi and McKenzie, 2013:6; see also Morrice, 
2017). Critical scholarship has presented the framing of knowledge in irregular migration 
studies as Eurocentric. Different concepts such as ‘Abyssal lines’ (de Santos, 2016: 118ff; 
2016b; Morrice, 2019) or ‘Departheid’ (Kalir, 2019) have been put forth to explain how the 
western line of thinking controls how ‘the others’ view migration and irregular migrants. “In 
the same way, in spite of the fact that political colonialism has been eliminated, the relationship 
between the European – also called ‘Western’ – culture, and the others, continues to be one of 
colonial domination” (Quijano, 2007:168). In the Western publics, the concept of irregular 
migrants appears to be well constructed as threats to national security and social systems 
(Balzacq, 2005; Huysmans 2006, 2006b:1ff; Bobba and Roncarolo, 2018), African exodus or 




This study holds the ambiguity of the root causes of African irregular migration at its center of 
analysis. Within the EU-Africa partnership scholarship, it remains unclear how African partner 
countries politically construct the concept of root causes of African irregular migration and 
express it to their European counterparts. As argued by Triulzi and McKenzie, the analysis of 
the framing of African irregular migration needs to be understood from a historical perspective 
instead of a narrow and presentists’ version. 
“The link between irregular migration and historical past appears to be poorly 
perceived among the new generations of African migrants. It is depicted as 
unemployed urbanized youths who appear to escape from the present 
‘regimes of violent’ rather than from their nebulous colonial past” (Triulzi 
and McKenzie, 2013:6). 
The study uses the term irregular migration according to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) definition - “the movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of 
the sending, transit and receiving countries” (IOM, 2011). Based on this definition, irregular 
migration is a generic term that consists of both asylum seekers and economic migrants. The 
study incorporates Africa’s historical past (colonialism) in examining Africa’s framing of the 
root causes of irregular migration. The meaning of colonialism, in this case, goes beyond the 
1884 Berlin conference on the scramble, demarcation and occupation of the African content. 
Instead, the term colonialism is borrowed from Boaventura de Sousa Santos, who defines it as 
“a system of naturalizing differences in such a way that the hierarchies that justify domination, 
oppression, and so on are considered the product of the inferiority of certain peoples and not 
the cause of their so-called inferiority. Their inferiority is ‘natural’, and because it is natural, 
they ‘have’ to be treated accordingly; that is, they have to be dominated” (de Santos, 2016b:18, 




As a claim, the construction of irregular migrants as victims of colonialism and neo-colonialism 
by African partner countries needs to be understood as part of the postcolonial discourse 
(Triulzi and McKenzie, 2013: 6). The dominant postcolonial critique is that the underlining 
power imbalance of the EU-Africa relationship in irregular migration management takes the 
form of neo-colonialism. “Postcolonialism claims that colonial discourses, domination and 
oppression continue beyond the end of historical colonialism and that there is an ongoing 
legacy of colonial relations of inequality and Western privilege” (Morrice, 2019:21-22). Other 
than the colonial rhetoric, the EU was heavily criticized for taking the fortress approach during 
the migration crisis (Del Sarto, 2016; Menéndez, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018; Vătăman, 
2016). 
Although the strategic use of colonial rhetoric in framing African irregular migration was a 
robust persuasion tool, its effectiveness was enhanced by a strong critique of the EU’s 
inconsistency in its ‘normative actorness’ in irregular migration control. In other words, the 
EU policy shift was a readjustment of its external actorness relative to the African partners’ 
influence to take responsibility in addressing the root causes. 
1.4 Defining variables  
The construction of colonialism and neo-colonialism as the root causes of African irregular 
migration by African partner countries influenced the EU migration policy shift from control 
approaches to addressing the root causes. However, to make the rhetoric of the root causes of 
irregular migration more influential, African partner countries critiqued the EU actors by 
highlighting the inconsistency within its ‘normative’ external actions. Besides, due to the 2015 
migration crisis, the EU urgently required a working solution. The migration crisis, in this case, 





In this study, rhetorical action and entrapment enable understanding the policy learning 
process, which led to the EU migration policy change. A policy change requires both knowing 
and deciding and takes different forms depending on the conceptual contexts and across 
different collective settings within policy processes (Birkland, 2006: 2-5; Heikkila and Gerlak, 
2013; Klindt, 2011; Radaelli, 2009). “By focusing on how issues are defined, one can explore 
how leaders – who are themselves politically motivated -actively adopt strategies to justify 
reforms” (Lin and Katada, 2020:5; see also Marmor et al., 2015). The EU policy change was 
an outcome of policy learning resulting from a successful rhetorical entrapment. As put forward 
by Heikkila and Gerlak, “in defining learning, we first draw out the connection between 
learning processes and learning products, both cognitive and behavioral” (Heikkila and Gerlak, 
2013:484). The EU paradigm shift in African irregular migration management and the 
establishment of the EU Trust Fund for Africa are conceptualized as the cognitive and 
behavioral products of rhetorical action. However, while these learning products are quite clear, 
the study focuses on the process of rhetorical action that resulted in policy change (see section 
7.6.2 in the discussion chapter for more detail).  
1.5 The relevance of the study  
By studying how the African partner countries constructed and expressed the construction of 
irregular migrants and the root cause of irregular migration, and the EU’s response to this 
rhetoric, it becomes possible to understand the degree and dimension of influence on policy 
shift. It also enables a proper understanding of each partner’s interests in irregular migration 
management and the underpinning sustainability of the EU-Africa partnership. In the analysis 
of international relations, this study sheds light on the increasing proactiveness of the ‘post-
colonial others,’ particularly Africa, against the normative power Europe. From the lens of 
social constructivism, the study informs how the predominantly lesser persuasive actors can 




also offers insights into how the seemingly dying politics of coloniality has been brought into 
a living debate within the EU-Africa irregular migration framework. 
1.6 The structure of the study 
Chapter Two: the EU migration policy change – focuses on the development and the 
dimensions of the EU asylum and migration policy change. The first section examines policy 
development from the early 1990s to 2015. This section is divided into two broad categories 
of policy development: first, policies that focus on irregular migration control within the EU 
(by the EU institutions) and, secondly, policies that aim at deterring irregular migration from 
outside the EU external borders. The chapter demonstrates the policy change in two 
dimensions: 1) EU’s actions in irregular migration control have continuously been expanding 
beyond the EU external borders, and 2) there is increasing involvement of non-EU actors in 
irregular migration management. In either case, migration control and border protection 
mechanisms remain the predominant approach. However, an unprecedented shift in the 
migration management approach took place in 2015. The EU took a different policy course – 
that of addressing the root causes of irregular migration. The policy goes against the EU’s 
tradition of migration control and indicates a change in the ‘core’ of the migration policy 
framework that I term as a normative change.  
Chapter three: literature review examines the scholarship of the EU’s asylum and migration 
policy change or failure to change. It discusses different scholarly arguments, including the 
‘policy venue shopping’ argument that explains the communitarization of asylum and 
migration policy. ‘The race to the bottom’ argument explains the establishment of the Common 
European Asylum Policy. The chapter further examines the African partners' resistance to 
cooperate in the EU-Africa partnership and brings out the tension between the two partners in 




of irregular migration in the EU policy. Lastly, the chapter reviews the literature on the root 
causes of African irregular migration within the EU-Africa partnership framework and how 
scholars have linked root causes to coloniality politics. 
Chapter Four: the theory chapter is based on constructivism. The study is informed by 
rhetorical action, which explains the hypothesis that ‘African partner countries constructed 
colonialism as the root causes of irregular migration and irregular migrants as the victims of 
colonialism to influence the EU policy migration change.’ For this study, rhetorical action 
involved a combination of rhetorical practices, including system narrative, issue narrative and 
identity narrative, to form mega rhetoric. System narratives criticized the Africa-EU 
neocolonial-like relationship. Issue narratives comprised the root causes of African irregular 
migration while identity narrative criticized the EU as a  normative power.  
While emphasizing the power of speech, the chapter explains how powerful rhetoric generates 
persuasion against an opponent. It further explains how rhetorical action by some actors results 
in rhetorical entrapment of the opponent, hence influencing it to adjust its behavior accordingly. 
The credibility of rhetoric to the extent that the opponent cannot oppose the accusations or 
defend himself without demonstrating inconsistency and double-standards is referred to as 
rhetorical entrapment. Rhetorical action helps explain African and European partners' 
engagement and influence on the EU policy change. 
Chapter five: the methodology - discusses rhetorical analysis as the analytical framework of 
the study. Rhetorical analysis is founded on rhetorical action and involves speech and text 
analysis. The methodology provides an analytical framework that brings speeches together to 
understand the process of framing and counter-framing of irregular migration and how rhetoric 
generates persuasion. The study used both official/diplomatic, and unofficial rhetoric from both 




the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit were analyzed. The analysis used speeches from other 
online platforms to show the changing attitude both before and after the Valletta Summit. This 
is notwithstanding further text analysis to demonstrate the changing policy text in the EU policy 
documents. 
Chapter six: empirical chapter – analysis rhetoric by both African and European leaders 
before, during and after the 2015 Valletta Summit. The rhetorical artifacts of the three periods 
are sequenced to show persuasion through rhetorical action. The study finds that by 
incorporating colonial rhetoric in African irregular migration management in around  2009, 
there was a successful rhetorical action and entrapment against Italy. Gaddafi demanded Italy 
pay for colonial injustice first so that Libya could participate in joint-irregular migration 
control. This was despite the fact that colonialism itself appeared irrelevant in the irregular 
migration control agenda. Italy compensated Libya for colonial injustices in return for 
cooperation on African irregular migration control. However, this rhetorical action was based 
on blackmail.  
Even then, Libya’s rhetorical entrapment became the starting point to link colonial rhetoric to 
irregular migration control. During the 2015 Valletta summit, African partners embarked on 
neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration. Both African and European 
partners had different agendas. On the one side, the European partners, being under pressure to 
manage the migration crisis, were urgently searching for a workable solution. They also framed 
irregular migration as a threat to security in Europe. On the other side, the African partners 
were pro-active in articulating the rhetoric of the root causes. To make the rhetoric more 
persuasive, African partner countries strongly highlighted the inconsistency between the EU 
normative principles and external practices. As a result, the EU found itself entrapped: it could 




other alternative other than to accept the African rhetoric of addressing the root causes of 
African irregular migration.  
Chapter seven: discussion chapter – discusses rhetorical action, a strategy that African 
partners used to influence the EU policy change. African partners influenced the EU migration 
policy shift by constructing rhetoric of coloniality as the root cause of African irregular 
migration. Scholars consider the EU a normative power and an actor in a continuous process 
of reconstructing self and changing ‘the others.’  One gap left by the existing NPE scholarship 
is whether ‘the other’ can influence the EU in the event where its internal processes fail to yield 
normative power.  This study contributes to filling this knowledge gap. Based on the evidence 
provided, and in the context of irregular migration control, ‘the post-colonial others’ have 
influenced the EU to reposition its normative actions. However, this evidence cannot be 
generalized to other social, economic and political spheres. 
Chapter eight: conclusion and recommendation - The EU’s inability to decline the 
delegitimization of NPE by African partners or defend its inconsistency and double standards 
in upholding the shared norms and values is what this study refers to as rhetorical entrapment. 
Any EU’s attempt to oppose would have put the EU in a worse state of self-contradiction. 
According to Africa’s anti-neo-colonial rhetoric, the primary root causes of irregular migration 
included the exploitation of natural resources in Africa, the negative effect of climate change 
and the imbalance in the Africa-EU trade agenda. These are development areas where African 
partner countries felt disempowered and where the EU partners demonstrated dishonesty in 
their relations with Africa for not incorporating them in the irregular migration management. 
The Africa-EU partnership, therefore, needs to redesign the economic agreement based on a 
true collaboration featured with shared responsibility, non-domination and non-partisanship. 
To achieve this, the study recommends that the EU work with Africa as equal development 




consideration of Africa’s development priorities would enhance joint cooperation towards 
irregular migration management. This ultimately improves the sustainability of EU-funded 








































CHAPTER TWO: THE EU MIGRATION POLICY CHANGE 
 
2.0 Introduction  
EU migration and asylum policy is seemingly changing, as shown by many policy 
developments and recasts. However, from the early 1990s until 2015, very little had changed. 
During this time, the migration policy only changed what Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 
(1993:31ff) refer to as secondary facets of a system. The EU migration policy core has 
maintained a high degree of steadiness. The EU has ever since maintained migration control 
approaches  (Ripoll and Trauner, 2014). This chapter systematically traces changes or status 
quo within the EU migration policy development up to 2015 when the EU took the 
unprecedented policy change. The chapter also demonstrates that before 2015, the EU’s 
governance structure was changing through different treaties, but the irregular migration 
management approach did not change. The establishment of the EU Trust Fund for Africa to 
address the root causes of African irregular migration in 2015 signified a change beyond just 
engaging the non-EU member states or managing the irregular migration outside the European 
borders. It was a shift in the EU migration policy. 
The current EU migration policy has a long history. Although migration and asylum had been 
mentioned in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the issue was primarily managed at the state level 
until the 1999 Amsterdam treaty (Lavenex, 2001, 2006). But even after the asylum and 
migration issue was taken to the EU level, it remained predominantly controlled by the Council. 
The Amsterdam Treaty, however, somehow checked the role of the European Council in 
handling the asylum matters by shifting the asylum issues to the EU’s first pillar. Such a move 
was an apparent advancement in the integration of the asylum since the first pillar matters relate 
to Areas of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), where member states adhere to the principles 




be considered to have shifted from being purely a national level issue to an intergovernmental 
issue, and to date, it remains ‘a community’ issue (Guild and Harlow, 2001; Noll, 2000:210 ff; 
2003).  
Despite the communitarization of migration and asylum issues, the EU did not experience 
smooth policy development in these areas (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2014). One explanation 
of the slow process of asylum harmonization among the member states is their reluctance to 
surrender power on the border-asylum issues to the supranational institutions, namely the 
Commission, the Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Another reason for the diverse 
commitment towards the integration of asylum is the member states’ reluctance to lose their 
freedom to their own external frontier controls (Geddes and Scholten, 2016: 218-219; Givens 
and Luedtke, 2004). Before the Amsterdam treaty, the intergovernmental cooperation remained 
unaccountable to other supranational institutions and hence enjoyed freedom from restrictions 
of asylum laws. The policymakers were neither accountable to their judicial institutions and 
parliaments at the national level nor the European community institutions. Nolls points out that, 
during this time, there lacked transparency and accountability as well as judicial control in the 
EU’s intergovernmental organ relating to asylum management (Nolls, 2003). This power 
imbalance resulted in a ‘democratic deficit’ in migration and asylum (Guiraudon 2000; Lahav, 
2006).  
The imbalance of power within the EU during this time provided an environment for 
developing the controversial extraterritorial asylum policies. This was mainly due to the high 
ambiguity of the moral and judicial legitimacy of EU’s compliance with asylum law as a whole. 
Nonetheless, the significant development in the governance structure of the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Court of Justice changed the EU policy-making dynamics. These 




(Guiraudon, 2000; Betts, 2003). Besides, this later came to be partially reaffirmed through the 
Treaty of Nice (as outlined under the Title IV TEC) together with the European Council 
Directive 3004/927/EC, which shifted the Council decisions from ‘unanimity agreement’ to 
‘qualified majority voting’ in all communitarized Justices and Home Affairs. All member states 
(apart from the UK, which was exempted from Title IV) were to abide by the decisions of the 
EU supranational institutions; hence, no member state could independently pursue policies 
such as extra-territorial asylum policies irrespective of their perceived effectiveness (Monar, 
2005). As the EU governance changed over time, the ‘Community approach’ got strengthened 
in the area of asylum and migration policy.  
2.1 Development of the EU Asylum and Migration Control Policy (1990-2015) 
The EU integration process on asylum can be traced back to the 1985 Schengen agreement, 
when asylum issues became at the center of the intergovernmental debate as the internal 
borders became less important. The introduction of the Single European Act in 1987 saw the 
concern of migration and asylum take the central foci, a phenomenon which was necessitated 
more by its potential practical realization than a political will (Noll, 2003). Simultaneously, 
more focus was given to the external border control and the member states’ cooperation on 
migration and asylum from within the EU territory.  
The EU’s preparedness to manage cases of a mass influx of irregular migrants who required 
international protection can be traced to the 1990s. The first asylum policy instrument was 
established on 15th June 1990 during the Dublin Convention, which aimed to harmonize 
member states’ responsibilities in irregular migration management. In particular, Article 3(5) 
forms the foundation of the current Dublin system. The signing of the convention was purely 
intergovernmental and occurred without the involvement of the European Commission. 




European Community framework. The EU later sought to formalize it and make it a European 
Community law partly through the Maastricht treaty in 1991. During this time, the 1991 forced 
displacement caused by the former Yugoslavia conflict led to a mass influx. This mass 
migration caught the EU off-guard - having no concrete policy instrument to respond. In later 
conventions - in London in December 1992 and Copenhagen in June 1993 - the member states 
and the EU institutions expressed their concerns about asylum management to enhance refugee 
protection.  
Based on the Maastricht Treaty, the unbinding cooperation among member states on refugees 
was adopted into the EU’s institutional framework. The Council was mandated to work with 
the Commission and the Parliament, but the European Court of Justice remained without 
powers over asylum issues. On 25th September 1995, the European Council adopted the 
resolution on burden-sharing regarding reception and protection of people in need of 
international protection (European Council, 1995). Later, on 4th March 1996, the Council 
adopted Directive 96/198/JHA regarding the readiness and emergency procedure for the 
burden-sharing to enhance temporary protection of displaced persons (European Council, 
1996). The directive was again strengthened by the Action Plan of the Council in December 
1998. The Commission laid the procedures for the prompt adoption of the plan following the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and minimum standards for temporary protection adopted later in 2001 
(Barents, 1997; European Council, 2001; Hatton, 2004; Van Selm‐Thorburn, 1998). 
In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty conferred new powers among the EU institutions to establish 
a mechanism for legislation of asylum matters. The conferment involved a transitional period 
of five years, during which both the member states and the Commission had shared rights to 
initiate an agenda, and a unanimous decision by the Parliament and the Council was a 




matters in specific cases (Levy, 1999; Kuijper, 2000). The treaty allowed the Council to follow 
the standard co-decision procedure and arrive at the final decisions through a qualified 
majority. Indeed, the Council adopted the co-decision procedure and has been operational since 
2005. Within five years of the transitional period, the treaty hoped to see the Council work on 
criteria and approaches of determining which member states should consider and process 
asylum applications on behave of the EU. The Council was also expected to set the minimum 
standard concerning procedures, refugees' status, and reception.  
When the Tampere Programme was adopted in October 1999, the Council resolved to 
implement the standard European system in two stages. The first phase was a short-term 
strategy to set the minimum standards for establishing a uniform procedure and a common 
status for those granted a valid and long-term asylum within the EU. This phase took place 
between 1999 and 2004 and led to the creation of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS). Among the significant achievements in this phase included the establishment of 
Eurodac database to store and compare fingerprint data; delineation of minimum standards for 
members to follow in admitting the asylum-seekers; qualification for international protection 
as well as the granted type; procedures for issuing and revoking asylum status; and enactment 
of policies for temporary protection in case of an influx of immigrants (European Council, 
1999; Lenaerts, 2010).  
At the end of 2004, the second phase took off following the EU’s effort, through the Hague 
Programme, to have the measures and policy instruments implemented by December 2010. 
These instruments and procedures aimed to establish a single asylum procedure with standard 
guarantees for refugees' protection. The Commission made efforts to have the second phase of 
CEAS implemented by crafting proposals and presenting them to the Parliament and the 




Treaty came into force in December 2009. The central EU’s objective was to develop minimum 
standards to establish a common European system with uniform procedures and status of 
asylum, uniform subsidiary protection status, and a uniform temporary protection system. It 
also involved common standard procedures for issuing and revoking asylum or subsidiary 
protection and rules guiding reception conditions. Besides, it provided procedures and 
guidelines on partnerships with third countries. Following the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, 
the TFEU Article 80 explicitly outlined mechanisms for solidarity and fair responsibility 
sharing principles among member states, which included the financial consequences (Takle, 
2018).  
The Lisbon Treaty also changed the decision-making process and introduced co-decision as a 
standard procedure for all asylum-related decisions. It introduced a code of qualified majority 
voting on legal migration issues and led to the creation of new legal bases for integration 
measures. The Council and the Parliament were to co-decide on immigration policies affecting 
both regular and illegal migrants. Nonetheless, in the vent of the asylum crisis, the Council 
adopted provisional measures and was a superior decision-maker. For other cases, the Council 
had to consult with the Parliament as per Article 78(3). Further, as per Article 79(5), the Lisbon 
Treaty explicitly noted that the EU and members were to share asylum management 
competence. Above and beyond, the treaty significantly improved the oversight roles of the 
Court of Justice, which saw the development of a vast body of case laws on refugee matters. 
Phase two further got a boost when the Council adopted the Stockholm Programme from 2010 
through 2014. In addition to establishing a common system, the program emphasized the need 
for solidarity with members experiencing migration pressures. It also outlined the tasks to be 
executed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (European Council, 2009). In short, 
the advancement of the EU governance structures presented new complexities in developing 




2.2 The Common European Asylum Policy (CEAP) 
The development of the EU governance, right from the Maastricht Treaty to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaty, resulted in the intensification of the Europeanization of asylum. 
The 1999 Tampere Convention marked the beginning of the current Common European 
Asylum Policy (CEAP), also known as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). CEAS 
consists of four Council directives: Directive in the event of mass influx, Reception Conditions 
Directive, Procedure Directive, and Qualification Directive. The development of all the council 
directives and their recasts were founded on full respect to the 1951 Geneva Convention. The 
EU claimed to honor the fundamental rights outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. It also asserted full respect for human dignity in asylum management.  
The CEAP acknowledged that fair recognition, assessment and the granting of refugee status, 
and the subsidiary protection status were crucial for limiting the asylum seeker's secondary 
movements from one member state to another. This movement was commonly understood to 
be motivated by the differences in legal frameworks across the member states. Member states 
were obliged to operate within the confinements of international law that they were party to 
and which outlawed discrimination. The CEAS came with high ambitions for efficient and 
effective irregular migration management strategies that defined the EU as a normative actor 
in refugee protection. However, with time, the consequent difficulties in managing the 
migration control and asylum protection undoubtedly indicated how far the objectives of CEAS 
remained unattainable (Meyerstein, 2005; Takle, 2012). As put forward by Roos and Orsini 
(2015), in practice, the EU experience was a de facto collapse of its Dublin system and the 
CEAS. 
The Dublin regulations required the member state through which asylum seekers entered the 




CEAS,  including the newest version of Dublin (III) that was enacted in 2013, was to raise 
efficiency and effectiveness in the promotion of refugee protection among all EU member 
states and to equitably distribute the asylum burden between the members (Moreno, 2008; 
European Commission, 2016b). In contrast, the strategy of sharing responsibilities between 
member states resulted in such a conspicuous imbalance in asylum burden that the highly 
burdened frontline countries abandoned these rules to their fullest extent. The disparity in the 
EU member state’s reception capacity vis-a-vis the actual number of refugees received 
demonstrated how the failure of the Dublin system was evident. Although most asylum seekers 
entered inner Europe through Greece and Italy, their asylum applications were not lodged in 
those countries. The frontline countries just acted like open gates, contrary to the Dublin 
system's obligation. The crash of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) led to the 
introduction of temporary border controls in different countries, which according to 
Thielemann and El-Enany (2010), posed a threat to the Schengen system – one of the most 
successful EU projects.  
The failure of the EU asylum policy did not only demonstrate how undesirable the Dublin 
system was but also, in the context to control measures, it raised concern about its viability. 
The major aspect of undesirability in the Dublin system was that its burden-sharing strategy 
was founded on a random geographical point of entry and the possibilities of migration flows 
(Koeppinghoff, 2018). Its inability to manage irregular migrants was a critical factor 
contributing to the low acceptance and legitimacy of the overall CEAP. Yet, the expectation 
that the EU could execute the Dublin system by merely exerting more pressure on the member 
states was unrealistic. The system was likely never to be successful since it stood contrary to 
the politics of migration control. While some member states refused to take in asylum seekers, 
others used their domestic policies to process asylum applications. As a result, the nature of 




seekers contrary to the reception conditions Directive and the asylum procedures Directive 
further resulted in increased secondary movement by the asylum seekers, making it harder for 
the Dublin system to function. 
Even in the Dublin III system, the main criterion for allocating the responsibilities for asylum 
claims was the proximity to the `points of entry´ into the EU territory. The states in which the 
applications were lodged were supposed to host asylum seekers until asylum processing was 
completed so that they could either be deported upon the rejection of the status or transferred 
to another member state if granted status. Reliance on this strategy was based on one 
fundamental assumption - that the allocated asylum responsibilities would be reinforced by 
protecting the EU external border by the member states. Owing to how slow the process of 
assessing and granting status in EU member states typically was, the Dublin III system served 
as an instrument of creating refugee burden and later shifting that burden to southern member 
states (Thielemann and El-Enany, 2010; Thielemann, 2017). This explained the reason for the 
abandonment of the EU asylum policies by the member states. Contrary to the expectation, the 
harmonization in the asylum procedure and granting status was not possible in practice. There 
was a massive discrepancy between different EU member states in recognizing asylum seekers 
from the same country of origin (Angeloni, 2019; Sebastian and Seibel, 2019). 
At the same time, the Commission claimed that irregular migrants had mastered the 
functionality of the Dublin System. They made every effort to avoid submitting their identity, 
and the refusal was increasing with the migrant influx. They also refused to conform with other 
Dublin System requirements with the hope of advancing to the member states of their wish to 
apply for asylum from there. As a remedy, the EU introduced the Eurodac system (European 




Eurodac was an instrument to empower the Dublin system by capturing irregular migrants' data 
at the EU southern borders. Eurodac system had a broad scope since it captured fingerprints 
beyond asylum. Alongside Eurodac, the Commission re-energized the harmonization of 
asylum systems by reducing undue pull factors for secondary irregular migration across the 
member states to bring the CEAS into reality. To achieve this, the Commission’s idea was to 
combine the three fundamental Council directives (the Reception Conditions Directive, the 
Procedure directive, and the Qualification Directive) into a single common asylum procedure 
through which the member states were supposed to apply in managing secondary movement. 
However, some policy instruments have remained inactive since their establishment. For 
instance, although the EU had effected the 2001 Directive on minimum requirements for 
granting temporary protection during migrant influx, the directive largely remained unapplied. 
This was partly due to the ambiguity of the directive’s terms, which created tension among the 
member states, especially regarding burden-sharing criteria.  
In 2010, the Commission allocated the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) a new 
mandate of supporting the implementation of the newly introduced migration control policies. 
EASO's main task was to provide finances and facilitate technical operations. The support 
office was also tasked with the implementation of additional recasts on legislative acts, 
including the Qualification Directive (which became effective in January 2012), the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, the Dublin III Regulation, the Eurodac Regulation, and the Reception 
Conditions Directive (all of which became operational in July 2013). Building on the 
achievements of the Stockholm Programme, the Council focused on Article 68 of the TFEU to 
develop guidelines for legislative and strategic planning in the Area of Freedom, Security, and 
Justice (AFSJ). These guidelines emphasized prioritizing and effectively implementing the 
CEAS while still ensuring people's free movement. It also aimed to provide a high level of 




further involved managing the EU’s external borders and police cooperation towards criminal 
matters such as migrant smuggling and trafficking. 
 2.3 European Approach for Migration (EAM) 
In 2015, the migration pressure saw the Commission issue the European Agenda on Migration 
(European Commission, 2015c). The EAM was proposed by the Commission and subsequently 
adopted by the Council after consultation with Parliament. In the spirit of implementing article 
80 of the TFEU, the main aim of EAM was to facilitate the emergency relocation of individuals 
who needed international protection from frontline countries, especially Italy and Greece. The 
policy involved several actions in managing migration pressure, including the establishment of 
hotspots to trace the movement of irregular migrants and implement EU-wide relocation and 
resettlement programs. The EU achieved this by establishing multi-agency coordination 
between European Border, Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, and EASO. These 
institutions worked to register and fingerprint all irregular migrants.  
The European Approach for Migration had short-term and long-term goals. In the short term, 
it focused on implementing proposed immediate actions to address the Mediterranean crisis. In 
the long-term, the EAM had four main policy themes. The themes included securing borders 
and saving lives, reducing motivation for secondary irregular migration, establishing an 
effective uniform asylum policy, developing new legal migration measures, and modernizing 
the blue card system. It also set new priorities for refugee integration to enhance migration 
benefits for asylum seekers and their countries.  
Indeed, the EAM aimed at establishing legislative mechanisms for improving the CEAS, where 
instead of Council directives, it would create a basis for directly applicable rules. The objective 
was to simplify and reduce refugee procedures, enhance uniform guarantees for refugees, and 




outlined which applicant qualifies for international protection. To make CEAS workable, the 
EU needed a plan to harmonize the refugee recognition rates and asylum protection and 
implement more strict measures to prevent secondary migration. The EAM highlighted the 
reception conditions Directive, which contained the most disputatious issues, to address the 
time challenge in asylum processing. It was to reduce the waiting period for accessing the labor 
market and ultimately prevent asylum seekers from traveling from one member state to another 
(European Commission, 2015c). 
Even under the EAM framework, there was an effort to change the Dublin Regulation. 
Moreover, EAM saw the Eurodac database reform with an aim to extend its coverage of data 
of immigrants who never applied for international protection but still were residing in the EU 
member states. Some measures included fingerprinting of the above six-year-old children to 
track and reunite them with their families. The policy permitted law enforcers to access the 
database (European Commission, 2015c). The Commission further made reforms whereby the 
EASO ceased to be an EU supporting entity and became a fully operational EU Agency for 
Asylum management. EASO was also mandated by aiding the operations of CEAS, such as 
monitoring the EU operational laws and ensuring uniformity in verifying applications across 
all member States (European Parliament, 2018). 
Some reforms in the EAM framework appeared redundant and overlapping. For example, the 
EU developed, adopted, and revised several directives on immigration without implementing 
them. The Council Directive 2002/90/EC outlined what constituted a crime of facilitating 
illegal entry, transit and residence while the framework Decision 2002/946/JHA defined the 
criminal liabilities for such actions (European Commission, 2002). The Directive 2011/36/EU 
offered guidelines on combating and preventing human trafficking as well as protecting the 




highlighted measures against granting the smuggled or trafficked people residence permit 
(European Commission, 2004). Later, the Commission developed a 2015-2020 EU Action Plan 
intending to combat migrant smuggling. In line with this plan, the Commission performed a 
fitness check on the implementation of the then legal framework. It established that there lacked 
enough evidence on the prosecution of people engaged in humanitarian assistance. Eventually, 
it concluded that a legal framework to address human smuggling was crucial for irregular 
migration management.  
The Commission further revised the Directive on Procedures to establish EU-wide common 
standards and procedures for deporting illegal immigrants. The initial recast was outlined in 
the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC), whose implementation report was first issued in March 
2014. Later in September 2015, under the council's direction, the Commission issued an Action 
Plan on return. The main objective of the Action Plan was to enhance the return of irregular 
migrants. Within the same plan, the Commission established the European Return Programme, 
which had both short and long-term goals of returning the irregular migrants with a rejected 
asylum application. The short-term goal was to harmonize the disparity between the national 
return schemes, while the long-term goal was to empower joint reintegration programs 
(European Commission, 2008; European Commission, 2015e). Again, this move appeared like 
going back to the previous policy proposals that had initially failed.  
Within the European Agenda for Migration, the EU had established trust funds to support its 
external management of irregular migration. The Asylum Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF), established under the EU Action Plan, was the chief funding source for implementing 
EAM. Overall, there was a significant increase in funding allocation for AMIF in the period 
2014-2020. Other funding instruments included the European Regional Development Fund 




Fund (ESF). However, since funds allocated to these programs were not explicitly provided for 
in the budget, the actual execution of the EU Action Plan remained unclear (European 
Parliament, 2018).  
2.4 Development of border control policies 
Most border-based migration controls were established through the Amsterdam Treaty and 
integrated into the EU legal framework. First, the Schengen Borders Code set out rules on 
external crossings and the conditions guiding the reintroduction of temporary internal border 
checks. Secondly, there was a burden-sharing mechanism. The EU recognized that not all 
members had external borders to control irregular migrants, and hence members were 
unequally affected by border traffic flows. It, therefore, reallocated funds to facilitate external 
borders-related activities. For the 2010-2014 period, the Commission developed the Internal 
Security Fund- Borders and Visa (ISFBV) as the burden-sharing mechanism. The third control 
policy related to developing a centralized database for irregular migration and border control 
purposes, including the Visa Information System (VIS), the Schengen Information System 
(SIS), and Eurodac. The EU also developed the Facilitators Package, which aimed to deter and 
penalize illegal entry, residence, and transit. Chiefly, the EU aimed at enhancing the 
operationalization of border management policies through Frontex, which played a critical role 
in offering European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) at all border points. Besides, 
Frontex engaged in joint operations with third nations bordering any member state to ensure 
that irregular migration flows were effectively managed (European Commission, 2017; 2018c).  
According to the provisions of the European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) practices, 
both external and internal aspects of the Union’s border surveillance had become intertwined. 
The integration of the two levels of migration control manifested through the defense forces' 




as assisting the third countries in training security forces and monitoring migration (European 
Commission, 2017). For instance, in the spirit of implementing EIBM, the member states’ 
navies had the EUNAVFOR MED and Operation Sophia as a core item of the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Initially, the military joined forces to fight smugglers. 
Later, their mission was broadened to include integrated border management activities such as 
information exchanges among law enforcement agencies. They worked in partnership with 
Europol and European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) in executing search and rescue, and 
surveillance activities. The EU further created Migration Management Support Teams 
(MMST) to support the implementation of border surveillance monitoring hotspots. This 
alliance worked to identify, check, book, and plan return operations for asylum seekers entering 
the EU (European Commission, 2017).  
The EU’s response to the securitization of refugee and migrants’ influx led to the 
Europeanisation of the management of borders. An amendment to the Schengen Borders Code 
was also adopted to address the potential terror threats. The proposal demanded all citizens 
leaving or entering the Schengen area be screened (European Commission, 2016d). In 2015, 
Italy initiated Mare Nostrum, a search and rescue mission for the stranded migrants in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Later the Mare Nostrum was replaced with a more restricted EU search 
and rescue program called Joint Operation Triton. 
 Another notable policy change around the border policies was the introduction of the ‘Smart 
Borders’ package. The Commission proposed the package to modernize border management 
through border checks automation and collecting any crucial data omitted by the Visa 
Information System, the Schengen Information System and Eurodac. The previous system 
could not systematically support the monitoring of irregular migrants from third countries. It 




identification documents after getting admission to the Schengen Area. Smart Borders package 
aimed to address the challenge wholesomely by reducing illegal migration, overstays and detect 
other serious crimes. It also aimed to solve other challenges, such as addressing the slow pace 
of joint border control activities (European Commission, 2016b; European Parliament, 2016c).  
Before the massive migrant influx that led to the 2015 migration crisis, only Spain, Greece, 
and Bulgaria had completed external borders fencing in 2009, 2012, and 2014 respectively, to 
deter irregular migrants. This was in contradiction to the Schengen Borders Code that 
prohibited such deterrence without good reasons. Since then, more member states started the 
political agenda to construct walls to prevent asylum seekers from reaching their borders 
indiscriminately. Other barriers were built in Slovenia and Austria, and Hungary. The 
construction of border fences such as the Spain-Morocco fence was made possible by the lack 
of explicit EU guidelines (Benedicto and Brunet, 2018).  
2.5 External control: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) 
Since 2006, within the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the EU and the member states approached 
the African states and other non-EU member states for joint irregular migration control. 
However, this partnership achieved minimal success. Later, in 2011, the Commission adopted 
the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). GAMM was the central EU’s policy 
framework in managing asylum and irregular migration with third countries. It defined how 
the EU was to execute its policy dialogues and partnerships with non-EU countries on 
migration issues. The policy worked to better reorganize legal migration and discourage illegal 
migration to promote international protection and maximize the development effect of 
migration. Through the GAMM, the EU and the member states aimed to be at the forefront to 
support the global-level talks regarding refugees and other migrants (European Commission, 




fostering well-managed mobility; preventing and combating irregular migration and 
eradicating trafficking of human beings; maximizing the development impact of migration and 
mobility; promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum. 
The protection of human rights is a cross-cutting priority” (European Commission, 2015b: 5). 
Under GAMM, the EU acknowledged that a properly managed migration was one that ensured 
fair treatment of third-country citizens legally residing in any member state. It thus 
strengthened efforts to prevent irregular migration and promoted partnerships with non-EU 
countries. Besides, the EU strived to develop standard obligations for both its citizens and 
regular immigrants. It used the ‘more for more’ approach (more cooperation on implementing 
migration control measures for more development aid) to persuade third countries to accept 
collaboration in irregular migration control.  
One Council Directives related to GAMM included Directive 2009/52/EC. It outlined measures 
and sanctions to be taken against employers of illegal asylums in member states. The directive 
implementation report was first issued in May 2014, where the EU showed the engagement of 
the third countries in negotiating and implementing readmission agreements. In this regard, the 
GAMM was mostly concerned with the fight against human smuggling and trafficking and 
returning irregular migrants. The Joint Readmissions Committees managed this exercise to 
supplement this Action Plan, and the Commission issued a communication on a more seamless 
return policy and a recommendation on enhancing returns (European Parliament, 2018). The 
intensification of irregular migration control activities along the EU southern border and the 
Mediterranean region led to a significant increase in the funding allocation to the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO). During the 2015 migration crisis, the EU established two 
major trust funds. One was the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis. This 




including Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, which were the main host countries for Syrian 
refugees. By enabling these countries to host refugees, the EU would have prevented migrants 
move to Europe for asylum. The projects under this trust fund also aimed to empower the 
refugees and host communities (European Commission, 2018b). 
 Overall, these policy instruments indicate an outward move - a shift from the EU internal 
decision-making to engaging the non-EU actors. Nonetheless, restrictive migration control 
remained the primary approach to irregular migration management (see Strik, 2017).  
2.6 A normative turn: Addressing the Root Causes of irregular migration  
As mentioned elsewhere, the concept of addressing the root causes of irregular migration did 
not begin with the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit. In coordination with External Relations, 
the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) constituted a High-Level Working Group on Immigration 
and Asylum that came up with a proposal to address the root causes of irregular migration. 
Later during the 1999 Tampere Convention, the EU indicated the necessity to take up the action 
plan to manage migration and asylum issues. However, instead of implementing the action plan 
to tackle the root causes, the EU embarked on reinforcing border control, combating tracking 
and smuggling of migrants and implementing readmission agreements (Boswell, 2002). The 
EU did not make further efforts to integrate the idea of root causes into the EU migration policy 
(Lindstrøm, 2005) (see section 3.10 in the literature review for further discussion). 
A normative EU migration policy shift, which relates to tackling the root causes, indeed, 
occurred in 2015. On 11 and 12 November 2015, the EU partners (European Union, the EU 
member countries) and African partners (the African Union and the African countries) held a 
summit in Valletta, Malta. From the African side, the summit involved 26 countries. These 
countries were categorized into three regions: the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) window, the 




the EU  established the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The EUTF was initially designed to 
run for five years (2015-2020). Unlike the objectives of the EU Regional Trust Fund in 
response to the Syrian crisis, which focused on migration control, the main goal of the EU 
Trust fund for Africa was to address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and 
irregular migration in Africa. In particular, the EUTF aimed to promote resilience, create 
economic opportunities, enhance security and development, and address human rights abuses 
(article 2 of the EUTF constitutive agreement, European Commission, 2015d).  
 








Fig 2.0: Author’s summative analysis of the EU’s policy change based on the above literature 
review  
2.8 Summary of the EU migration policy change 
The figure above demonstrates that although the EU’s migration policy appeared to have 
undergone reform, until 2015, the EU maintained a status quo. The apparent changes before 
2015 revolved around different mechanisms of irregular migration control - internal control, 
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control along the external borders, and control through partnerships with third countries. 
However, one of the most significant shifts was establishing the EU Trust Fund for Africa, 
whose main aim was to address the root cause of African irregular migration. The change of 
the migration approach corresponds with the argument by Crawley andSkleparis. 
“It is clear therefore that there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘fixed’ about the legal and policy 
categories associated with international migration: rather these categories are in a 
constant state of change, renegotiation and redefinition. The categories ‘refugee’ and 
‘migrant’ do not simply exist but rather are made. Choosing to label – or equally not to 
label –someone as a ‘refugee’ is a powerful, and deeply political process, one by which 
policy agendas are established and which position people as objects of policy in a 
particular way” (Crawley andSkleparis, 2017:52). 
The above elaboration of different policy instruments requires a scholarly understanding of the 
EU’s motivation to change or failure to change its migration policy. The following chapter 
(literature review) explores the scholarship of the EU migration policy change, including what 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) would call the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) or what 
Crawley and Skleparis (2017) terms as policy renegotiation and redefinition within the EU-











































CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.0 Introduction  
The contemporary EU migration governance has been viewed differently by scholars and has 
been an area of contestation in academic debates explaining the EU migration policy change 
or failure to change. This literature review chapter discusses scholarly work on why the EU’s 
migration policies have either changed and the dimension of change or failed to change. The 
chapter further explores the EU’s motive to reach out to African partner countries to form 
migration control partnerships.  
Migration is a policy-oriented field, and diverse views of the EU policies emerge from the 
different approaches scholars use to evaluate policy moves. Even though analyzed from 
different schools of thought, in general, one academic challenge is that many migration studies 
“often suffer from either too much theory that has not been tested empirically or too many 
empirics with weak theoretical foundations” (Bonjour et al., 2018: 414). Researchers also use 
different levels of analysis and implicit assumptions in explaining the EU migration policy 
change. 
The chapter is structured in three major sections:  
• Section one explores the EU’s internal migration policy developments. Here, I show 
that policy venue shopping can best explain the initial EU migration policy change. I 
explain the second policy move (i.e., the development of Common European Asylum 
Systems (CEAS)) as a race to the bottom.  
• Section two (the core of the literature review) explores the EU-Africa partnership. In 
this part, I demonstrate resistance by African partner countries to cooperate with the 




resistance to cooperating should not be understood as a policy proposal. The resistance 
does not explain the EU policy shift. Therefore, I show the need for more evidence that 
demonstrates the 2015 policy shift.  
• The last section acknowledges that the concept of addressing the root causes of irregular 
migration was mentioned in the 1999 Tampere convention. Nevertheless, it remained 
dormant in the EU migration policy until the 2015 Valletta Summit. I further review 
the emerging literature that links colonialism and neo-colonialism to the root causes of 
African irregular migration. In this section, I identify some literature gaps that the study 
aims to fill.  
3.1 Policy venue shopping for fortress Europe 
In the early 1990s, the EU initiated the process to integrate migration from exclusively 
intergovernmental levels to the European community level - the so-called communitarization 
process. The process started as soft-laws that were later formalized in 1991 through the 
Maastricht Treaty. At this time, the migration and asylum issues were placed in the third pillar 
of policymaking. The move was commonly associated with intergovernmentalists’ ideologies 
(Moravcsik, 1993).  
The integration of migration and asylum issues in the EU formed a two-level game, i.e., the 
national-level governance and international-level governance. The EU member states were able 
to take advantage of one level of control when the other one was not favorable for some policy 
moves. This meant that the member states had greater flexibility than previously when 
migration and asylum were purely managed by domestic actors. The member states' attempt to 
search for a policy-making venue and circumvent domestic limitations to best boost their 
interests of migration control was what Guiraudon (2000) and Lavenex (2001) referred to as 




states to circumvent different actors involved in the EU migration governance, particularly the 
Court, the Parliament and the Commission, to achieve restrictive migration policies. To the 
proponents of the policy venue shopping, the Europeanization of migration policies enabled 
member states to avoid responsibilities that limited them from achieving their desired goals in 
migration control. One of the significant challenges was judicial constraints that emerged from 
upholding asylum rights, which tended to limit the jurisdiction of the governments' actions of 
migration control. Another perceived challenge was the opposition by other state organs such 
as ministries and parliamentarians, and pro-migrants lobby groups that advocated for more 
liberal measures in migration management (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Lavenex, 2001; 
Bonjour et al., 2018; Daviter, 2018).   
There have been methodological challenges in examining the preference formation between 
the EU institutions, particularly the Council. The Council was viewed as the most difficult 
institution and in which policy-formulation reflects member states’ domestic policymaking 
process (Bonjour et al., 2018). Hence, policy venue shopping analysis starts from liberal inter-
govermentalism where the scrutiny of preference formation at the state level. At this level, 
preferences were considered to be shaped by national dynamics such as interest groups and 
political party competitions (Boswell, 2007; Eising et al., 2017). The governments of the 
member states acted as proxies to resist the unfavorable policies in the Council. The situation 
became even more complex because policy-making at the EU level did not go through the same 
process as at the domestic level (Huysmans, 2006b). Member states pursued interests with 
diverse sensitivity, and therefore, political issues were differently politicized. The issues of 
security, for instance, could be more preferential than those of human rights. As a result, the 




In the migration and asylum, the member states’ representatives at the Council pushed for 
policies similar to those of their government to reduce adaptation costs in implementing policy 
change. In such a scenario, according to Börzel, there emerged a struggle in any move to 
introduce a policy change (Börzel, 2002). Migration scholars, therefore, conclude that national 
policymakers in the Council were influenced by the state’s preferences and tended to resist or 
initiate change relative to the existing domestic policies (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Zaun, 
2016; Bonjour et al., 2018).   
A similar process took place within the EU institutions, where the policy-making involved 
different actors with diverse interests, shifting preferences (Kaunert et al., 2013). The shifting 
of preference formation occurred through problem framing. A way of understanding policy 
formulation at the EU level, according to Daviter, was through the analysis of how the framing 
of policy problems contributes to policy change. In other words, the shift in policy depended 
on how migration and asylum issues were constructed, categorized and prioritized as policy 
problems (Daviter, 2018; 2015). This is why Kohler-Koch explains the need for researchers to 
examine how shifting problem framings reinforce each other to either promote or resist a policy 
change within a dynamic political environment that involves supranational actors (Kohler-
Koch et al., 2017).  
Throughout the 1990s, there was a minimal migration policy change. The EU’s institutional 
framework had the member states having the maximum influence in the decision-making 
process. Other supranational institutions were granted almost insignificant decision-making 
power. Researchers view the member states to be in a continuous process to keep off irregular 
migrants by developing restrictive asylum and migration policies (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; 
Bonjour et al., 2018). In this regard, scholars commonly viewed EU integration as cooperation 




In the 2000s, there was minimal EU policy change. The treaty of Amsterdam was important in 
the European communitarization process. It gave supranational institutions minimal 
competence in migration and asylum. Yet, these areas largely remained intergovernmental. In 
2009, through the Lisbon treaty, the distribution of power within the EU institutions changed. 
Although the Council still retained the highest decision-making power, the parliament gained 
influence in the legislative process. The court also got involved in a broader range of affairs, 
including partial judicial control over migration and asylum issues. The Commission remained 
with the role of proposing legislation and overseeing the implementation. Considering that the 
member states had partially surrendered power to supranational institutions, this redistribution 
of power within the EU institutions presented a thesis against policy venue shopping. Scholars 
argue that governments of the member states lacked the overwhelming dominance at the EU 
level, and hence policy venue shopping did not perfectly apply (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; 
Block and Bonjour, 2013). 
 The critique of policy venue shopping, nevertheless, did not apply to all the EU policy areas. 
In migration and asylum, the Council still dominated power leaving the other EU institutions 
with limited jurisdiction. Scholars have thus not given much attention to the role of 
supranational institutions, namely the Commission, due to its perceived insignificant role in 
the decision-making process. Instead, in the case of migration and asylum, the Council was 
described as more restrictive while the Parliament and Court were seen to be more liberal. The 
restrictive nature of the Council was derived from the member states where the interests of 
interior ministers were to restrict irregular migration (Bonjour et al., 2018).  
3.2 A race to the bottom  
In 1999, the European Council adopted the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 




Reception Condition Directive (2003), and the Qualification Directive (2004). During this 
time, the asylum was conceptualized as a collective problem that required the Europeanization 
of the asylum system (Guiraudon, 2000; Lavenex, 2001; Guild, 2006). The effort to 
Europeanize asylum processes led to establishing common but minimum asylum management 
standards across the member states (Boswell and Geddes, 2011:51ff). The common standards 
were more restrictive and more confined than the asylum protection standards already held by 
some member states. The principal reasoning for such low asylum standards was to at least 
achieve some level of convergence among all the member states. It was further argued that 
those countries whose standards were above the average-level would reduce their policies 
relative to other member states to the minimum level to avoid attracting irregular migrants. 
Toshkov and de Haan (2013) explain that although every member state would have preferred 
a high asylum standard, individually, they made an effort to joy-ride by shirking responsibility 
to other member states. Motivated by the need to reduce irregular migration within the EU, 
scholars argue that the member states would relegate their migration and asylum policies to the 
harmonized minimum level. This move was commonly referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’ 
(Guiraudon, 2000; Hatton, 2005; 2009; Des Places and Deffains, 2004; Czaika, 2009; 
Monheim-Helstroffer and Obidzinski, 2010).  
Initially, the CEAS was not legally binding among the member states since every state used its 
domestic structures of managing migration and asylum and therefore would not entirely solve 
the problem of neglecting responsibilities. The CEAS was commonly measured by the outcome 
of asylum processing, including the rejection and acceptance rates of asylum applications. Even 
then, based on these outcomes, the CEAS did not yield any significant harmonization of asylum 
management among the member states (Caminada et al., 2010; Neumayer, 2005; Toshkov and 
de Haan, 2013). Although there was no doubt that member states would have preferred more 




some EU member states such as the Netherlands were seen to be reluctant to relegate their 
migration and asylum policies (Bonjour and Vink, 2013, see also, Monheim-Helstroffer and 
Obidzinski, 2010), others such as Austria, as argued by Benedek (2016), were quick to 
introduce more restrictive policies that could be interpreted as a race to the bottom.  
In analyzing the racing to the bottom, the stance of the supranational institutions in the 
pursuance of liberal policies remains debatable. One argument was that the commission 
supported the member states in establishing restrictive policies. Others argued that the 
commission’s role always followed the wind direction; it changed from supporting more or 
less restrictive migration policies (Lahav and Luedtke, 2013). The most popular scholarly 
observation was that establishing the common (minimum) standards signified the increasing 
role of the supranational institutions, namely the Commission and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). The parliament was also considered to have a more liberal position 
since it gained full legislative powers (Bonjour and Vink, 2013; Block and Bonjour, 2013; 
Bonjour et al., 2018). Even after the Amsterdam Treaty and Lisbon Treaty, migration policy 
largely remained the same was mainly described using ‘a race to the bottom.’ In either way, 
the member states maintained a ‘fortress Europe’ through restrictive migration control 
measures. In other words, the EU held a status quo within a policy change. 
Dublin System was a refugee burden-sharing mechanism established as an intervention to 
distribute asylum seekers from the EU’s front line countries. It was established through the 
1990 Dublin Convention. Like other CEAS Council Directives, the Dublin system indicated 
the racing to the bottom (Thielemann, 2004; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006). Scholars have 
criticized the Dublin System and CEAS, citing inconsistencies between the EU normative 
actorness and lack of willingness among the EU institutions to execute it (Lavenex, 2018; 




In the study of ‘policy venue shopping’ and ‘the race to the bottom,’ however, there is a 
difference in the empirical studies of the policy change itself. Bonjour et al. (2018) question 
the measure of restrictiveness or liberalization of the EU migration policy. On the one hand, 
the analysis of policy venue shopping involved comparing domestic and international 
migration policy venues, each with different actors and policy-making processes. On the other 
hand, the race to the bottom compares the communalized migration policies (CEAS) with those 
held by member states. Scholars, therefore, differ significantly in examining the resultant 
policy outcome and the primary motivation towards a policy change. Either way, the idea 
narrows down to the EU effort to maintain a restrictive migration policy. Failure to initiate a 
policy change within the EU was influenced mainly by the Council’s power relative to other 
EU actors.  
3.3 Migration Control through co-operation with non-EU member states 
The conceptualization of the idea to reach out to the non-member states on irregular migration 
control was initialized through the 1999 Tampere Convention by the European Council. The 
convention highlighted the need to establish a partnership with third countries - both migrants’ 
home and transit countries (European Council, 1999). Yet, the policy move remained dormant 
as the EU explored the internal migration control mechanisms. The failure to manage irregular 
migration from within led the EU to increase its effort to establish cooperation with its 
neighboring countries. In the case of EU-Africa relations, the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 was 
the first instance to bring on board the agenda of African irregular migration to Europe. 
However, the agreement remained non-binding. The solidification of the linkage between 
irregular migration control policies and external cooperation started taking shape around 2005. 
The motivation to establish partnerships with non-EU members took a different dimension from 




which were more associated with restrictive migration policies, had their powers checked by 
the relatively increasing powers of supranational institutions, namely the parliament and the 
Court. The EU, therefore, ceased to be a favorable policy venue for restrictive migration 
policies. As an alternative, they established cooperation with the third countries. By so doing, 
as argued by Celata and Coletti (2016) in their work ‘Beyond fortress Europe’, the member states 
were able to circumvent the limitation poised by their opponents within the EU to pursue their 
interests beyond Europe. As such, the Court and the parliament had no jurisdiction in the affairs 
relating to establishing EU-Africa or even Turkey-EU migration control partnership.  
Secondly, the EU reached out to African countries due to its inability to manage irregular 
migration from within. Even if there were no internal limitations by the court and the 
parliament, managing irregular migration from within the EU was not viable. Moreover, 
considering the high number of asylum rejections, the cost of deporting migrants was equally 
rising and becoming unbearable. Controlling migration from outside the EU was thus a cheaper 
and more effective option. Besides, as noted by Strange and Oliveira, the EU’s move to reach out 
to African countries was an attempt to escape condemnation associated with the violation of 
human rights during the migrants' deportation process (Strange and Oliveira, 2019).  
Within the EU-Africa framework, the irregular migration management policies were framed as 
either security or development issues. As explained by Lavenex and Kunz, within the EU-non-
EU partnership, “the policy change involved in realizing this nexus requires an instance of 
‘frame-shifting,’ i.e., a major reorientation of the ways in which the migration problem is 
defined and dealt with in the EU policy” (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008:442). Such a view presented 
a major reorientation of how the irregular migration problem was defined and reconstructed 
within the partnership framework. The process was not only characterized by the involvement 




migration-development nexus’ (Sørensen et al., 2002a;  Sørensen et al., 2002b; Chou, 2006; 
Lavenex and Kunz, 2008) and ‘migration-security nexus’ (Geddes, 2000; Geddes, 2001; 
Lavenex, 2001; Huysmans, 2006). The dualism between the concepts of migration-
development and migration- security was brought together through the idea of human security, 
which was seen mainly as securitization of the development process.  
Under the migration-security discourse, the EU developed the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(EPN) and engaged the African countries. The ENP was founded on what Lavenex and Kurz 
call policy frame. They define policy frame as “the ideational core of a particular policy field, 
which contains the dominant interpretation of the underlying social problem and expresses 
guideposts for action” (Lavenex and Kurz, 2008: 442). Migration policy frames contained 
factual information about the empirical relationship between irregular migration and the 
normative value of policy action. In the EU’s external actions in migration control, the 
normative value was underpinned to ‘shared security.’ On the one side, this policy framing of 
shared security favored the EU member states since its main objective was irregular migration 
control (Vorrath and Zoppei, 2017). On the other side, the securitization of migration policies 
gave African partner countries more bargaining power. They variably used irregular migration 
as a bargaining chip against their European partners in driving out what was in their interest 
(Andersson, 2014:274). 
In the first phase of cooperation with African countries, the EU prioritized both border control 
and immigrants' readmission. This was still within the conceptions of shared security and 
within the European Neighborhood Policy framework. The power relation was in favor of the 
EU migration and security agenda. The EU was the principal convener of the agenda, financier 
of the intervention actions and the leading player in the implementation process. The third 




(Chou, 2012; 2008b; Guild and Bigo, 2010; Andersson, 2014). At the same time, African states 
were to forcefully return their nationals transiting in their territories illegally and accept back 
their nationals deported by the EU member states. Nonetheless, convincing African countries 
was difficult since they were also aware that the entire policy action was meant to serve the EU 
interest (Chou, 2009; 2011; Chou and Gibert, 2012).  
In 2004, the EU introduced Aeneas Program, scheduled to run from 2004-2008. The program 
aimed at strengthening the cooperation between the EU and the African countries towards 
migration control. It also offered assistance to the third countries in implementing migrants' 
returns and readmissions. Favored by the power imbalance, the EU and the member states 
changed the cooperation terms of the agreement and placed conditionalities on the African 
countries (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). For instance, during the 2002 Seville European Council 
meeting, there was a suggestion that development aid ought to be conditional on the third 
countries’ co-operation in migration control. Eventually, the presidency's conclusions passed 
the conditionality as policy. Based on the Seville Council meeting, an unjustified lack of 
cooperation in joint irregular migration management could lead to restrictions in developing 
relations with the third countries (Cassarino, 2006). The EU and the member states had since 
influenced the partnership with the third countries in migration control through their 
development aid tools (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006; Del Sarto, 2010; Kunz and Maisenbacher, 
2013; Tittel-Mosser, 2018; Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019). It achieved this by making 
cooperation on migration control a precondition for development aid.  
Secondly, the securitization of irregular migrants was growing. The increased influx of African 
migrants was seen as a cause of insecurity in Europe, giving the EU and the member states a 
more substantial reason to engage African partners. Balzac refers to such policy framing as a 




itself from securitized migrants. As put forward by Brachet, the aim of the European politicians 
and technocrats was to extend the EU’s southern migration frontier from the shores of the 
Mediterranean to beyond the Sahara desert. “Seeking to control population movements further 
and further “downstream”, the southern migration frontier of the EU has been progressively 
externalized, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Sahara: Europe attempts not only to 
control entries in its territory but also movements within the African continent” (Brachet, 2016: 
276).   
3.4 The EU-Africa partnership on irregular migration control 
Unlike the well-established analytical frameworks of the EU internal policy-making, i.e., 
‘policy venue shopping’ and ‘the race to the bottom,’ migration scholars view the EU-African 
relations through migration-development nexus and migration-security nexus. At the initial 
stages of the EU-Africa partnership, African countries were passive in participating in joint 
migration control, prompting the EU actors to undertake significant policy developments and 
implementation (see Chou, 2012). As the EU and the member states pushed for migration 
control strategies, African countries resisted through go-slows and non-cooperation in those 
programs. Instead, they showed more interest in the migration-development nexus as opposed 
to the EU’s migration-security nexus. De Haas views African partner countries in a race to 
position themselves as ‘victims of irregular immigration’ to be included as beneficiaries of the 
migration-related programs. They did so by establishing their relevance as migrants’ countries 
of origin or transit countries strategically positioned to manage migration effectively (De Haas, 
2008a; 2008b: 4ff; Collett and Ahad, 2017; Parkes, 2017). The major migrant transit countries 
included Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Morocco, and Libya and exploited their geopolitical 
strategy in engaging the EU actors. Other countries such as Nigeria, Gambia, Mali, Ghana, 




Haas, 2008b: 4ff; Bradford and Clark, 2014). The transit countries gained more relevance due 
to their additional significance as key migrants’ countries of origin (Adam and Trauner, 2019). 
To the EU actors, the relevance of transit countries as strategic partners was not only based on 
the partner’s capacity to control irregular migration but also on the number of migrants 
transiting through a route (Chou, 2012). However, migratory routes are very fluid. There would 
be no much effectiveness in migration control if one country cooperated in establishing 
deterrence measures and others failed. Deterring migration in one country created a transit 
opportunity in the other. For instance, “in October 2006, boats were leaving the Gambian beach 
of Tanjeh after Senegalese and Mauritanian beaches were patrolled” (Cross, 2009:179). The 
more significant and established a migratory route traversed a country, the more that country 
appeared relevant for the EU actors to invest in control-based projects. During the negotiation 
process, countries like Libya and Morocco had established their position as transit countries. 
They saw themselves as the most significant EU partners in deterring illegal migration through 
the central and western migratory routes. As a result, they created a geostrategic agenda to 
enhance their citizens' legal mobility to Europe (Parkes, 2017). After analyzing Moroccan 
engagement with the EU, Parkes suggests that Morocco used irregular migrants as a bargaining 
chip for its citizens' access to the European labor market (Parkes, 2017; see also, Andersson, 
2015).  
One of the significant and conspicuous EU’s weaknesses in forming partnerships was its 
inability to solely implement migration control activities. The actual control tasks such as 
border protection were left for the African partner countries (Chou, 2009; 2012). Many African 
states preferred to engage in bilateral negotiations (state-to-state diplomacy) instead of 
multilateral engagement with the EU institutions. Bilateral negotiations were rapid, efficient 




offered attractive funding packages in migration management compared to the EU as a polity 
(Castillejo, 2016, 2017; Mohamed and del Salto, 2015).  
3.5 African countries’ resistance to cooperating in irregular migration control  
Other than halting the irregular migration influx, the second primary EU’s objective in the 
partnership was to return and re-admit African migrants. However, the deportation faced strong 
resistance from migrants' home countries. In many African countries, cooperation to enhance 
forced return migration was seen as conspiracy and detrimental to their own development 
process (Mouthann, 2019). The EU’s use of development aid as a conditionality of ‘less for 
less’ (i.e., ‘less cooperation in migrants deportation, for less development support’) did not 
seem to leverage African partners’ contribution to irregular migration control.  
There was either little or complete lack of genuine interest among African partners to control 
migration. From the economics of labor perspective, irregular migration served vital political 
and economic interests and constituted a potential development resource to the African partner 
countries (De Haas, 2008a). Emigration in this context appeared to benefit African states by 
relieving pressure on domestic labor markets. Another perspective suggested by Leonhard den 
Hertog was that non-compliance in migration control among the African states was due to the 
EU’s renaming, reallocation, recycling, and eventually double-counting foreign aid to inflate 
what it claimed to offer to African states as development aid. They also perceived EU funding 
as a reallocation of funds from mainstream development to irregular migration control projects 
(den Hertog, 2016).  
Other scholars argue that the African countries' resistance to cooperate in the repatriation of 
migrants was motivated by remittances. The volume of remittances received from the diaspora 
by far surpassed the development aid that the EU actors offered to Africa (Lavenex and Kunz, 




development spending (De Haas, 2005; 2014; Amuedo-Dorantes, and De la Rica, 2007; 
Fokkema and De Haas, 2011; Parkes, 2017). Cooperating on repatriation, hence, posited a 
retrogressive impact on the development process among African partners. It increased pressure 
in the local labor markets and was against their development vision. In other cases, there was 
skepticism among African states’ on the viability of legal circular labor migration as a 
motivation to accept repatriation (Parkes, 2017). The politicization of return migration was an 
attempt to secure the labor market for irregular migrants in Europe and remittances sent home. 
In countries with high restrictions to travel to Europe, the back door was the only option for 
irregular migrants (De Haas, 2008a; De Haas, 2010a). In this context, irregular migration was 
motivated by restrictive policies, continued absorption of migrants in the European labor 
markets and the role of remittances in the migrants' home countries (De Haas, 2010b; 
Dickinson, 2017; Kunz, 2008; Singer, 2010; Knoll, 2017; Chou and Gibert, 2012).  
Scholars tend to combine the government's official stance on irregular migration control and 
the general public conceptualization of irregular migrants to analyze the struggles between the 
African and European partners (Munck, 2008; Chou, 2009, 2012; Vives, 2017b). In many 
African partner countries, forced repatriation was seen as a potential source of political 
instability. Using the Malian and Ethiopian cases, Parkes suggested that governments feared 
the spread of anti-regime ideas that migrants could be incubating when in the diaspora. They, 
therefore, feared co-operating to forcefully return them home (Parkes, 2017). The potential 
political instability related to repatriation, in this case, was founded on the public view that 
such the governments’ actions would be cutting down remittances. As noted by Castillejo, “it 
seems that Ethiopia is stalling on this issue [migration control and deportation of migrants] 
because it does not want to alienate its diaspora, because of the importance of remittances, 
because of the political sensitivity of and public hostility to forced returns, and because it does 




African states had consistently resisted accepting repatriated migrants. Instead, they promoted 
the development agenda in the EU-Africa negotiations. Correspondingly, the redirection of 
development aid from the mainstream development to migration control projects by the EU 
actors was met with unofficial non-compliance by the African partners. They deliberately 
stalled migration control and reintegration projects. For instance, in its diplomatic negotiations 
with the EU, Ethiopia was one of the countries that seemingly accepted the agreement on the 
return and readmission of its nationals within the Mobility Partnership Framework (Castillejo, 
2017). Yet, practically Ethiopia blocked the entire return and readmission process. All through, 
Ethiopian authorities cited both legal and technical challenges in executing the return process. 
It dragged the process of verifying its nationals and issuance of travel documents to make the 
EU’s project unsuccessful. Eventually, the repatriation pilot project of Ethiopian migrants 
proposed by the EU never materialized, and no migrants were returned. Instead, Ethiopia 
blamed the EU for losing potential returnees (Collett and Ahad, 2017). 
Tunisia had continuously resisted any agreement on migration control and the repatriation of 
irregular migrants with rejected asylum applications. This was a way of avoiding the potential 
public upheavals through protests against the signing of such agreements (Mohamed and Del 
Sarto, 2015). The case was similar to Morroco, where for a long time, it resisted any form of 
agreement with the EU on the deportation of irregular migrants. A major negotiation held in 
2010 failed after other 15 rounds of failed negotiations. As a result, the EU’s attempt to 
reestablish readmission negotiations with Morocco was termed as wholly stalled. Similarly, no 
sooner had the readmission negotiations with Nigeria started than they immediately stalled. 
While the EU was busy engaging Nigeria on irregular migrant repatriation, the Nigerian 
governments did not support deportation and knew that the negotiations were heading nowhere 
(Castillejo, 2017; Parkes, 2017). It was known to the African countries that the EU’s objective 




The Senegalese government was another partner that linked the migration agenda to its 
development process. The EU’s need for a migration management partner created Senegal's 
opportunity to drive forward its development agenda (Van Criekinge, 2010). The EU sent its 
first diplomatic mission on irregular migration control to Senegal in 2005. The delegation 
framed irregular migration as an emergency that required urgent intervention. As a remedy, it 
recommended a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). The EU had committed to provide 
Senegal with long-term funding for the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) program. It 
procured funding and launched it, intending to establish a long-term instrument. Almost 
immediately after the mission, the EU, led by France, Portugal, and Italy, deployed the 
FRONTEX mission in Senegalese waters under the framework of RRM (ibid). In less than half 
a year, the migration management operated on an emergency mode that necessitated high 
cooperation of Senegalese authorities and IOM in deterring irregular migration (Chou, 2012; 
Gaibazzi et al., 2016:222ff; Mouthaan, 2019). Within the partnership framework, the push and 
pull persisted as Senegal appeared to have diverse interests. As the EU saw Senegal as an 
uninterested partner, Senegal saw the EU as imposing its own agendas without adequately 
considering its development interests. However, when the program started, it was faulted for 
having lacked government ownership. For Senegal, the RRM project was good for nothing. It 
was an EU’s unilateral program that did not contain incentives significant enough for Senegal 
to engage.  
Although the EU-Senegal partnership agreement mainly outlined comprehensive management 
of irregular migration, most projects only focused on deterrence measures, including 
strengthening naval forces and training and equipping them to prevent departures. The 
partnership also aimed to enhance the repatriation of Senegalese irregular migrants. Other 
activities involved research assistance on legislation to improve migration management, assist 




minors. Nonetheless, due to the EU’s overemphasis on control measures and less concern for 
Senegal’s development needs as outlined by the ‘comprehensive migration management’ 
agreement, Senegal withdrew its engagement and the projects stalled (Panizzon, 2008; Van 
Criekinge, 2010). Senegal did not appreciate the little development aid offered by the EU. As 
viewed by Vives, the funding allocation was tiny for any constructive management of 
Senegalese migration-related challenges (Vives, 2017a, 2017b). 
Despite apparent fruitful cooperation between IOM and the Senegalese government in the 
initial stages, there was still little progress in irregular migration control. The EU's two major 
concerns in the migration control agenda were: first, to establish a common stance in executing 
control measures and border management. Second, to strike an agreement in readmission of 
migrants. In either case, the country’s development agenda was not the top priority. In Senegal, 
while the migration control projects started immediately, i.e., barely a few months after the 
2005 EU’s delegation, other development-related projects took kicked off years later (Van 
Criekinge, 2010). In 2007, Senegal and the EU made an unprecedented step by releasing a joint 
declaration -‘comprehensive migration management’. The declaration indicated a shift away 
from the previous dialogues (featured by irregular migration control) and established a 
development-migration nexus (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008; Sinatti, 2015). In 2008, the European 
Commission initiated an incentive-based mobility partnership based on a ‘more for more’ 
approach. The EU was keen not to apply the negative framing of the statement (less for less), 
which would have appeared a threat to the partners, thus provoking total non-cooperation 
(Chou, 2012; Funk et al., 2017; Parkes, 2017). The then ‘new agreement’ contained two 
elements: the political aspect and the programmatic aspect. The political components outlined 
the mutual interest in the cooperation. They included a list of migration-related issues such as 
enhanced circular migration mechanisms and reduced bureaucracies to enter and exit the EU 




contained a practical approach to control irregular migration (Chou and Gibert, 2012; Van 
Criekinge, 2008). This shift in the dialogue process led to additional funding for the mainstream 
development process. 
Further EU-Senegal engagements were characterized by difficult negotiations on how to bring 
out the best from the project (Reslow, 2012; Funk et al., 2017). Regarding the deportation of 
migrants, Senegal was conscious of not engaging non-Senegalese nationals, especially from 
other West African countries and avoided deporting them. It saw the EU's objective to control 
migration within the African territories as detrimental to people's free movement within the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Senegal feared that other ECOWAS member states 
would retaliate by expelling its citizens back (Collyer, 2009; Chou, 2012: Fioramonti and 
Nshimbi, 2016; Panizzon, 2008). Since the initial dialogue and the resultant unilateral policy 
action by the EU, Senegal successfully tamed the EU’s influence. It was also able to divert the 
dialogue to its interest and policy agendas (Kunz et al., 2011:194).  
The EU’s inefficiency in engaging African partner countries was evident due to its internal 
challenges in coordinating strategic actions on irregular migration management. There was an 
apparent pull and push between the commission, the Council and the Member states. Some 
scholars such as Van Criekinge (2010) viewed the EU member states-African states bilateral 
negotiation as an alternative due to inefficiency at the EU level, where member states differed 
on migration management strategies. For instance, the EU delegation to Senegal highlighted 
that one of the limiting factors was the lack of approval of the action plan from the Council. 
The fact that the commission could not operate autonomously resulted in little or no progress 
at all. This prompted the individual member states to be more pro-active in engaging in bilateral 




Other scholars such as Van Criekinge (2008) and Chou (2009, 2009b, 2012) suggest that the 
bilateral negotiations with individual EU member states were EU’s tactical change of plan to a 
more strategic one. The shift in strategy was an EU’s attempt to find a better grip of the African 
partners in achieving the same goal – irregular migration control. Although bilateral 
negotiations with individual member states appeared to be a newer strategy,  the EU member 
states had engaged the African states through development agreements long before. Some 
agreements linked migration and development; however, they led to nothing tangible in 
irregular migration control.  
As the EU struggled to shift development aid from the general poverty reduction domains to 
migration control, Senegal saw it as a weak strategy. Senegal’s unwillingness to cooperate in 
the joint-migration control missions saw them come to a halt. The EU could not influence the 
Senegalese government even in implementing the seemingly comprehensive migration 
management projects. The continuously evolving EU’s actions were negatively perceived and 
interpreted as scheming. Despite the struggles among the EU actors about the right approach 
to engage Senegal, the Senegalese government did not interpret it as a sincere difficulty of 
integrating migration into the development agenda (Van Criekinge, 2010). Instead, Senegal 
saw it as the EU's strategic attempt to address its interest without considering the country’s 
development problems (Sinatti, 2015). 
Whether the bilateral negotiations were part of the EU’s deliberate strategy to reach Senegal or 
not, in either way, the Senegalese government found an opportunity in them. It was easier to 
shift the agenda to consider its development interests initially despised by the EU delegation 
in the RRM, resulting in the government disowning them (Van Criekinge, 2010). Even during 
the engagement with individual member states, the Senegalese government mainly indicated 
resistance in the dialogues as well as non-compliance in the implementation of whatever did 




came to a halt soon after starting. Senegal was against readmission of non-Senegalese until 
additional funds were guaranteed (Panizzon, 2008; Van Criekinge, 2010; 2008; Roig and 
Huddleston, 2007). However, it did not despise the negotiation in totality. 
At a particular point, all the negotiations stalled due to a lack of a working agreement. The EU, 
through the Commission, approached Senegal again to resume the talks while focusing on 
readmissions. This time, the EU shifted its stance closer to that of Senegal. Yet, Senegal was 
still not satisfied with what the EU offered in return for its cooperation in migration control 
and temporarily halted the further negotiations. Further negotiations could only continue upon 
the EU’s commitment to more development aid and additional labor market access to 
Senegalese migrants (Chou, 2009; Chou and Gibert, 2012). The Senegalese government had 
expressed a similar stance to individual EU member states, especially France and Spain, that 
were the most pro-active in bilateral negotiations. Besides, Senegal avoided the negotiations 
with the commission and some individual EU member states that appeared to prioritize 
migration control agenda. Instead, the country engaged those EU member countries that 
aligned with the comprehensive approach to irregular migration management. France and 
Spain took the lead role in redesigning new schemes that would consider Senegal’s demands 
omitted in the earlier RRM policy tool (Kabbanji, 2013). 
Mali was another EU’s strategic partner in African irregular migration control. Although there 
was a high number of Malian irregular migrants in Europe, Mali was a relevant partner due to 
many non-Malian irregular migrants transiting through the country (Dünnwald, 2011; Sylla 
and Schultz, 2020). Like Senegal's case, France and Spain were the lead EU member states in 
engaging Mali to find a strategy to readmit Malian irregular migrants in Europe. From the 
Malian perspective, there was less concern to meet the EU’s irregular migration control 




its nationals' mobility challenged its authority and existence. After experiencing difficulties in 
returning irregular migrants to Mali, the EU established tailored cooperation at least to ease the 
situation. The Netherland, for instance, worked to strengthen the partnership that would enable 
the deportation of Malian migrants in exchange for development projects in Mali. In Europe, 
the agreement was praised as it would hasten the process by providing the necessary documents 
for returning migrants to their home countries (Colleta and Ahad, 2017). It was seen as a 
solution to the long-term migration management challenge with Mali.  
Contrastingly, as the Mali-Netherland agreement was applauded in Europe and seen as a 
successful case of a renewed partnership, the situation was the opposite in Mali. The deal was 
met with ridicule, protests and seen as a betrayal of Mali nationals by its government. The logic 
to refer to the agreement as a betrayal emerged from comparing the amount of foreign aid 
offered with the remittances to Mali (Colleta and Ahad, 2017). A few days after the deal, the 
Malian government denied signing an agreement with the EU on the deportation of Malian 
migrants. The Dutch Minister Koenders, who had signed the agreement on behalf of the EU 
High Representative Vice President (Federica Mogherini), was compelled by the Malian 
authorities to issue a formal confirmation that the agreement did not include readmission of 
Malians (The government of Netherlands, 2016). Later the confirmation revealed that what 
was agreed was a rather general ‘Joint Roadmap’ on priority actions that outlined ‘joint work 
to tackle root causes of migration’.  
Through the foreign minister Abdoulaye Diop, the Malian authorities issued an official 
government's position regarding the agreement. Diop denied signing any document that would 
enable the repatriation of Malian migrants living in Europe illegally. The Malian government 
quickly made a U-turn to avoid losing the grip of the people. Abdoulaye Diop claimed that 
Mali “does not intend to put a price on its dignity even if the EU is a development partner” 




a month after the deal. The Malian government explained that the migrants lacked formal 
Malian passports and had traveled using the European Travel permits. The Malian government 
officials further indicated that it would only accept people if they were well verified to be its 
nationals and not just be assumed to be Malians. The French government remained silent and 
temporarily stopped the deportation of Mali nationals (Colleta and Ahad, 2017). 
3.6 Subverting the EU’s influence  
Most African partner countries were pro-active and pragmatic on which migration issues to 
own or to reject. They focused more on advancing their development issues instead of just 
accepting the EU’s unilateral control approach. For instance, in Senegal's case, every attempt 
to cooperate was accompanied by explicit gains in the context of migration and development 
and domestic capacity building (Lavenex and Kurz, 2008). The leveraging occurred in two 
ways: the countries showed their relevance as major migrant countries of origin and/or revealed 
their strategic geographical position as transit countries. Their threats to non-cooperation in 
migration control or repatriation meant creating a suitable environment for favorable agendas 
and prioritization of their development process (Parkes, 2017). Moreover, they always kept the 
EU actors nearby. The cost of their non-cooperation in migration control was high enough to 
make the EU concede to their demands for development-related migration management 
projects. Most transit countries expressed their relevance in holding or letting African irregular 
migrants transiting to Europe. The more the EU showed a high need to control migration, the 
more the African partner countries found an opportunity to articulate its interest (Reslow and 
Vink, 2015; Van Criekinge, 2008). 
 Moreover, African countries like Senegal, Ethiopia and Mali expressed a strong perception of 
the EU’s incapability to manage irregular migration alone. Through negotiations, Tunisia, 




control in their territorial waters without their cooperation. In the negotiation process, they saw 
the EU as unwilling to deploy adequate resources in the EU-Africa cooperation on irregular 
migration control (Mouthaan, 2019). Overall, to leverage negotiating for increased EU 
investment, African countries did not completely pull out of the partnership agreements. As 
explained by Parkes, a country like “Ghana was still unlikely to pull lucrative migrant workers 
out of Europe in order to secure ODA which it anyway knows is subject to a sunset clause” 
(Parkes, 2017; 88: see also, Munck, 2008). 
3.7 A recap and highlights of the literature gap 
The literature review above highlights the key explanations of why the EU developed policies 
towards specific dimensions. To start with, the member states' decision to take the migration 
and asylum issue to the EU level has been argued as policy venue shopping - to make policies 
favorable to their interests. At the EU level, they initiated the race to the bottom by developing 
CEAS. But this did not solve the challenge of irregular migration. The inability to control 
migration from within its territory led to reaching out to African partner countries. 
The EU-Africa partnership was characterized by tension where African partner countries 
struggled to overcome economic and political domination by the EU actors. However, this 
body of literature experiences one challenge. It only showed how African partner countries, 
within the partnership framework, resisted the EU’s influence in irregular migration control. 
As such, I argue that although African countries had always engaged in decolonization to 
address the structures that reproduced global inequalities (Ferrero, 2017), their resistance to the 
EU’s migration control approach did not present any policy recommendation. Guided by the 
research question, ‘how did African partner countries influence the EU’s policy change from 
control measures to addressing the root causes of irregular migration?’, I advance the 




migration. This is with the acknowledgment that migration scholars need to avoid being 
entangled in what De Genova (2014) terms as one-dimension thinking in migration studies. 
Often, researchers look at people's migration without considering the whole context and 
historicity of irregular migration. (see De Genova, 2018; Tazzioli and Walters, 2016). 
The scholarship of the root causes of African irregular migration offers a different explanation 
of the EU-Africa engagement. Paoletti argued that a way of understanding the dynamics of 
policy change within the EU-Africa partnership is to examine the African partner countries' 
rhetorical demands. He further contends that the tension between European and African 
partners in the irregular migration control framework was a struggle for African countries to 
challenge the EU’s political and social dominance. In other words, they aimed at addressing 
the apparent neo-colonialism in migration control. “A rise in North-South tension over the issue 
of irregular migration would lead poorer states to demand more equitable economic and 
political arrangements within the new international order” (Paoletti, 2010:4). 
There has been a growing politics of decolonization by Africa countries in international affairs 
(Veracini, 2010). Although there was a general understanding between European and African 
partners that there exist root causes (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007), there was a significant 
difference in how each partner pursued its interests. From Africa, irregular migration to Europe 
was a consequence of colonialism that left the global south prone to economic and political 
meddling (Matunhu, 2011; Rodney, 2018:1ff; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2010; 2016). 
Gatrell presents a critic that the construction of the refugee crisis in Europe failed to consider 
the long history of the refugees’ home countries.  
“To write the history of refugees is to engage critically with a category of concern 
which has to be problematized and historicized, to understand how refugees have 




something more akin to a total history that integrates ‘history from below’ with 
other domains, including the history of geopolitics, law, and humanitarian 
assistance. Such an approach acknowledges but does not privilege the exercise of 
external power over refugees” (Gatrell, 2016:184).  
 The proponents of the two accounts of historical establishments (colonialism and neo-
colonialism) criticize the early halting of investigations of the root causes at the presentist level, 
failing to consider how the historical past could shapes structures with the potential to 
reproduce disadvantages to the current refugee home countries. The shallow investigations 
subdue the concerns of the primary (vulnerable) agents. As well, ending the quest too soon 
produces narrowly focused results and incomprehensible policy proposals. Paoletti further 
argues that  
“Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this research is that the North’s exclusionary 
border management practices provide the South with a greater degree of bargaining 
power across a number of different issues. Said practices of border control and more 
specifically, of externalization affect the way in which North-South bargaining is 
conducted, and provide Southern countries with tools for leverage in other matters 
that are on the negotiating table” (Paoletti, 2010:6).   
To this end, I argue that the resistance of the African partner countries to cooperate in joint 
irregular migration control missions was a manifestation of decolonization. African countries 
were conscious of colonialism and neo-colonialism. They therefore generated the right 
bargaining tools to leverage the EU’s migration policy shift to a dimension that reflects a 




3.8 Towards decolonization: The root cause of African irregular migration as an 
emerging issue of contention 
Before the 2015 Valletta summit, there was an acknowledgment within the EU migration 
policies that the most sustainable approach was to address the root causes of irregular 
migration. The 1999 Tampere convention was the first instance when the EU mentioned the 
relevance of addressing the root causes but since this time, ‘tackling root causes’ remained an 
abstract idea (Boswell, 2002, Lindstrøm, 2005). “As yet, the EU cannot, as of now, be said to 
have devised a root causes strategy in which policies that impact on asylum and migration 
pressures are coordinated to ensure the maximum impact is achieved” (Lindstrøm, 2005: 600, 
see also Carling and Talleraas, 2016). Initially, the EU referenced the root causes of irregular 
migration from East and Central Europe and not outside Europe. By this time, migration from 
outside Europe was not a major issue. 
 Boswell further argues that the EU stood a more politically neutral actor compared to some of 
the former colonial EU member states in engaging African countries in irregular migration 
management (Boswell, 2002). Although addressing the root causes appeared to offer a long-
term solution, the EU saw a quick option in implementing deterrence and migrant readmission 
policies.  Moreover, instead of addressing the root causes, the EU diverted its effort to the 
Common European and Asylum System (CEAS) (Lindstrøm, 2005).  In short, other than the 
one-time mentioning of the need to address the root causes of irregular migration (in the 1999 
Tampere Convention), the concept remained absent within the EU migration policy.  
In recent times, migration scholars have revived a critical debate on addressing the root causes 
of African migration. Different from the argument that African’s resistance to cooperate in the 
EU’s migration control was motivated by the value of migrants’ remittances or development 
aid, another newer argument is related to the historical past (Hurts, 2010; Hansen and Jonsson, 




African partner countries' dissatisfaction with irregular migration control. However, the 
partner’s resistance to a particular policy can lead to a policy change but does not by itself offer 
a direction of change. Informed by the hypothesis of the study, the African partner countries 
did not only resist the EU’s influence but also articulated the issue of the root cause of irregular 
migration. The analysis here links the root causes of African irregular migration to the colonial 
era and the aftermath structures that explain Africa’s dependence on Europe. Scholars suggest 
that the African countries demanded Europe to take responsibility by addressing the effects of 
neocolonialism. By doing so, the EU would have tackled the root causes of irregular migration. 
As such, African partner countries' attempt to utilize their relevance in irregular migration 
control was a form of repositioning to use migrants as a ‘bargaining chip’ (Andrijasevic, 2010; 
Klepp, 2010; Paoletti, 2010:6). 
The idea to revisit the historical past to properly understand the current African irregular 
migration can be explained using Marks's thoughts in her work ‘root causes and human rights’. 
To Marks, it requires the examination of real social engagement to understand history. “It 
would take us beyond ‘pragmatism’ and ‘practicality’ to praxis, beyond distributional 
consequences to the organization of productive processes, and beyond ‘fantastic’ possibilities 
to real, historically created ones” (Marks, 2011: 77). Marks further explains that the role of 
discourse ought to take precedence in understanding the root causes. The mainstream thoughts 
tend to assume that history is given and somehow fixed – that the African state of 
underdevelopment is a phenomenon that naturally existed rather than created. And so is the 
understanding of the cause of irregular migration in Europe. The strong resistance to cooperate 
in joint migration control missions by African partners can be referred to as Africa’s resistance 
to accepting false necessity. “False necessity brings into focus the ‘fatalistic myths’ which the 
historicity of existing arrangements and prevent us from grasping their contingency, 




that vast migration literature is based on the idea that the history of underdevelopment is fixed 
and natural. Marks takes a more radical argument that human rights abuse and its root causes 
should not just be highlighted but rather explained. She reorients the concept of root causes as 
planned misery, which manifests through human insecurity, such as extreme poverty caused 
by economic exploitation, conflict and violence, environmental degradation and global 
inequality created through human actions. “So, where abuses are currently explained with 
reference to bad policies, laws and interpretations, the concept of planned misery would urge 
inquiry into the material context of such harmful thinking” (Marks, 2011:76). 
The understanding of root causes and planned misery concurs with Unger’s concept of ‘false 
contingency’. False contingency is a critic of the doctrine of fatalism that argues that events 
and phenomena are fixed, accidental and inevitable, and human beings are powerless to change 
them (Unger, 2004: XViiff). Challenging determinism and achieving a real alternative to 
history starts with rejecting the inevitability of certain outcomes. It is then followed by 
proposing a thought-provoking but accepted argumentation; if the problems are systemic, then 
the solutions must equally be systemic.  
To Hansen and Jonsson, the EU-Africa partnership on migration control reveals a striking 
parallel between the present and past. The policies of the 1920s onwards (through the colonial 
era) have greatly shaped the African human geography and the current migration projections. 
These scholars criticize the mainstream literature for failing to engage the historical past in 
studying the current EU-Africa partnership on migration control. Scholars need to engage a 
more crucial colonial history in the examination of the existing power asymmetries. The failure 
to do so obfuscates the comprehensive understanding of the forces behind African partners' 
actions and reactions (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011). In the study of African irregular migration 




perception of the current African irregular migration as a re-enactment of the transatlantic slave 
trade. He backdates the genesis of examining the African partners’ reaction in the current 
partnership framework to the pre-colonial period (Ogu, 2017). 
“At that time, issues of migration were seen in the context of a co-European 
colonial effort in Africa. This historical dimension is precisely what is lacking in 
existing scholarly analyses of European migration, which are usually governed by 
a ‘presentist’ perspective. In previous scholarship, there is of course much 
awareness of colonialism’s impact on the current, path-dependent migration 
regimes of individual EU member states, but the equally significant colonial impact 
of European integration’s approach to the nexus of Africa and migration has gone 
largely unnoticed. […] Only by bringing this by now largely forgotten past into the 
picture can we begin to understand the motivating forces behind current EU-Africa 
relations, in general, and the EU’s migration policy towards Africa, in particular” 
(Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 263). 
Further, as put forward by Ogu while explaining the root causes of African irregular migration, 
imperialism and colonialism were instrumental in Africa's instability and economic 
underdevelopment (Ogu, 2017). Other scholars present the idea that links the colonial era and 
the current structures of economic dependence known as neo-colonialism (Andersson, 2016; 
Stewart, 2013: 20). Further, these scholars suggest that the high demand for development aid 
by African partners as a prerequisite to cooperate irregular in migration control aimed to 
compel the EU member states to take responsibility for the misery established by the former 
European governments through colonialism. Using Senegal's case, Chou and Gibert explain 
that the African partners’ refusal to cooperate due to lack of an explicit value-added aspect of 




 Besides, the EU’s external actions to control irregular migration in Africa were viewed as an 
attempt to enlarge its sovereign state control area. This created a strong consciousness among 
African countries that the colonial and neo-colonial periods were connected to wealth 
accumulation, resource extraction, and control by European states (Fregonise, 2020; Chou, 
2009b). Marks' observation of historicity and coloniality is better explained by interrogating 
who gains - and who loses in maintaining certain perspectives of historical truths of the root 
causes (Marks, 2011). 
There is a general agreement among scholars that migration is a path-dependent process 
(Castles and Miller, 2009:6-10; de Haas, 2010a; Massey et al., 1999:169). Andersson has 
presented the same view, that “outsourced controls – by constituting a boom for collaborating 
states and a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Europe; by undermining regional mobility even when 
‘successful’; and by creating security path dependency in bilateral cooperation – have become 
self-perpetuating” (Andersson, 2016: 1065). “The history of European-African relations and 
the wide power asymmetry between the EU and African political actors means that the extra-
territoriality of EU migration governance in Africa has been subject to criticism that it is a form 
of neo-colonialism” (Strange and Oliveira, 2019:236, see also, Woolley, 2014). The 
interconnection between postcolonialism and the need to address the root causes of irregular 
migration is increasingly taking shape. As Gallien (2018) explained, postcolonialism refers to 
a philosophy of activism that does not only contests against the colonial-founded system of 
inequality but also seeks new anti-colonial ways to challenge the power structure (see, Young, 
2003; Gikandi, 2010: 113).  
The above highlighted Africa’s resistance to joint irregular migration control is a postcolonial 
approach to seek an alternative power structure within the EU-Africa partnership. As well, 




African countries. Stephen Hurts, in his work, ‘Understanding the EU development policy: 
history, global context, and self-interest’ notes that “more recent enlargements of the EU do 
present an opportunity to shift development policy away from just being a continuation of 
Europe’s colonial past” (Hurts, 2010:162). Although overcoming the colonial-based EU-Africa 
relationship ought to have occurred long ago, there still lacks evidence of how and to what 
extent African states have struggled to tackle colonial dominance. To understand the influence 
in the shift of the EU migration policy, one ought to view the European partners' actions and 
reactions contingent on the problem framings by the African partners (Squire, 2015; Bilgiç, 
2016).  
Chapter six of this study brings new understandings of how African partner countries 
articulated the colonial and neo-colonial as the root causes of African irregular migration to 
their European counterparts. The argument is that African partner countries developed and 


































CHAPTER FOUR:  RHETORICAL ACTION THEORY 
4.0 Introduction 
In the world of constructivism, international relations scholars have developed the idea of 
rhetorical entrapment to demonstrate that actors can strategically use community norms to 
shape actors' behavior. Ideational forces, shared learning and knowledge, normative and 
institutional structures are crucial in influencing states’ behavior. In a social-setting, when 
actors internalize and accept norms, they are obliged to comply. Those norms generate 
legitimate pressure for the actors to conform. In the case of non-conformity, actors become 
subject to actions of naming and shaming, which influences them to change their behavior 
accordingly (Glanville, 2018). Actors, therefore, might find themselves trapped by their own 
rhetoric of normative commitment. Such pressure to comply with community norms has also 
been referred to as ‘community trap’ or ‘rhetorical entrapment’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001), 
‘rhetorical trap’ (Kaplan, 2017), or ‘ethical trap’ (Lebow and Frost, 2019). Awareness of 
regional identity and a sense of belonging to a regional community by actors are critical in 
rhetorical entrapment. Additionally, interests and identities are reconstructed through 
interaction between actors. 
Rhetorical action is a strategy of political legitimization and delegitimization of states’ actions. 
It is one of the explanations that advance the understanding of states’ reception and reaction to 
rhetoric. The scholarship of rhetorical influence on foreign policy outcomes is increasing (see 
Krebs and Jackson, 2007; Morin and Gold, 2010; Park, 2017). This chapter deploys a rhetorical 
action to explain the research variables in answering how African partner countries, within the 
Africa-EU partnership framework, contributed to influencing the EU’s policy change towards 




In international relations, actors construct ideas that structure expectations about appropriate 
norms and behavior in a community setting (McDonald, 2018). The framing then shapes the 
actors’ identities and hence defines the characterization of social engagement between them. 
An actor use norms to validate a particular stance to influence others. But the use of the norms 
can also be strategic (see Schimmelfennig, 2003). Rhetorical action is particularly concerned 
with justification, argumentation, and persuasion using community norms. It is best suited to 
explain strategic moves through rhetoric where speech functions to create effects upon an 
intended audience. It further expounds on how actors rely on archetypal rhetorical strategies 
founded on different values and underlying interests and assumptions in a socialized setting 
(Heracleous, 2006). Strategizing combines a discourse and social practice and “comprises those 
actions, interactions and negotiations of multiple actors and the situated practices that they 
draw upon in accomplishing that activity” (Balogun et al., 2014: 176). In explaining the process 
of persuasion through rhetoric, Schimmelfennig presents a combination of norms, interests to 
establish a rhetorical action. Precisely, he refers to rhetorical action as “the strategic use and 
exchange of arguments based on ideas shared in the environment of the proponents and 
intended to persuade the audience and the opponents to accept the proponents’ claims and act 
accordingly” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 199). He even simplifies rhetorical action as the strategic 
use of norm-based argument (Schemmelfenig, 2001; 2003).  
 Initially, due to the strategic combination of norms and interests, Schimmelfennig argued 
rhetorical action as a form of bridge-building between rationalists and constructivists 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). However, in his later work, he concedes that the framework belongs 
to the social constructivism school of thought (Schimmelfennig, 2006; see also Kratochvíl et 
al., 2006; Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010). Viewing rhetorical action through a social 
constructivism lens, one can explain it as a strategy that connects cultures, values and norms to 




embeddedness of language in the behavior of individual actors. Language is not only viewed 
as just a reflection of reality but also as a tool through which reality is constructed and 
reconstructed (Balogun et al., 2014; Diez, 1997; Kratochvíl et al., 2006). It thus requires a 
proper understanding of the language to understand the dynamics of social actions and 
international engagements among actors. Language, in this context, expresses both 
instrumental rationalities and shared norms. 
In rhetorical action, the establishment of norms and compliance with those norms is crucial. 
Actors strategically use rhetoric to pressure other actors to accept a particular normative 
position where a conceivable social behavior is already determined. It also involves qualitative 
process-tracing case studies analyzed from a specific methodological starting point (Dixon, 
2017). As suggested by most scholars, shaming and pressure to comply with international 
obligations emerge from the export of norms from the western power to ‘the others’. A 
rhetorical action is thereby a form of resisting influence and exerting pressure on the ‘normative 
powers’ (Hansen, 2006).  
4.1 Rhetorical action and adaptation 
 
Rhetorical action has various possible outcomes, each of which depends on the reaction of the 
targeted actor. The actor may eventually adapt to the admired normative position and become 
rhetorically entrapped or may resist. Hence, connected to rhetorical action is the concept of 
rhetorical adaptation. Rhetorical adaptation enables understanding of complex and uncertain 
ways to respond to pressure to comply with shared norms. In rhetorical adaptation, an actor is 
deemed inconsistent or not compliant with social norms when it does not shift its behavior to 
adapt to the normative expectations. In agreement with schimmelfennig definition, Dixon 
views rhetorical adaptation as “drawing on a norm’s content in order to craft arguments that 




in violation of a norm” (Dixon, 2017:85). Hence, rhetorical adaptation refers to an actor’s 
behavioral adjustment relative to the rhetoric that asserts pressure to change. There are four 
types of actor’s reactions/adaptations to rhetorical actions: 
• The first form of reaction is norm disregard. It involves an actor ignoring a norm that 
is connected to a given action. Despite being fully aware of the norm, an actor deliberately 
chooses not to reference it. Actors use such a strategy when the norm involved is weak, or 
there exists a little consensus on the logic of appropriateness of the opponent’s idea. Actors 
can avoid being entrapped through norm disregard when the norm is not socially 
institutionalized or in the absence of severe consequences in case of norm violation (Ben-
Josef and Dixon, 2019). When a norm is widely accepted and acknowledged as appropriate, 
it becomes difficult for an actor to ignore it. In this case, the strategy of norm disregard is less 
likely to succeed. In a situation of a highly established norm, actors try to avoid the cost of 
violation of the norm.  
• The second form of reaction to rhetorical action is norm avoidance. The strategy starts 
by acknowledging the validity of the norm. However, an actor might argue that its motivations 
and actions are not within the scope of the norm under concern and therefore denies any norm 
violation. Such denial is termed by Cohen (2001, chapter 2) as ‘interpretative denial,’ which 
involves admitting raw facts without placing those facts in specific contexts (see also Bruna, 
2010; Martin, 2015). 
• The third type of response to a rhetorical action is norm re-interpretation. This arises 
when one or more understanding of a norm is contested. Such a strategic response aims to 
narrow the scope within which a norm is interpreted in an attempt to delink any action that 
might appear to contradict the norm. Moreover, this defensive strategy is associated with the 




Unlike norm avoidance, where an actor refrains from the norm, re-interpretation tends to 
redefine the norm (Dixon, 2017).  
• The fourth form of reaction in rhetorical action is rhetorical entrapment. Park defines 
rhetorical entrapment as “a process of social influence that alters the range of possible future 
actions by eliminating or exaggerating the political cost of, specific – including previously 
used – policy options” (Park, 2017:490). Entrapment involves a situation where an actor 
cannot reject the validity of the understanding of a norm, and any attempt to do so generates 
inconsistency and double standards. As a form of rhetorical adaptation, rhetorical entrapment 
takes place in two ways. Rhetorical entrapment starts with norm signaling - that Dixon refers 
to as ‘talking the talk.’ Actors start to rhetorically acknowledge the need for change towards 
the proposed normative stance. Later there is ‘walking the walk’ – adjusting the behavior to 
resonate with the implied normative direction (Dixon, 2017; Hansen, 2006). At this point, the 
rhetorical action is viewed to have achieved a successful entrapment, which leads to the other 
actor’s behavioral change.  
Nevertheless, when all the actors engaged in rhetorical action do not share a normative 
commitment and depend on just the procedural norm of consensus-seeking, they are likely to 
find themselves in a never-ending argument, unable to persuade each other or be persuaded. 
When the interlocutor does not accept norm-avoidance, norm disregard and norm re-
interpretation, actors end up with an unworking relationship. Morin and Gold clarify that in 
rhetorical action, “actors unwilling to suffer reputational costs by having behaviors 
inconsistent with their previous discourse and unwilling to build trust with their interlocutors 
by ignoring their previous behaviors, can close their debate by adopting an unworking 
agreement” (Morin and Gold, 2010: 566). In this case, actors do not mind behaving contrary 
to their own claim of commitment to normative practice. In other cases, they are prepared to 




accession was due to Turkey’s attempt to entrap the EU. However, Turkey's efforts to 
rhetorically trap the EU were not successful. Turkey did not have sufficient materials to entrap 
the Turkey-skeptic EU member states: its European identity was controversial (Bürgin, 2010; 
Saatcioglu, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2011). But when the actors claim to be committed to 
the shared norms, rhetorical entrapment occurs.  
4.2 Rhetorical entrapment 
Rhetorical entrapment is established in a strategic process when players are cognizant of the 
inequality in the interaction and are unwilling to change their stances. Indeed, Kaplan (2017) 
refers to rhetorical entrapment as a plan for the weak - the apparent weaker actors become 
tactical. They use their opponents’ public commitment to the shared norm in the process of 
framing arguments. Understanding how interlocutors strategically act within a social setting to 
‘locking in’ the opponent is vital in rhetorical entrapment. First, locking in involves a situation 
where the rhetor is expected to argue within socially accepted principles to the extent that any 
attempt to argue against those principles results in self-contradiction, inconsistency and double 
standards - hence losing credibility. When the opponent chooses to remain consistent with the 
norms to maintain integrity, they do not need to counter-argue. This is what Schimmelfennig 
refers to as silencing of the interlocutor. The actors under social pressure (usually) do not 
change their interests; they only refrain from illegitimate behavior. Successful rhetorical action 
silences the opponent without bringing about a substantive consensus on the norm-conforming 
policy (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Interlocutors achieve this by hiding their own interests behind 
rhetoric that asserts values to which all parties present feels obliged to give lip service 
(Schimmelfennig, 2003:197). 
A rhetorical argument, however, goes beyond the intersubjectively shared norms and the 




effective rhetorical action, interlocutors must frame their interests into a language that 
articulates the shared norms and values so that when rhetoric is communicated, it leaves an 
impact on the speaker. Morin and Gold refer to this as a civilized force of hypocrisy. “Speakers 
cannot return to a pure bargaining process and openly reveal inconsistencies between their 
discourse and their instrumental objectives without risking the loss of credibility” (ibid; 
2010:577). In other words, persuasive rhetoric is non-reversible. It shifts strategists from the 
world of rational choice to the world of construction through arguing. Nonetheless, even the 
actors engaged in rhetoric may as well find themselves entrapped between the logic of 
consequences and the logic of appropriateness. 
Rhetorical entrapment is founded on the interaction between normative identity and behavior. 
Hence, it has the highest impact when the normative standards are well established and the 
social engagement between actors is substantial (Aoun, 2012). As Krebs and Jackson (2007) 
argue, rhetorical entrapment is a political strategy that involves arms twisting through twisting 
tongue. During times of crisis, the actor’s identity comprises the potential to encounter the 
subjectivity of self, thereby allowing the rhetor to force the target to adapt to rhetoric formally 
established (Mattern, 2005:139ff; Schimmelfennig, 2003:42-47). The subjectivity of self has 
also been referred to as a meta-power that defines how actors' socialization leads to 
constructing and reconstructing interests and identities at the international level.  
As explained by Abdallah et al. (2011), a particular rhetorical practice can be reinforced by a 
strongly related non-rhetorical approach. The two eventually form what Bednarek et al. (2017) 
refer to as rhetorical transcendence. Besides, specific rhetorical practices can be joined together 
to establish a discourse. And a rhetorical approach might constitute overarching discourses. 
These multiple rhetorical practices interconnect to generate a form of ‘synergy rhetoric,’ 
making it possible to bridge opposite sides (Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 2007; Jarzabkowski et 




that demonstrate consistency between rhetoric and rhetorical situation, such as the historical 
context of socialization. By analyzing this meta-powered rhetoric, we are able to understand 
the pursuance, by an actor, to multiple objectives within that particular community setting 
(Bednarek et al., 2017).  
4.3 Formation of rhetoric in rhetorical action 
Rhetoric, according to Hauser “is concerned with the use of [verbal] symbols to induce social 
action” (Hauser, 2002:3). It is aimed at a specific audience for a particular action. In 
constructivism, rhetoric is based on social facts expressed through speech. Both rhetoric and 
narratives are features of discourse but are not always the same, but speeches and texts that 
makeup rhetoric are the same building blocks of a narrative.  In rhetorical discourse, narratives 
become rhetoric when their application is strategic. “While they are rarely complete narratives 
or completely narrative, rhetorical discourses often use narrative elements as means to their 
argumentative, convincing or otherwise motivational ends” (Iversen, 2014). When a narrative 
contains rhetoric, i.e., entails argumentation with the potential to persuade, it becomes a 
rhetorical narrative (Herman et al., 2012: 4-7). In this situation, Phelan terms narratives as 
rhetoric where a narrative is not just a story but also an action (Phelan, 1996:8-10).   
Miskimmon et al. differentiate a mare narrative and a rhetorical narrative by referring to the 
latter as strategic narratives. They define strategic narratives as “instruments for political actors 
to extend their influence, manage expectations and change the discoursive environments in 
which they operate” (Miskimmon et al., 2014:2). In other words, when a narrative is framed, it 
becomes rhetoric or a strategic narrative.  As explained by Kirkwood (1992:30), “rhetors may 
tell stories of deeds which reflect characters’ states of mind, or they may enable or challenge 
people to perform such acts themselves, with striking consequences for their own life stories. 




revealing through commentary or the careful stipulation of narrative details”. The interplay 
between rhetoric and narratives in rhetorical action has two implications: first, actors can 
generate rhetoric by combining framed narratives, and narratives can contain a whole argument 
that connects to the targeted audience. 
Narratives hence are part of rhetorical discourses, and through framings, they create rhetoric. 
Due to the strategic use of norms in rhetorical action, rhetors combine different narratives (e.g., identity 
narratives, issue narratives and system narratives) to generate a persuasive effect. An actor can 
generate and project a narrative relative to the existing discourse and relevant to their situation. 
In this regard, narratives form a structuring effect on rhetorical action, i.e., based on a particular 
discourse, the strategic framing of narratives generates a rhetorical action. Actors reflexively 
operate within discourses to strategically construct narratives with a very instrumental aim to 
influence others to behave in a particular manner (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2019:12ff; 
Baynham & De Fina, 2016). In short, framings and narratives are components of rhetorical 
action. 
Irrespective of the discourse, rhetoric is shaped by one or more different features, including 
history, metaphors, symbols, analogies and images). Likewise, framing refers to “selecting and 
highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to 
promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Miskimmon et al., 2014:7, see 
also Entman, 2009). Framing involves a joining-up account of the matter and throwing out or 
taking both possible perspectives of a narrative (Ankeny, 2011). As such, rhetoric links to the 
concept of constructivism, which Diez (1997) refers to as ‘sense-making’. Diving deeper into 
their functions, narratives express the root causes of a phenomenon and define the effects or 





In practice, framing is commonly undertaken by political leaders and other elites in shaping 
political thoughts. For instance, political speech relating to the foreign policy domain can well 
connect to the country’s development or public policy change. A good example is Hansen’s 
methodological framework of identity constructions in foreign policy (Hansen, 2013:10ff). A 
root cause of a domestic issue can be framed to emanate from within or outside the country. 
The nature of framings enables examining how narratives become rhetoric (De Fina and 
Georgakopoulou, 2019:10-14). In this case, discourse is understood as a platform for exercising 
framing, generative, performative functions (Carta and Morin, 2016:1). It is not only conceived 
as heavily reproducing structural dynamics of the social interaction but also acts as both the 
only access point to the real world and constitutive of the reality as discovered. Rhetorical 
action directs to articulating strategic narratives to generate conceptualization of the norms as 
structures, i.e., what we believe as the reality of convergence and divergence of various 
fragments that constitute the whole. In political realms, articulation is the approach of 
establishing the structure and the exercise of power. This articulation of rhetorical artifacts 
defines the relations of domination and subordination within knowledge perspectives and the 
social relations of power (Graham, 2018). The analysis of rhetorical action involves the whole 
process of combining, through framings and narratives of norms and interests.  
Rhetoric is based on events and issues as well as social settings. It is also implicit to the time 
factor, i.e., historical - beginning, middle or present. Social relations consist of actors with long-
term engagement and, therefore, long-standing narratives about the perception of themselves 
and other actors, about historical-present issues and about the structure of the international 
system. These relations may be based on short-lived events such as crisis, summits and 
conventions that later become rhetorical artifacts. ÓTuathail (2002) terms the connection of 
these events as “storyline”. These storylines are sense-making tools that generate a reasonably 




form them. “While actors actively form ‘positions,’ they are also entangled within the webs of 
meaning that dominant storylines permit and are ‘positioned’ by the images, metaphors, 
analogies and reasoning that these narratives allow” (ÓTuathail (2002:607). 
As building pillars of rhetoric, narratives are necessary for informing the emergence, 
sustainability, transformation of structure-agency relations over time. Roberts (2006) explains 
three forms of narratives to understand actors’ engagement at the international level - identity 
narrative, system narrative and issue narrative. The identity narratives are concerned with 
actors' identities (both states and polities) in international engagement with others, e.g., 
normative power. As highlighted in the later section of this chapter, identity narratives lack any 
definite analytical framework. They usually present a constant process of negotiation and 
contestation. Secondly, there are system narratives - they involve the nature and the structure 
of a system of interaction such as the Africa-EU partnership. Finally, are issue narratives - they 
apply strategic sense-making out of issues to shape the nature of social engagement and policy 
direction.  
These three forms of narratives are reinforcing components of rhetorical action. Their 
convergence occurs primarily when the construction of a narrative works to express a gap in 
evidence that requires a solution through the search for further evidence. “Other-times, the 
stitching together of the narrative offers the scientist a process to figure out where and why the 
different explanatory devices and situational elements fit together, knowing that they need to 
be aligned to make any kind of joined-up account of the matter” (Morgan & Wise, 2017:4, see 
also De Fina, 2016). For simplicity, within discourses, narratives are framed to form rhetorical 
action, i.e., a joined-up account of the matter.  
Social actors are situated in social practice; a situation is thus a vital force that constitutes a 




rhetorical situation where a speech must respond to the essentials of the occasion. The 
rhetorical situation is different from the rhetor or the persuasive intent. It guides the 
understanding of rhetoric. “The rhetorical situation ‘dictates the significant physical and verbal 
responses,’ it ‘constrains the words which are uttered,’ and it ‘prescribes its fitting response” 
(Benoit, 2000:179, see also Herrick and Education, 2004). The rhetorical situation connects the 
speech to the inner truth and external values. Such a scenario is also viewed as situated social 
relations and combines political rhetoric and the context. This is notwithstanding that rhetoric 
does not only interact with the context but also changes it (Martin, 2015). “Situations control 
rhetoric, as questions control answers, and situations are only rhetorical if they require 
modification through rhetorical means” (Turnbull, 2017:117). When interlocutors in a 
rhetorical action are situated, then they must be understood in the right context. 
4.4 Rhetorical action and Persuasion 
In rhetorical action, language matters: through language, strategic narratives become 
instruments of rhetorical action and persuasion. Rhetorical action underpins a form of 
persuasion that combines both the logic of consequences and appropriateness (Petrova, 2016; 
Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2004; Risse and Kleine, 2010). From the definition, persuasion 
captures the critical elements of the two paradigms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 914) define 
persuasion as “the mission of norm entrepreneurs: they [actors] seek to change the utility 
functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitments. Persuasion is the 
process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the 
subjective becomes intersubjective”. In this regard, the objective is to reach a reasoned 
consensus with the right process of reasoning (Risse and Kleine, 2010). 
Within a social engagement, actors use language to express diverse perceptions and ideologies 




reality, language enables social relations through discourse claims to form reality. A 
conceptualization is made possible by language as a network of words or signs juxtaposed to 
derive the desired meaning whose significance is constructed relative to other objects. These 
collocations establish links with either positive or negative meaning when put together through 
contestation. The understanding of rhetorical action aids the investigation of how actors 
socially construct or express beliefs, ideas, and meanings to influence other actors (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 2001). Besides, rhetorical action takes intersubjectiveness normative positions as 
prominent features in the real world. For instance, the concept of refugees is a framed social 
fact and is reliant on the agreement among actors about asylum. Thus, refugees will always 
exist as long as the agreement remains (Betts and Loescher, 2011:89; Haddad, 2008:7). As long 
as a state is a party to asylum law, the international community will always compel it to comply 
with asylum norms and standards. 
Rhetorical action is dependent on how an actor frames a social phenomenon in relation to the 
other. For instance, irregular migration control inhibits asylum rights in the sense that states 
are perceived to deter human movement to safe-havens. It is, however, essential to note that 
these systems of juxtapositions are unfixed and are in a continuous struggle of developing 
certain understandings in which they should be fulfilled since there will always be diverse 
potential meanings (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:28-36). The constructs of rhetoric must 
resonate with the norms of social engagements. Rhetors do so with an intention to create a 
purposeful meaning to the political past, present or future (Miskimmon et al., 2014: 12-14). 
Rhetorical action acknowledges this struggle by placing social norms and actors' interests 
together to strategically conceptualize a specific phenomenon and create influence within those 
social norms to maximize interests.  
There has been an attempt to distinguish “being a narrative” from “possessing narrativity” in 




different narrativity, which cannot be put into one perspective since each narrative is 
determined by the speaker and the audience's interpretation. Some events of international 
socialization may not be narratives by themselves but can later be recognized to possess a 
narrative. For instance, there was no formal end to the Cold War. Yet, the interpretation of 
events using the narrative’s semantic features by activists and political leaders led to the 
development of an understanding of a transition from the historical period to an unknown new 
beginning (Miskimmon et al., 2014:12-14). The main purpose of differentiating ‘being a 
narrative’ and ‘possessing narrativity’ in rhetorical action is to comprehend the nature of 
rhetoric and how actors intend to maximize gains, legitimize an action or defend themselves 
against other actors' persuasion. 
Depending on the context, rhetorical action involves actors with persuasive strategies for a 
particular problem and use speech to convince other actors. By analyzing communication 
dynamics between socialized settings, researchers deduce that actors use language to get others 
into their envisioned position by strategically maneuvering and rhetorically sharing their 
perspectives. This is why Rumelt (2011) explained that rhetorical action is an application of 
strength against weakness in social interaction.  
Rhetorical action and entrapment involve the language performing a critical role. The process 
places rhetorical practices at the core of persuasion. For example, for this study, the rhetorical 
analysis starts from a normative power perspective - inconsistency within the EU foreign 
actions. It then perceives the African partner countries as restraints of the EU actors. A 
relational concept of power can both be productive and repressive. Through power and 
relations, activities are made to happen or not: or the extent of their achievement (Carta and 
Morin, 2016:5-7). By placing an entity with respect to other entities, a subject position is 
constructed through the rhetorical process. As a form of persuasion, rhetorical action uses 




divergence of various fragments that constitute the whole. In other words, the identity 
narratives, system narratives and issue narratives are joined together to generate mega rhetoric 
as a persuasion tool. This articulation generates the influence to reconstruct social engagement 
among actors. 
As a strategy of influence, rhetorical action acknowledges the power imbalance between actors, 
thereby emerges to offer an alternative way out among the seemingly disadvantaged actors 
(Bednarek et al., 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2014:10). Mega rhetoric is an instrument of power 
that constitutes and redefines the norms and practices in shaping the actor’s identity and the 
meaning of a social system. Unlike other persuasion strategies, rhetorical action offers tactical 
means of power relations that create an opportunity to free the lesser influential actors from 
domination by major actors dominating power using dominant discourses.  
The seemingly weaker actors, such as small states, aware of their less material power, act 
strategically to establish persuasiveness. When the actors adopt a strategic rather than truth-
seeking orientation, the outcome will reflect a compromise instead of reasoned consensus 
(Morin and Gold, 2010; Petrova, 2016). Thus, rhetorical action involves no change in the 
actor’s preferences. Instead, it relates more closely to the rationalists’ conceptualization of 
‘information updating’ but with the recognition that socialization leads to the change in the 
actor’s behavior. Morin and Gold argue that while an actor's primary objective in rhetorical 
action is gain-maximizing, in communicative action, the key intention is truth-seeking. In 
rhetorical action, the consensus is a procedural norm, and the outcome is a result of an 
unworking agreement (Morin and Gold, 2010). While communicative action occurs between 
actors in symmetrical social relations, rhetorical action arises in asymmetrical social settings 
where the subaltern has to be strategic in applying normative aspects to generate influence. In 




action points beyond Habermas’ normatively grounded technics for advancing validity claims” 
(Huspek, 2007:362).  
The main requirement in examining persuasion in rhetorical action is identifying the critical 
norms shared through the actors’ socialization and the framing of those norms within the 
rhetorical situation. Subsequently, the concern is whether the objectives of the rhetorical action 
are achieved at the behavioral level without necessarily exploring the actor’s internal motives 
for the change. As a persuasion strategy, a key feature of rhetorical analysis is the interrogation 
of “whether the behavioral change was a consequence of changing preferences, or just a tactical 
reaction to a successful rhetorical attack” (Kratochvil et al., 2006: 499).  
Actors develop persuasion by hiding the pursuit of self-interest and embark on norm-based 
arguments. The rhetorical action continues until the opponents cease arguing against the issue 
and act accordingly, irrespective of whether they have been convinced or not. In the case of 
non-compliance by the opponent, the interlocutor questions the validity claims on the 
truthfulness while pointing out inconsistencies between the opponent’s real stance and what 
ought to be the stance (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). Argumentation, thus, does not necessarily 
lead to trust. The breach of trust in the previous engagements could as well have an impact on 
the capability of the argumentation to build trust. Based on such knowledge, interlocutors 
construct a set of beliefs about the real impetuses and goals of the other. These beliefs may 
alter the interpretation of the speech act of others. Such peaceful but strategic rhetoric becomes 
a trap. It becomes easy for the accused to confirm the interlocutor’s rhetoric and quite 
challenging to disapprove it. This is best brought out by Morin and Gold, who define rhetorical 
entrapment as “the inability to pursue a preferred option that violates a prior rhetorical 
statement while refusing to comply with normative standards because it would undermine 




The construction of high power rhetoric mainly depends on domestic-international contexts, 
the goal of political leadership and communication environments. In the context of the research 
hypothesis, the rhetorical action by the African partner countries was presumed to have 
successfully entrapped the EU actors. The EU’s establishment of the Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa to address the root causes of irregular migration signified both rhetorical entrapment 
and practical adaptation (‘talk the talk’ to ‘walk the walk’). The study does not distinguish ‘talk 
the talk’ and ‘walk the walk.’ The two steps of rhetorical entrapment form a continuous process 
of policy change.  
4.5 rhetorical action and the EU policy-shaping  
The EU has been the principal focus of rhetorical entrapment due to its growing identity as a 
normative actor whose actions are based on globally acknowledged norms and values. Due to 
the well-established concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), the analysis of persuasion 
mechanisms, mostly between the EU and the EU potential member, has its starting point as the 
causal effects of norms. The non-EU countries accept the EU's normative identity but try to 
manipulate EU norms to their advantage. In these accounts, the EU has sometimes been 
presented not as an actor but rather as a normative context in which rational actors are situated 
using the EU norms to increase their own benefits (Aoun, 2012; Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010). 
Using the logic of obligatory action where norms guide actors' behavior, the EU's engagement 
and ‘the others’ leads to states sharing a belief system of the EU (Petrova, 2016). Within this 
socialization, the arguments by the non-EU’s partners - pushing their self-interests – are 
capable of compelling the EU to conform with its own normative positions. The idiosyncratic 
interlocutors are hence able to frame norm-based arguments and disband any socially 




The debates on migration policies revolve around international norms of asylum protection and 
the EU’s role as a global leader in upholding those norms. Rhetorical action leads to a policy 
change by first invoking knowledge claims about the causes of an issue and even its effects. 
Knowledge claims shape policy proposals and are determined by the actor’s understanding of 
policy problems and appropriate interventions. Salmivaara and Kibler (2020) term such policy 
proposal as policy rhetoric; this is a policy recommendation that emerges from different 
argumentations, beliefs and underpinning rhetoric. Boswell et al. (2011) refer them to as policy 
narratives - “the factual beliefs espoused by policy-makers and others engaged in political 
debates about the causes and dynamics of the problems they are seeking to address, and about 
how policy could impact these dynamics” (Boswell et al., 2011:4, see also, Boswell, 2011). As 
causes of policy change, policy rhetoric possesses the most influence when they are cognitively 
plausible, morally compelling, and contains perceived interest. Besides, they are more 
persuasive when they keep coherence, consistency and plausibility.  
When policy rhetoric is quite prevalent, they attract expert knowledge and place the policy 
debates at the center of analysis, stressing the role of ideas in policy formulation. Policy 
changes that emerge from political decision-making are partly influenced by public debates 
and tend to depart from the state’s policy preferences (guided by rational interest) or objective 
‘facts.’ This happens when political actors gather the ideas from the outside to construct a 
policy problem and the most appropriate solution (Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011). 
Although conventional political thoughts shape rhetorical practices, they are also motivated by 
rival actors in an attempt to win a situation to their advantage (Bleich 2002; Schmidt and 
Radaelli, 2004; Boswell, 2011). For a knowledge claim to be competitive vis-a-vis others, it 
needs to be understandable to the knowledge experts and persuasive to the general public.  
There exist no specific approach to the formation of policy claim. Commonly, different groups 




knowledge typically acquires a particular pattern, especially in situations that are hard to define 
or have no straightforward solution, such as crises. During crises, decision-makers make their 
decision heavily influenced by an existing rhetoric, i.e., the next course of action, who is 
responsible for what, how, and why. Policymakers usually work to align their policy proposals 
with the existing wave of opinion, which they use to explore and define an issue in addressing 
a policy dilemma (Boswell, 2011; Krebs and Jackson, 2007).  
EU policy changes have been influenced through rhetorical practices, which express policy 
knowledge (Aoun, 2012; Boswell, 2011; Carta and Morin, 2016:68; Vertovec, 2011). 
Rhetorical action has been used to influence a shift in the EU migration policy change 
(Guglielmo and Waters, 2005). Policy rhetoric in the migration domain is based on ideologies 
that range from left-right. In the case of irregular migration control, left-wing politics have 
ideologies that promote less restrictive migration policies. On the contrary, right-wing politics 
tend to promote policies founded on their school of thought, i.e., securitization of migrants and 
criminalization of asylum seekers (see Boswell et al., 2011). It is deducible that policy rhetoric 
is constructed and diffused based on the actors’ interests. Balch and Geddes found that 
rhetorical practices related to human trafficking impacted the UK’s migration control system 
during the 2006 migration crisis (Balch and Geddes, 2011). Carling and Hernández-Carretero 
examined the effect of rhetorical practices in Spain about the West Africa irregular migration 
to the Canary Islands. They examined the effect of high-risk irregular migration narratives and 
those related to security threats to immigrants and how those narratives influenced migrant-
protection policy changes. They found that political narratives at the national level triggered 
governments' efforts to reach out to the African countries to establish migration management 
partnerships (Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011; Hernández-Carretero and Carling, 
2012). In every level of policy articulation, knowledge claims by various actors are involved, 




perceived as knowledge claims and becomes a shared role between politicians and technocrats. 
The move to bring together the political rhetoric and the knowledge claims within the EU is a 
changing role of expert knowledge.  
4.6 The EU-Africa Partnership as a platform of social engagement 
Researchers tend to use both the official (diplomatic) and unofficial discourses to study the 
EU-Africa partnership on migration control. The official discourse involves studying what is 
diplomatically expressed by partners within the formal EU-Africa events such as summits and 
official agreements. It is also the dominant discourse in the literature of the EU-African 
partnership on irregular migration control (see, Panizzon, 2008; Chou and Gibert, 2012; 
Reslow, 2012). The study of diplomatic negotiations examines the official bargaining process 
and highlights the official reasons for compliance or non-compliance in joint irregular 
migration control. But again, the official discourse experiences limitations. It does not tell it 
all; it fails to seek adequate depth in studying the construction of irregular migration and the 
root causes - thereby missing out on some critical elements. For instance, it is difficult to 
explain the gap between the rhetorical acceptance to comply and the practical non-compliance 
among some African partner countries in irregular migration control (see Collett and Ahad, 
2017). 
To de Haas, the use of unofficial discourse in explaining the engagement between the EU and 
the African partners is more appropriate and comprehensive in understanding each partner's 
motives.  
‘What remains largely unspoken behind official discourses proclaiming they will 
‘combat illegal immigration’ is that European and African states, or at least some 
powerful interest groups within them, have little genuine interest in stopping migration, 
because the economies of receiving and sending countries have become increasingly 




Like de Haas (2008a, 2008b), who prefers the study of the EU-Africa partnership using 
unofficial rhetoric, Sillince et al. (2012) find the analysis of rhetorical action more appropriate 
in a free social environment. Whether in an official or unofficial setting, the key motive in 
rhetorical action is the connection of rhetoric to the targeted audiences, both the physical 
audience or implied audience. As Collett and Ahad (2017) applied in the study of the EU 
engagement with non-member states in irregular migration, the unofficial discourse consists of 
political rhetoric expressed in public.  
The official and non-official discourses are, however, not exclusive of each other. Speakers 
can engage various audiences to articulate specific meanings of actions, goals and values. They 
achieve this by aligning their interests with the norms and values held by the audience. 
Rhetorical action necessitates going beyond examining what partners say during diplomatic 
negotiations to include the broader societal understanding and reactions to the issue being 
contested. The use of both official and unofficial rhetorical settings brings together a wide 
range of societal actors.   
4.7 Operationalization of variables: rhetorical action and entrapment  
This study used rhetorical action to explain the role of the African partners, within the EU-
Africa partnership on migration control, in influencing the change of the EU migration policy. 
Rhetoric is strategic when it is based on community norms and is perceived to be consequential 
by the dominating actors. Sillince et al. (2012) view dominating actors as those holding 
responsibility and power to determine the survival and direction of engagement. For the 
repressed actors, the strategy involves persuading the target audiences (i.e., the dominating 




4.7.1 Independent variable: Rhetorical action 
The study expresses three [strategic] narratives that constitute rhetorical artifacts of rhetorical 
action based on the Africa-EU partnership.  
• The rhetoric of root causes of African irregular migration (issue narrative)  
• The rhetoric of long-standing EU’s dominance over the African partner countries in 
irregular migration management, i.e., the colonial and neocolonial-based structures that 
define European and African partners (system narrative), and 
• The critical rhetoric of the EU’s identity of normative power, i.e., the inconsistency in 
normative ‘actorness’ in irregular migration management (identity narrative) 
The rhetoric of root causes 
Rhetorical action includes a wide range of rhetorical practices (see Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 
2007; Sillince, 2005). Within the EU-Africa mobility framework, the unworking relationship, 
featured by resistance to cooperate by African partner countries, went hand in hand with 
rhetorical practices by African leaders of what constituted the root causes of irregular migration 
management. Moreover, as suggested by studies, there seemed to exist multiple rhetorics of 
coloniality in Africa. Ogu (2017) suggests that European colonial action in Africa was the root 
cause of vulnerability, forced displacement and irregular migration. On the other hand, other 
scholars (Andersson, 2015; Kohnert, 2007) view the consequent structures of dependence and 
the imbalanced Africa-EU relations (commonly known as neo-colonialism) as the root causes 
of irregular migration. Although these discourses of root causes of African irregular migration 
appear to vary in a way, the related rhetoric shows some resonance. They suggest intervention 
policies different from migration control and border protection approaches.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, rhetorics can be combined to form ‘synergy rhetoric’. The 




engagement (colonial-based relationship) connect to generate more persuasion. Such 
broadening of the concept shows how the processes of rhetorical actions are entangled and how 
they unfold in resonance with non-rhetorical practices (e.g., non-compliance with the migration 
control agreement by African countries) to construct high-powered rhetoric to entrap the EU 
actors. 
Rhetorical entrapment requires actors to declared their overall support to the legitimacy of the 
shared norms at the early stages of engagement. Then, they point out the inconsistency within 
the EU's normative power (Sillince et al., 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2003:192ff). This happens 
based on either honest belief of rightfulness or strategic reasoning. Later during the 
engagement, actors (non-EU members) prefer to depart from the normative standard since it 
contradicts their interests. They expose the inconsistency between the community’s normative 
declarations and the (EU’s) behavior through rhetorical action. Regarding the Africa-EU 
partnership on migration control, this is contextualized in the following steps: 
• Acknowledging the EU as a normative power.   
• Highlighting inconsistencies within the normative power Europe (NPE) regarding 
irregular migration control measures, i.e., a critic of fortress Europe. 
• Framing the EU as part and parcel of the root causes of African irregular migration 
The EU’s identity as a normative power: Normative Power Europe (NPE) is a theorization 
of the EU’s identity - what the EU is and what it does. Manners describes normative power 
Europe as the ability to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’; the EU is presumed to shape the 
norms, standards, and prescriptions of world politics. As such, the EU’s actions to influence 
‘the others’ are generally accepted as universally applicable (Manners, 2002; 2008). The 
concept NPE is characterized by five central core norms that include: peace, liberty, human 




social solidarity, anti-discrimination sustainable development and good governance (Manners, 
2002). These normative principles originate from the EU’s political and legal foundations (its 
treaty-based nature), its hybrid polity (a post-Westphalian polity - with intergovernmental and 
supranational institutions), and its historical context (Manners, 2002; Birchfield, 2013). 
The concept of NPE has gained popularity, especially when analyzing the EU’s normative 
actorness against its normative foundation. These two perspectives can also be seen as the EU 
‘being’ a normative power and the EU ‘acting’ as a normative power (Manners, 2002; Diez 
2005). At times, these two perspectives align, while in other cases, they contradict. For 
instance, in his study of the militarization of the EU vis-a-vis the normative power Europe, 
Manners argues that even military intervention has been legitimized by the concept of human 
security, which builds EU normative actorness. “The focus of all human security concerns has 
been people-centered freedom from fear and want, which is precisely what the normative 
principle of sustainable peace has sought to address” (Manners, 2006: 192).  
The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) acknowledges non-state actors as key security 
threats. It also recognizes human security as an approach to address these threats. The ESS 
(later, Common Foreign and Security Policy) highlighted the discursive practices, norms, and 
values that the EU stands for (Pace, 2007). In the document ‘A Human Security Doctrine for 
Europe,’ the EU made some effort to consolidate the concept of human security as its security 
approach and a guide to its external actions. At the same time, the EU launched the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), whose content resonated with the seven principles of the 
Barcelona Report. The two documents (ESS and the Barcelona report) became the foundation 
of the current European Neighborhood Policy (Albrecht et al., 2004; Glasius & Kaldor, 2006: 
6-8; Kaldor et al., 2007; Martin & Kaldor, 2009:1-5). The ENP sets out the platform for, among 




The legitimacy of a normative power becomes more attractive and convincing when the 
principles being promoted are more justifiable, coherent and legitimate. The coherence of the 
normative power emerges from solid and non-contradicting principles. The consistency is 
maintained by ensuring the same level of performance both within and outside the promoting 
agent (Manners 2008; 2009; 2009b). As put forward by Cruz-Rubio from post-positivist lenses, 
legitimacy is a product rooted in ‘the belief’ of legitimate power relations, while the 
legitimization of power is presented as the process of building and sustaining legitimacy. Public 
policies are instruments for legitimizing and products of legitimization on the larger political 
system (Cruz-Rubio, 2013; Clark, 2005:33ff).  
Although scholars of NPE do not doubt the foundational principles as normative, critics fault 
the EU implementation of those principles (i.e., EU’s external actions) or their negative impacts 
- either expected or non-intended consequences. As some cases, such as the abolition of the 
death penalty, show a strong consistency between the normativity and the EU’s actions 
(manners, 2002), in irregular migration control, researchers indicate a contradiction between 
the EU’s normative stance and its external actorness.  
Inconsistency within NPE: The extension of the debate on the EU’s being and acting 
normatively has attracted another dichotomy between the EU’s norms and interests. Scholars 
advance the concept of NPE while acknowledging that norms and interests are strongly 
interlinked and not easily separated (Diez, 2005; Diez and Pace, 2011; Pace, 2007). But again, 
norms and interests do not easily co-exist, and choices are inevitable (see Aggestam, 2009; 
Manners, 2009b). However, some studies present a contrary view that the EU is a realist power 
that only uses normative power in disguise while perusing its interests (Hyde-Price, 2006; 
Seeberg, 2009; Ruffa, 2011; Del Sarto, 2016). Other studies examining the EU’s role, 
particularly in the asylum-migration control nexus, show a strong disconnection between the 




Neighborhood Policy in 2004, the EU’s strategy on irregular migration control, as noted by 
Cardwell, has deviated from the core normative principles. The control of asylum-seeking is 
one of the areas that Cardwell explains how “EU non-Member States participate in the pursuit 
of ‘internal’ EU policy goals whilst remaining as ‘outsiders’” (Cardwell, 2011:220). 
The fact that there is no other polity with an established identity as a normative power gives 
the EU a unique role in legitimizing its policies and practices. Despite the apparent 
contradiction between the normative principles and actions, the EU has attempted to legitimize 
its actions while still protecting its interests within the neighborhood. As put forth by Pace, 
“EU actors thus engage in getting the EU’s strategy right: when to offer carrots, when to impose 
sticks, when to use conditionality” (Pace, 2007: 1046, see also, Diez and Pace, 2011). The EU 
achieve its mission through complex policy application using diverse legal instruments, 
institutional setup and strategies (Cardwell, 2011). The conceptualization of normative power 
involves analysis-linking of ideational and non-material justification of normative principles, 
actions and outcomes.  
Scholars deconstruct the EU as a normative power by analyzing its external actions. They argue 
that its actions in the field of asylum and migration have a detrimental impact on its normative 
identity (Carrera, 2012; Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Pawlak, 2009; Martin, 2011; Niemann and 
Zaun, 2018; Tocci and Cassarino, 2011). The contradiction of the EU’s normative principles 
and interests manifests in its actions, “is already obvious in the EU’s external actions such as 
energy, security and migration” (Aggestam, 2009: 33). Menéndez strongly asserts that “the 
commitment to an asylum by the EU has ever been ambivalent, the actual normative force has 
heavily been dependent on the prudential value of asylum policy” (Menéndez, 2016: 390). The 
EU partnership agreements with the developing countries on migration control have shown a 
big gap between the EU’s self-proclaimed normative actor, and the EU’s view by ‘the others’. 




agenda and driven by self-interest (Elgström, 2008). The absence of specific legal acts to guide 
the EU’s external actions in irregular migration control establishes an environment for the EU 
member states’ avoidance of national and European laws (Menéndez, 2016; Niemann and 
Zaun, 2018). 
Even some of the staunch proponents of the NPE highlight inconsistency in the field of 
migration. Diez, for instance, argues that “another criticism of the EU as a normative power 
concerns its consistency, both in terms of not discriminating between different external actors, 
and not undermining norms from inside. Thus, there have been charges of bias and arbitrariness 
related to the EU’s application of human rights. Also, since 9/11, the EU and its member states 
have taken part in the drive towards the securitization of migration” (Diez, 2005: 624; see also 
Diez, 2013). Other scholars have expressed similar arguments. Having securitized migration 
internally, the EU has opted to address the vulnerabilities that originate from the third countries 
by externalizing its governance (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Lavenex, 2004; Lavenex, 2006; Balzacq, 
2005; Boswell, 2007). 
In other cases, some scholars have looked at the EU’s external action in migration control from 
a crisis management point of view. The EU actors are seen to frame the asylum issues as ‘crises’ 
- thereby legitimizing urgent measures (Boin et al., 2013:100ff; Menéndez, 2016; Trauner, 
2016). Inconsistencies related to normative power are constructed as the EU’s unpreparedness 
to act or application of temporary measures to manage crisis awaiting for comprehensive 
intervention actions (Vătăman, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018). Inconsistencies are also framed 
as human rights violations within the EU member states. UNHCR quoted that the asylum 
system in some parts of Europe was becoming continually fragile; difficulties in accessing 
territories, asylum procedures, and breach of the principle of non-refoulement were evident 




practices was continually widening, compelling the EU actors to engage in a policy reform 
process (Trauner, 2016). 
In the effort of disentangling the widely expressed EU’s inconsistencies between the normative 
principles and its actions in migration control, different implications have been posited. Diez 
argues that “the EU ‘humanitarian’ interventions in Africa seem to depend on the geostrategic 
interests of the EU Member States” (Diez, 2013:197, see also Gegout, 2009). However, 
Birchfield responds that “many criticize the normative power Europe approach when they find 
empirical evidence of the EU’s hypocrisy or double standards or sheer lack of influence in 
international arenas, without recognizing that it is the holistic, ethically grounded concepts that 
are being tested against real-world examples in the first place, whereas most other approaches 
are not even concerned with such questions” (Birchfield, 2013: 916). Although Birchfield 
claims that most of the instances of inconsistency are a manifestation of unintended policy 
failure and not deficiencies of the policy framework, he fails to offer how the EU legitimizes 
its actions to distinguish (an unintended) policy failure from strategic use of policies to achieve 
self-interests. 
As noted elsewhere, African leaders described the EU’s foreign aid as an instrument to curtail 
asylum rights by financing border surveillance projects. The migration partnerships between 
the EU and countries like Libya and Mali, where slavery of irregular migrants heading Europe 
for asylum-seeking was documented (IOM, 2017), were highly criticized from all corners. Such 
a migration control approach destroyed the EU’s normative image and deduced its influence 
on asylum standards to ‘the others’ (Collett, 2016; Rankin, 2017; Toaldo, 2017; Guillem and 
Cvetkovic, 2018). “If our research findings were taken seriously, European leaders would not 
be building walls and telling people to stay away. They would be working together to ensure 




upholder of human rights and international protection” (Squire and Perkowski, 2016 see also, 
Finlay, 2018; Tocci, 2017; Sjursen, 2017). 
The EU, as part of the root causes. Scholars suggest there is increased effort by ‘the other’ 
to challenge the prevailing order of EU dominance.  
“As a result, and somewhat paradoxically, the EU and its Member States are asked 
by the rest of the world both to acknowledge their position at the periphery of the 
emerging multipolar system and to assume global responsibilities commensurate 
with historical weight and contemporary economic wherewithal.  It suffers too from 
what is often perceived as ‘neo-colonial’ behavior, whether in the context of Euro–
African trade agreements, World Trade Organization negotiations or the 
International Criminal Court” (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013: 285). 
 Other studies portray the EU as reluctant to rise to the challenge and consider the voice of ‘the 
others’. The concept of normative power Europe which sometimes is contended to be similar 
to the Eurocentric international order, is seen to be too strong for the periphery to overcome 
(Bickerton, 2010; Nicolaïdis, 2010; Staeger, 2016). 
The critique of normative power Europe is highly visible in the politics of Pan-Africanism. 
Africa’s efforts to attain full decolonization, in this case, perceive the normative power Europe 
as Eurocentric agenda. A similar argument has been presented by scholars of international 
relations who claim that Western democracies participate in creating the conditions for people 
to migrate from their countries irregularly. “By engaging in wars abroad, participating in the 
destruction of entire regions and societies, exploiting cheap labor and natural resources, and 
supporting autocratic and authoritarian regimes, these democracies create the very refugees 
that they then reject” (Gallien, 2018: 736, see also Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007).  The African 




contradictions. On the one hand, is the EU’s self-presentation a normative power, a human 
right defender and hospitable to those in need of protection.  On the other,  ‘the post-colonial 
others’ view of the EU’s political influence aimed to create conditions for people to flee from 
their homes while yet reject them from reaching its fortress Europe (Grosfoguel, 2016; 
Palladino and Woolley, 2018).   
4.7.2 Intermediate variable: The 2015 migration crisis - a catalyst for the rhetorical 
action 
The 2015 Valletta summit, in which the concept of root causes was formally incorporated in 
the EU policy, was held when Europe experienced a ‘migration crisis’. As defined by Nohrstedt 
and Weible, crises refer to “periods of disorder in the seemingly normal development of a 
system and widespread questioning or discrediting of established policies,  practices, and 
institutions” (ibid, 2010:5). Studies have suggested that the 2015 migration crisis might have 
triggered the EU migration policy shift (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019; Falkner, 2016). Others 
suggest that the 2015 Valletta Summit was the origin of the EU’s policy change (Fulvio, 2016; 
Pace, 2016; Parshotam, 2017; Vătăman, 2016). Even then, the studies that start the analysis of the 
EU policy shift from 2015 hint that the 2015 migration crisis triggered the EU migration policy 
shift. These studies are founded on the notion that crises are causal drivers for significant policy 
change (Boin et al., 2009; Grossman, 2019; Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2017; Nohrstedt, 2008; 
Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010). Nevertheless, scholars point out that post-crisis policy outcomes 
can range from comprehensive policy change to either small change or even continued 
stagnation (Boin and Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2009). “What explains these different outcomes? 
Most scholars writing about the nexus between crises, disasters and public policy note their 
potential agenda-setting effects, but have not developed explanations for their contingent 
nature and their variable impacts” (Boin et al., 2009: 82). Here, I argue that as triggers for 




migration crisis alone does not offer a convincing explanation as to why the EU shifted its 
migration policy specifically from ‘control measures’ to ‘addressing the root causes.’ 
On the flip side, a crisis can be a catalyst for policy change (Niemann and Speyer, 2018; Pautz, 
2018; Schader, 2020; Zimmermann, 2020). A policy outcome is understood as an end product 
of ‘frame contests’ between different actors, already with competing interests, who seek to take 
advantage of a crisis-induced opportunity. A crisis catalysis the contestation between frames 
and counter-frames regarding the nature, magnitude, and causes of the crisis itself (Greussing 
and Boomgaarden, 2017; t Hart and Tindall, 2009: 9). Further, as a catalyst, a crisis enables 
the politicization of the responsibility of the occurrence or escalation of the issue (De Vries, 
2004). During a crisis, “contestants manipulate, strategize and fight to have their frame 
accepted as the dominant narrative” (Boin et al., 2009: 82). Hence, a crisis becomes a 
phenomenon that needs to be explained, including its origin (Ansell et al., 2016). 
While acknowledging that the idea of addressing the root causes of irregular migrants had 
existed prior to the 2015 crisis, the role of the migration crisis as a catalyst for the policy change 
was well established (see Bedea and Osei Kwadwo, 2020; Troncotă and Loy, 2018; Buonanno, 
2017:100). The 2015 migration crisis was not a trigger for the EU’s policy change per se since 

















                                  The process of rhetorical entrapment 
Fig 1.0: Conceptual diagram: rhetorical action, rhetorical entrapment and policy change 
Rhetorical action involved the combination of the issue narrative (root causes of African 
irregular migration), the system narrative (a critique of neo-colonialism) and the identity 
narrative (a critique of normative power Europe). Rhetorical entrapment resulted from 
rhetorical action and compelled the EU to shift its migration policy. The 2015 migration crisis 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.0 Introduction to rhetorical analysis 
Rhetorical analysis is a methodology that analyses people’s rhetoric, opinions, appraisals, and 
evaluations of phenomena such as events, people, politics, international affairs, debates, and 
their attributes to persuade others to act accordingly. The methodology further involves 
examining the persuasive force of rhetoric. It consists of qualitative analysis, including the 
collection of rhetorical evidence and subjectivity analysis.  
Informed by political rhetorical action, the rhetorical analysis examines persuasion through the 
actor’s rhetorical expression of shared norms and interests to compel the other (mostly the 
state) to act accordingly. It brings together the meaning analysis and the relation between 
meanings to generate a relational meaning analysis (see Berger, 2018: 109ff). The relational 
meaning analysis enables the examination of meaning while considering the nature of 
socialization between actors (the presentation of self and others) in an attempt to influence 
others. It is generalizable that rhetorical analysis is a methodology of inquiry to analyze both 
the rhetorical act of persuasion by an actor and the persuasive power of discourse (Leach, 
2000). 
As mentioned elsewhere, rhetoric comprises framing, i.e., combining narratives or framing 
strategic narratives. Foreign policy researchers have used rhetorical analysis to identify the 
presence and the use of a particular way of framing rhetorical artifacts in political speeches 
(Miller, 2007: 56-58, 212). Frames are analytical units that generally lack causal features within 
discourses (Miskimmon et al., 2014: 7). The understanding of framing enables us to examine 
why and how strategic narratives become rhetoric. Various rhetorical artifacts must be framed 




The influence of rhetoric depends upon the strategy of the rhetor, the credibility of a message 
and the audience. The expression of rhetoric presents the pursuance of interests in a social 
engagement; shared norms hence play a critical role. To understand the power of rhetorical 
action, a researcher should be interested in how the rhetor forms a linkage between various 
elements of texts or speech in explaining how each or part of the component impacts the 
persuasion. Most rhetorical artifacts function dramatically, whereby a rhetor might use 
fantasies, dramas, and myths to express popular rhetoric (Berger, 2018: 100ff). Rhetorical 
action is therefore characterized by unique features that might not necessarily be seen unless 
juxtaposed with other rhetorical artifacts. These rhetoric features may not be striking or readily 
visible until a researcher brings them together (Selzer, 2003). A researcher's principal task in 
studying an issue through rhetorical analysis is to combine the common denominator(s) of 
rhetors to develop unique characteristics of different pieces of rhetorical evidence and compare 
them. In other situations, a speech might not have readily available rhetorical artifacts to 
illustrate or construct the envisioned meaning. This is demonstrated by the speaker's 
argumentative structure that includes repetitions to create persuasion. Thus, the researcher 
might opt to go beyond the strict confinement of rhetorical comparisons to illuminate the 
purposed construction (Leach, 2000). The comparison between rhetoric by different speakers 
enables generalizations of the whole influence process.  
As a scientific inquiry process, rhetorical analysis functions to study how interlocutors map 
their perspectives and truthful appeals to the targeted audiences. It incorporates the shared 
norms (in the form of ethos, logos and pathos), including the speaker's credibility, 
trustworthiness, and dynamism (Charteris-Black, 2018: 8-16; Leach, 2000). Issues such as 
loyalty, friendship, hatred, and reverence are also part of what a researcher examines in the 
analysis of rhetorical action. These rhetorical features are identified through the speaker’s ideas 




5.1 Analyzing rhetorical situation and rhetorical action  
First, rhetorical action emerges from a situation of shared norms. Therefore, one external 
feature of rhetorical analysis is the examination of the rhetorical situation. This analytical 
characteristic enables the incorporation of audience, contingencies and exigencies to create an 
opportunity to understand a rhetorical action and reaction in their appropriate context. A 
rhetorical situation is characterized by the nature of socialization in which the rhetor, the 
(contentious) issue and the target audience are involved. In such a case, the rhetorical situation 
analysis involves examining the existing cooperation or misunderstandings between the 
involved parties. The speaker and the target audience are expected to communicate within 
certain shared social norms, which should be evident in their rhetorical expressions. The 
context ought to be apparent in the language used (Dixon, 2017). Timing and place are critical 
factors in understanding the framing of a rhetorical situation. For example, a rhetorical analysis 
of Europe and Africa's present interaction could be based on historical socialization. These 
historically fixed or changing values, thoughts, fantasy, attitudes and realities being constructed 
ought to be factored in when analyzing a rhetorical situation.  
Secondly, rhetorical entrapment is concerned with the examination of the effect of rhetorical 
action. A strategy is derived from how actors use speech to impact the actual or targeted 
audience (Sillince et al., 2012). A key feature in rhetorical action is the persuasive art, where 
argumentation takes advantage of ambiguity, contradiction or even inconsistency in normative 
practices. The prevalence of a particular rhetorical practice (Sillince et al., 2012) and the 
importance of the issue itself (i.e., the nature of rhetoric) (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; 
Bednarek et al., 2017; Erkama and Vaara, 2010) are vital in generating rhetorical persuasion. 




a social environment. Depending on a scenario, rhetorical action becomes instrumental in 
shaping the actors' decisions, thereby altering their behavior. 
The analysis of rhetorical entrapment focuses on the targeted audience that is presumed to be 
persuaded. The audience's analysis is critical because politicians, government leaders, and 
activists direct their rhetoric to a specific audience and not just the general physical audience. 
Because of this reason, the audience is classified into two major categories: the 
particular/targeted audience and the universal audience. Irrespective of the type of audience, 
for rhetorical entrapment to occur, there requires a shared reference(s), i.e., understanding the 
context between the speaker and the audience. The speaker’s intended purpose of rhetoric 
determines the audience. On the one hand, the targeted audiences are the speakers’ 
premeditated audience as opposed to merely the physical and tangible public (Perelman, 1979; 
Goodwin, 2017). The particular audience is finite and involves people or agencies closely 
inclined to the speaker. On the other hand, the universal audience is usually broad and involves 
all the relevant actors. However, a speaker can address both categories of the audience at the 
same time. There is a scenario where a speaker can target a particular audience by choosing 
rhetoric that appeals to the universal audience, such as the international community.  
Social facts and truth in rhetorical action are phenomena that both the universal and particular 
audiences need to agree with. This is especially in socialization settings where actors have 
different preferences; homogeneous and heterogamous values exist concurrently. A speaker 
can start by connecting to the audience by establishing what the audience believes in or the 
absence of what it believes in. Hence, rhetorical argumentation exists in two forms: the 
associative (connective) techniques and the dissociative (separative) techniques (Wiethoff, 
2018). In the rhetoric of association, the speaker sets up a connection at the beginning of the 
broader contentious issue. Such framing is aimed at creating a more persuasive argument 




In dissociative rhetoric, the speaker tends to ground his stance away from the argument's 
starting point. For effectiveness, the speaker can split the idea into different parts to establish a 
disassociation with undesirable elements of the broader rhetoric. The associative and 
dissociative argumentations are opposite processes but not mutually exclusive. They are, 
instead, complementary and strategically applicable co-currently (Goodwin, 2017). 
Additionally, ambiguity is a crucial element of rhetorical action since excessive clarity might 
exclude some targeted audiences. A speaker might avoid some extreme opinions or explicit 
statements in an attempt to appeal more to the shared values and to enable the audience to 
connect the meanings to the rhetoric that aligns with their own specific values. The way in 
which speakers construct connections (of different framings) in relation to the values and norms 
of the targeted audience enables the understanding of how the audience is connected to the 
speaker’s world. A critical task in rhetorical action is to link the implied audience even when 
it is not co-present in the speech ( see Heracleous, 2006; Sillince et al., 2012). 
5.2 Digital data and data sources  
Social scientists are increasingly turning to digital data and so do rhetorical analysts. A study 
by Cesare et al. (2018) shows that digital techniques have dramatically made social research 
cheaper and faster and have created new research possibilities for researchers and policymakers 
(see, Salganik, 2018:99-105; Porter, 2009). In this digital age, researchers have an opportunity 
to study actors’ characteristics such as interests, rhetorical behavior and establish a connection 
between these elements in ways that were impossible in the past. This vast, rapidly increasing, 
and diverse digital information is known as ‘Big Data’. With the advancement in 
communication technologies and their application in international relations studies, researchers 
do not just think of going online, but also everywhere (Handa, 2013:2-7). Rhetorical analysis 
involves studying argumentation about an issue by people speaking from different locations. It 




analysis using digital data is that it creates an opportunity to study rhetoric within the speaker’s 
real environment and examine the audience's response, such as jeering or applauding. 
The application of advanced digital techniques has a long history, but until 2000 little had been 
done about rhetoric (Yue et al., 2018). Although initially, it was a computer science subject, it 
has heavily spread to social science. First, the advancement in communication technologies has 
enhanced the demand for feedback in almost every socio-economic and political sphere. 
Political communication is one area that involves the examination of feedback, especially with 
the proliferation of digital means of inquiry. Likewise, the emergence and development of 
mainstream media and social media have offered an enormous volume of opinionated data, 
essential in research studies in political science and international affairs. As viewed by 
researchers, social media development correlates with the application of rhetorical analysis as 
a research methodology in social research (Yue et al., 2018; Deacon, 2007). 
When institutions require public opinions, they use focus groups, surveys or opinion polls. The 
rapid growth of websites and social media, for instance, has enabled public opinion analysis 
such as reviews, blogs, Tweets and postings on social network sites (Neuendorf & Kumar, 
2016; Flaounas et al., 2013; Hogenboom et al., 2013). The result has been the emergence of 
more and new forms of data. This data has increasingly been used to inform policymaking and 
political moves. In addition, people use product reviews consisting of previous opinions to 
examine how the world perceives them. Therefore, states and polities have reduced the 
necessity to conduct focus groups and surveys to gather public opinions due to the high volume 
of publicly available information.  
The transition from analog to digital methodologies did not happen all at once. It is ongoing, 
but so far, researchers have found entirely satisfactory opportunities to make the rhetorical 




physical audience, but then the address is posted online. Whether online or offline, rhetorical 
expressions are commonly presumed to represent the true position of the speakers. 
Nevertheless, the review of new data sources is continuously progressive. Social-
constructivists continue to search for new ways of making sense of the social world with this 
massive digital data development (see Alburez-Gutierrez et al., 2019; Handa, 2013:85ff; Kang 
et al., 2018; Mullen, 2006). Bar-Haim et al. (2011) conducted an expert investors’ rhetorical 
analysis in microblogs in studying capital market performance. Speech and text analysis of 
blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and mainstream news have also been used to study different 
phenomena such as trade (Zhang and Skiena, 2010), prediction of the stock market (Bollen et 
al., 2011), and prediction of election results (Tumasjan et al., 2010). In most non-political 
domains, such analysis has been referred to as sentiment analysis. 
In the current international affairs, the rhetoric (in the form of opinionated postings) in social 
media has aided reshape political activities and has profoundly impacted socio-political 
policies and systems. In other cases, researchers have found that rhetorical persuasion has 
mobilized the masses for political changes, like in the case of the 2011 Arab Spring (Breuer 
and Groshek, 2014; Karolak, 2018) or the 2010 UK election prediction (Franch, 2013). The 
rhetorical action is effective with external data such as opinionated documents and internal data 
such as analyzed voluntary feedback regarding a political issue. 
The common sources of digital data used in this study were institutional websites, Youtube, 
mainstream media. These sources, especially social media, have been used to study issues 
where respondents were entirely out of reach (Alburez-Gutierrez et al., 2019; Swarts, 2012). 
In many digital platforms, researchers can query data about the users who have agreed to share 
their opinions about specific issues. These digital technologies are standard in the study of 
digital rhetoric, i.e., internet-based communications (see Eyman, 2015:12ff; Gries, 2015; 




media is considered already opinionated (Kursuncu et al., 2019). The opinion extraction is thus 
not necessary for data gained from social media. For this study, the opinion holders were the 
speakers or authors of online postings. The information about data, e.g., the posting date, was 
captured and used in all cases. 
5.3 Data and data sources 
The study acquired digital data from various internet platforms, including online sources like 
personal Youtube channels, TV interviews, and institutional press releases. Principally, all the 
2015 EU-Africa Valletta summit proceedings were accessed from the EU website. The 
information was not necessarily uploaded for research purposes, but the researcher found it 
relevant for the study. When such information is used for research, it is referred to as 
unstructured data. The process of collecting/gathering it from various online platforms is 
referred to as data mining (Salvo, 2012).  
The study acknowledged that the two widely spoken languages in Africa are English and 
French. Where the original data was in French, translation was done. In some official events, 
such as the 2015 Valletta summit, the summit’s official translation was considered. When there 
was no official translation, the researcher translated using extensive tools, such as automated 
translations. In these cases, the researcher sought assistance from a French-English speaker to 
confirm the translation. 
 
5.4 The process of rhetorical analysis  
Research design is about connecting research question(s) and answers. The following sections 




5.4.1 Preparation for research (gathering background information) 
The use of unstructured digital data necessitated me to familiarize myself with the available 
data before the actual data collection. I started by exploring the possible materials necessary 
for the research question. My main task in the preparation was to seek ways to understand the 
analytical constructs of the subject being investigated. Analytical construct is the process of 
operationalizing a content-context relationship to analyze rhetorical change (Krippendorff, 
2009:105; Koliba & Gajda, 2009; Takahashi et al., 2012; Krippendorff, 2018).To establish 
valid analytical constructs, I developed a relationship between texts and speeches and sought 
the right context in which they existed. By so doing, I validated the speakers' intentions and 
developed a clear picture of the rhetorical effects. Once the key features of the contextual-
textual relationship were established, I conducted an inter-contextual correlation. This enabled 
me to know in advance the context and the network of correlations that formed the background 
of texts and speakers. Another focus of the analytical construct was situating concepts in their 
appropriate contexts, rather than merely counting the number of concepts. Here, my main 
concern was gathering information about the rhetorical artifacts and the context in which they 
occurred. I achieved this through an in-depth investigation of the entire speaking situation. The 
exploration included studying the speaker, the issue, and the reaction of the target audience. 
Another form of preparation involved listening to audio and video versions of speeches 
available online. I further referred to how analysts and experts interpreted these rhetorical 
artifacts. In this case, I used the expert's analysis of relevant rhetoric to expound my own 
analysis. This understanding provided me with a more relevant scope of research. It also 
enabled the development of expectations within the reasonable range and the means to judge 
data. Moreover, I conducted a more in-depth examination of the speaker’s previous rhetoric to 




migration management. This helped in generating a proper understanding of the rhetorical 
situation. The prior examination of the rhetorical situation involved analyzing the strategy 
employed by a speaker to generate the intended persuasion. For example, some speakers 
preferred an indirect way of linking the historical past of the Europe-Africa engagement to the 
current irregular migration, while others preferred a radical approach. This information 
provided more clarity and trust that the rhetoric collected, indeed reflected reality and 
contributed to the research agenda. Some of the background information included,  
• the date of the occasion where the speech was spoken 
• the circumstance in which the speech was given, i.e., an event in Africa that involved 
the EU delegates, the nature of the immediate audience  
• the differentiation between the overt and covert goals of the rhetor 
• the repetition of rhetoric by a single rhetor, i.e., affirmation, reaffirmation or subversion 
• the different sources where the text, audio, or visual speech was found.  
• Whether the person spoke on his behalf or when represented an institution, i.e., on 
behalf of the country, the African Union (AU) or European Union (EU) 
All this background information enabled me to get the right rhetorical artifacts. There were 
possibilities where the rhetor would represent a group of rhetors - for example, ‘we’ to refer to 
African leaders or both African and European leaders. In other cases, a speaker spoke on his 
own opinion.  
5.4.2 Data collection and sorting  
The study retrieved the unstructured data by performing a two-stage process. First, I classified 
the texts and speeches based on their typical relevance. Where the computer-aided application 
did not yield the expected results, I used the manual search. Rhetoric retrieval involved an 




European Union-Africa partnership, colonialism, neo-colonialism, the root causes of irregular 
migration, and other relevant phrases. Then, I did a second-level ranking of data whereby the 
sorting was based on the strength and relevance of rhetoric.  
I considered a document or a speech relevant if it contained at least an argument that 
contributed to answering the research question. This meant that for a rhetorical artifact to 
qualify for classification per the query issue, the relevance of opinionated wording would 
matter. Liu explains that “the totality of the opinionated sentences and their strengths in a 
document together with the document’s similarity with the query is used to rank the document” 
(Liu, 2012:120; see also, Karimi and Shakery, 2017). Essentially, rhetoric was established 
based on the study's theme - irregular migration management - but not limited to positive and 
negative classifications. 
The Valletta summit was explicitly between the European and the African partners on African irregular 
migration management. Since the conversation was direct, the speakers and the audience were 
straightforward. The physical audience was still the target audience. Although the researcher, at times, 
deployed interpretive and reflexive speech analysis, by and large, the literal meaning of rhetoric was 
dominant. The context (i.e., time, place, and situation) of the speaker was considered to play a minimal 
role since the summit's objective was well defined. The speech was interactive rather than a unilateral 
communicative situation. It was possible to have a response to a specific argument within the same 
gathering.  
There were a total of 236 video clips about the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit on the EU website. 
However, I did not use some video clips for different reasons; several did not contain speech, 
some were duplicated, and others contained general remarks, such as welcome remarks or vote 
of thanks and did not qualify to be rhetoric. Some video clips, nonetheless, were lengthy and 
captured speeches by different speakers. Speakers ranged from heads of state or heads of 




organizations, including Interpol, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), and United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), were considered. Political analysts' voices were also captured. Altogether, 67 pieces 
of speech and text were included in the study. Many speakers just gave general support to their 
affiliated side without expressing concrete rhetoric independently. In some instances, some 
speeches were not available, but they had been quoted in written documents.  
5.4.3 Data analysis 
Data mining/collection was followed by data analysis. The analysis was beyond a mere word 
count in examining the nature of rhetorical persuasion contained. The fundamental purpose 
was to bring out how rhetorical action was a persuasion strategy in the EU migration policy 
change. I captured the generic styles of speech in all the relevant video clips. I incorporated 
time and space in the rhetorical analysis to examine the act of persuasion – the speakers’ 
attempt to reorient audiences to a particular situation. A speaker could speak at different times 
to convey different but related arguments. Also, a speaker could repeat an argument several 
times in different places. Because of this reason, the main analytical task was the examination 
of the reflection of speech in particular situations, audiences, and purposes.  
 
To maintain consistency of analysis based on the thematic areas, the researcher must be willing 
to compromise by dropping and connecting parts of information (Krippendorff, 2018). First, I 
ensured that thematic content analysis preserved the originality of textual interpretation. I 
maintained this by clarifying the target audiences to remain sensible in achieving the research 
objective. This categorization was done to all forms of rhetorical artifacts used in the study. 




I began the analysis by scanning through each classified video clip from the beginning to the 
end. Then I carefully reread all transcripts, highlighting the critical use of ethos, pathos and 
logos in a speech or text. Keywords and phrases that captured these key features in every video 
transcript were highlighted and categorized accordingly. I then established a smooth 
connection between rhetoric. At this stage, some texts and speech transcripts were split into 
subcategories, while others were combined. Even after splitting and combining arguments, I 
revisited the data that did not directly fit into the primary categorization but was still relevant 
and analyzed it distinctively. Lastly, all the categories were organized into a hierarchical 
structure according to the thematic rhetorical action areas.  
The study used the three primary interpretation approaches: the literal approach, an interpretive 
approach and a reflexive approach. The literal approach mainly focuses on the exact use of a 
particular language and semantics. The interpretive approach is concerned with making sense 
or constructing participants’ accounts. In other words, the interpretive approach involves 
interpolating meanings. In a reflexive approach, the researcher gets more engaged in reflecting 
a speaker's intention by conducting a situational analysis (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Hsiu-
Fang and Shannon, 2005; Welsh, 2002). Depending on the necessity, I deployed all three 
approaches in conducting a rhetorical analysis – analyzing the characteristics of a language as 
a persuasion tool. The concurrent use of literal, interpretive and reflexive forms of analysis 
enabled the integration of the content and context of speech and text to examine the 
subjectiveness of rhetoric. 
Another significant task in video analysis was the re-figuration of the context to bring out the 
persuasiveness of rhetoric. I examined whether speakers spoke only about the prevailing 
situation of migration, i.e., framing irregular migration as a crisis, or linked the current EU-
Africa relations to coloniality. At this level, it was possible to observe how each partner sought 




appropriate to their opponent. Another analytical task was examining rhetorical entrapment - 
political behavior of when and how the EU felt entrapped. For this task, I categorized my 
analysis relative to the thematic areas of rhetorical action (such as the rhetoric of colonialism, 
neo-colonialism by African partner countries) and the European partners' rhetorical 
entrapment.   
In both rhetorical action and rhetorical entrapment, I focused on the nature of rhetoric, i.e., 
whether rhetoric was an action or a reaction. Such an analysis brought out the subjectivity of 
rhetoric. However, a single expression could have an objective or/and subjective rhetoric. 
Objective statements express factual information, while subjective statements express 
subjective views. However, at times, the sentence-level analysis failed to precisely capture the 
speakers’ attitude towards the direction of migration management. As an alternative, the 
analysis involved the clauses and contexts of the speech. I used feature-level analysis by 
concentrating on the features of rhetoric. The feature-level analysis is an aspect-based rhetoric 
summarization (Liu, 2012:11). Rather than examining the construction of the language in use 
through the analysis of sentences or clauses and phrases, the feature-level analysis is concerned 
with the overall opinion. A feature-level study is founded on the assumption that an opinion 
consists of rhetoric and a target audience; hence an opinion without a target did not have any 
use and was thus not considered as rhetoric. The ability to capture the targets of the opinions 
enabled a proper understanding of the purpose of rhetoric. In a nutshell, the feature-level 
analysis enabled the production of a structured summary of arguments about the subject of the 
study. Under every theme, I checked if data was enough to construct strong rhetoric, 
generalizable and supportive of the larger context of the rhetorical action.  
One form of analysis is data extrapolation. Extrapolation involves inferences of unobserved 




2018: 47-8). Rhetorical action is presumed to analyze a general case of a policy change system 
featured by complex variables, e.g., rhetorical action, rhetorical reaction and policy change. 
For instance, I examined the entire policy influence system - how African partner countries 
framed the root causes of irregular migration and how a rhetorical entrapment by the European 
partners occurred. Some components of the system (rhetorical action and entrapment) were not 
readily available. Thus, I used extrapolations to manage the situation. Some extrapolation 
involved establishing a relationship based on time, while others were based on the content. 
Content inferences addressed the limitation of the unavailability of some arguments presented 
by both African and European partners, especially during the 2015 Valletta summit. The 
established analytical constructs ensured that rhetoric was processed in line with what they 
purposed to achieve.  
Lastly, I analyzed how the rhetoric of addressing the root causes of African irregular migration 
was incorporated in the EU's wider policy discussions. Although the central space of rhetoric 
was the EU parliament, I also engaged the rhetorical evidence from political discussions across 
Europe. 
 5.4.4 Presentation of research findings and discussion  
The findings chapter was meant to describe the large bodies of rhetoric as behaving (i.e., 
evolving and changing). It also aimed at describing relationships between rhetoric by different 
partners and the principles of interaction between those rhetorical elements. The rhetors' 
persuasiveness was described using the already identified rhetorical artifacts and presented 
according to the study’s thematic areas.  
The analytical approach captured the complexity of rhetorical action as a mechanism of 
persuasion. The analysis was presented through what Krippendorff refers to as ‘filtering 




(based on time) and based on how it was linked to other thematic areas to complete a thematic 
area within the larger rhetorical action process. However, both forms of analysis (the filtering 
methodology and the time-series analysis) operate within a framework that enables analysts to 
interpolate between data points and extrapolate its ups and downs into the future (Krippendorff, 
2018: 50; Volkens et al., 2009). Lastly, in the discussion chapter, I discussed the evidence 
within the rhetorical action framework. 
5.5 Validity and reliability  
In qualitative research, researchers tend to use terms such as ‘rigorousness,’ ‘soundness,’ and 
‘trustworthiness’ to refer to the validity and reliability of data (Cohen et al., 2013: 295ff; Leung, 
2015; Sarma, 2015). In rhetorical analysis, validity refers to the “question of whether the 
researcher sees what he or she thinks he or she sees so that there is evidence in the data for the way 
in which data are interpreted” (Welsh, 2002; see also Woods et al., 2016). Validity ensures that 
data present evidence in a way that reflects the interpretation of that data. Rhetorical analysis 
and the associated qualitative content analysis have been regarded as akin to ‘impression 
analysis’ because of the lack of scrutiny on how the analytical process is conducted. However, 
the use of software has added value to qualitative research. To ensure validity and reliability, 
first, I ensured a comprehensive online search to facilitate data interrogation. This is important, 
primarily when ‘attributes’ are used to search for data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Bazeley 
& Jackson, 2013: 130-132). Secondly, in the 2015 Valletta Summit speeches, all the recorded 
video clips were available on the EU website in their original form. It was possible to revisit 
them for clarity. I studied all the speeches and comments recorded at the summit without 





5.6 Limitation in rhetorical analysis 
The use of digital data is not without limitations. Most of these limitations are related to data 
access, representativity and ethics. Digital sources are non-representative samples of a large 
population (Zagheni and Weber, 2015). The non-representation model, however, did not affect 
the rhetorical analysis since the analysis was not dependent on the number of individuals 
constructing rhetoric. Instead, the concern was how strong rhetoric contains persuasion. 
 The attempt to trace rhetoric from online platforms presented two significant challenges. First, 
identifying the appropriate online location of the rhetorical artifacts was a cumbersome task. 
The task involved tracking the opinion sites on the internet and sorting the information 
contained. Due to the high rate of online postings, most of the information posted before 2015 
was not readily available. In rhetorical analysis, data availability depends on the speakers’, the 
audiences’ or analysts’ willingness to upload it on the internet. Because of the high proliferation 
of different online sites, some striking speeches have been reproduced hence easily accessible. 
In as much as the advanced online search was commendably solving the problems of rhetoric 
mining, it was still insufficient. The use of synonymous words gave reasonably similar results. 
For instance, the term ‘colonialism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’ are closely related and sometimes 
perceived as synonyms. Both words are shared - only a prefix of three letters differentiates 
them. All applications captured the two terms as almost the same. Besides, many such aspects 
of expressions describing rhetoric are multi-word phrases, which is difficult for embedded 
dictionaries to handle. In other cases, some ‘aspect expressions’ such as neo-colonialism to 
describe a particular entity, e.g., imbalanced terms of trade, might not necessarily be the 
domain-specific synonyms of that entity. To manage these challenges, I treated the first-level 




Some video clips on the 2015 Valletta Summit were also uploaded on the EU’s website under 
the same names, making it difficult to distinguish them. There was an assumption that the 236 
video clips on the EU website captured all the critical events of the  2015 Valletta Summit. For 
the successful use of digital data in studying rhetorical analysis, there was a need for advanced 



















CHAPTER SIX: STUDY ANALYSIS  
6. 1 Introduction   
This chapter provides evidence about how the African partner contributed to influencing the 
EU’s policy change from ‘border control measures’ to ‘addressing the root causes’ of African 
irregular migration. The analysis of findings is based on ‘rhetorical political analysis’ as used 
by James Martin in his work Situating Speech: A rhetorical Approach to Political Strategy.  I 
examine how rhetoric as a medium of speech is used to influence actors' change of behavior. 
As a strategy of influence, “rhetorical analysis underscores the situated nature of ideas, that is, 
their presence in speech and argument delivered at, and in response to, specific times and 
places” (Martin, 2015: 25; see also Schimmelfennig, 2003). Actors frame ideas out of certain 
controversies and express them rhetorically. Rhetorical action, in this case, involved changing 
symbols and their meaning to influence the target audience. Rhetorical analysis hence examines 
the force created by the contents of arguments (Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005:117-125; 
Finlayson, 2007; Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Martin, 2015). The analytical task involved 
identifying premises of speech, i.e., figurative elements or generic style of speech. Another 
analytical task included inventive re-figuration of the context to bring out the persuasiveness 
of discourse. The chapter further incorporated time and space factors into the argument to 
demonstrate how actors persuaded audiences by redirecting them to their desired situations and 
how audiences changed over time.  
Since 2006, there were apparent differences between the European and African partners, and 
struggles within joint irregular migration control programs were visible. As mentioned 
elsewhere, I argue that the resistance by African partners to cooperate in the EU-Africa joint 
migration control missions was not a policy proposal. It only indicated policy rejection and not 




non-rhetorical struggles such as African partners’ resistance to take part in joint migration 
control missions; instead, it focuses on examining the influence through the act of speech -
rhetorical action.  
A noticeable similarity between the European and African partners was that both used formal 
and informal rhetoric. The informal rhetoric, in this case, refers to the public rhetorics that 
emerged either before or after a formal/diplomatic engagement like a summit. Informal rhetoric 
also includes the speech spoken during a TV interview, press conferences, political forums, or 
expressed out of personal motivation. On the other hand, formal rhetorics are those expressed 
in summits and parliaments or other official engagements. However, there existed a vast 
correspondence between official/formal and unofficial/informal rhetoric. A person could speak 
about an issue formally and informally, depending on the place and the purpose. The repetition 
of rhetoric also occurred on different platforms or places. The study analysis, therefore, did not 
distinguish between formal and informal rhetoric. Rather, the focus was on the purpose of the 
rhetoric itself.  
Unlike colonialism, which was conducted overtly, neo-colonialism operates as an unequal 
influence within relations where the former colonizers pursue their economic and political 
interests resulting in retrogressive effects on the formally colonized. The African countries 
consistently constructed irregular migrants to Europe as the victims of neo-colonialism. Since 
2008, elements of persuasion were evidenced by the continually growing colonial rhetoric on 
different political platforms by African partners. Contrastingly, it was apparent that the EU and 
member states showed reluctance to acknowledge the colonial or neo-colonial rhetoric during 
the early years. Although the rhetoric of root causes was on the rise across Africa, during the 
EU-Africa 2015 Valletta Summit, African partners successfully constructed a link between the 
root cause of African irregular migration to neocolonialism. As a result, the EU finally found 




6.2 Africa’s rhetoric of coloniality   
This section is divided into two. The first part analyses the link between the rhetoric of 
colonialism and African irregular migration. The second bit is concerned with the rhetoric of 
neo-colonialism as the root cause of irregular migration.  
6.3 The rhetoric of colonialism in irregular migration control 
As early as 2006, the EU had intensified irregular migration control beyond its territory. The 
EU reached out to African countries to develop a partnership towards irregular migration 
control. Besides, it was around this period that some African countries started linking 
colonialism to African irregular migration. During Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, Libya became 
an EU’s strategic partner in African irregular migration control through the central 
Mediterranean route that was the main migratory route to Europe. Being a direct receiver of 
African irregular migrants and Libya’s neighboring country, Italy had a more active role in 
acting on behalf of the EU in developing a partnership. In 2008, Italy initiated diplomatic 
negotiation with Libya on establishing a partnership on African irregular migration control. In 
this negotiation, Gaddafi brought from nowhere the rhetoric of Italy’s colonial rule in Libya 
and the need for compensation. Rather than framing Italy’s financial input as development 
funds like in the other African countries, Gaddafi was particular - he claimed that Libya was 
only interested in compensation for the colonial rule in the early 20th century as a precondition 
to co-operate in irregular migration control. Speaking at a ceremony in Rome during his three-
day visit, and while standing next to the then Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, Gaddafi 
said,  
“Europe will 'turn black' unless the EU pays Libya £4 billion a year, as 
compensation for colonial injustice. Libya will not participate in the control of 




will otherwise become another Africa. Tomorrow Europe might no longer be 
European because there are millions of African immigrants who want to come 
in. We don't know if Europe will remain an advanced and united continent or if 
it will be destroyed, as happened with the barbarian invasions”.2 3 
From a rationalist perspective, there was no direct correlation between the rhetoric of 
compensation for early 20th-century colonial injustice and co-operation towards African 
irregular migration control. Nevertheless, Ghaddafi was well aware that Libya was the most 
strategic migrants’ transit route to Europe. He emphasized his unequivocal relevance in 
assisting Europe to manage African irregular migration. By so doing, he magnified the 
consequences of the EU’s failure to manage African irregular migration by saying, “tomorrow 
Europe might no longer be for Europeans as there are millions of blacks who want to come in”. 
Gaddafi further used irregular migrants to negotiate his high demands through outward 
blackmail. He capitalized on the differences between African irregular migrants and Europeans 
when he said,  
“We don't know what will happen; what will be the reaction of the white and Christian 
Europeans faced with this influx of starving and ignorant Africans”. 4 
Again, he created a problematic situation for Italy to oppose his demands: first, he wanted Italy 
to acknowledge that there existed an unsorted issue of colonial injustice. Secondly, he 
demanded Italy take responsibility for colonial actions by offering compensation. Most 
significantly, he framed African irregular migrants as a security threat to European culture to 
construct irregular migration control a priority to the EU actors. In response to Gaddafi’s 
demands, the former Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, had several options:  
 
2 The Telegraph (2010). 
3 BBC News (2010). 




• First, Berlusconi could have disregarded Libya’s role in irregular migration control and 
therefore dismiss Gaddafi’s demands. This then would have necessitated Italy and the 
EU to seek for an alternative strategy without Libya. Italy would then avoid being 
entrapped by embarking on what Dixon (2017) refers to as norm disregard. However,  
Libya being the major migratory route to Europe, the cost of losing the Italy-Libya 
partnership was unbearable to the EU.  
•  Secondly, Italy could have disregarded colonial injustice and claim that the context 
was irrelevant and, if it was relevant, only to an insignificant level. By so doing, Italy 
would have pushed for irregular migration control agenda without incorporating the 
Libya-Italy colonial engagement. Ben-Josef and Dixon (2019) refer to such a reaction 
as norm avoidance – Italy would have avoided colonial rhetoric by directly funding 
irregular migration control and therefore avoid being entrapped. Even then, Italy would 
have acknowledged Libya as a vital partner in irregular migration control. Yet, the risk 
would have been high for Italy since there would be no motivation for Libya to 
participate in migration control. 
• The third option would have been a re-interpretation of the colonial rhetoric to its 
advantage by accepting the logic of colonialism but giving more attention to irregular 
migration. Such a move would have downplayed Libya’s colonial demands and 
capitalized on Italy’s interest - irregular migration control. However, Libya would have 
questioned the partnership as ingenuine and one that only served the EU's interests.  
• Due to strong socialization between Libya and Italy, and the EU’s need for strategic 
irregular migration control partners, and the validity of colonial rhetoric, the process of 
rhetorical action led to an entrapment. Berlusconi could not reject the validity of the 
colonial injustice committed by Italy. He had minimal chances for a valid counter-




Eventually, Berlusconi signed an Italy-Libya agreement in 2008. According to the agreement, 
Italy pledged to compensate Libya 5 billion Euros over the next 25 years for colonial injustice, 
and in return, Libya was to cooperate in irregular migration control5. Berlusconi acknowledged 
that the money that Italy committed to compensate Libya was purposely meant to address the 
adverse effects of colonialism as opposed to the common expectation - contribution towards 
migration control mechanisms. He categorically stated that,  
“As head of the government and in the name of the Italian people, I feel it is my 
duty to apologize and express my sorrow for what happened many years ago 
and left a scar on many of your [Libya’s] families. The money paid is a material 
and emotional recognition of the mistakes that our country has done to yours 
during the colonial era".6 7 
Provocative and controversial as Gaddafi’s remarks were, they revealed a feeling of entitlement 
for compensation of colonial injustice that Africa still holds. As a result of this attitude of 
entitlement, it remained apparent that African leaders lived to wait for good opportunities to 
address the atrocities and injustices related to the colonial era. For instance, Gaddafi responded 
to Berlusconi’s remarks that, 
"In this historic document, Italy apologizes for its killing, destruction and repression 
against Libyans during the colonial rule."8 
Gaddafi’s demanding tone, as exemplified by his diction, was not of an aid beggar. The EU's 
need for African irregular migration control gave him a perfect opportunity to address colonial 
injustice. Even in the absence of a significant crisis, through blackmail (the securitization of 
 
5 Financial Times (2016).  
6 The New York Times (2008). 
7 Fetouri, (2019).  




African migration), Gaddafi created a compelling reason for Italy to pledge compensation for 
colonial injustice.  
Gaddafi’s strategic action to drag the colonial rhetoric into irregular migration control 
partnerships did not end with the Libya-Italy agreement. Instead, it became the beginning of 
new rhetorical action (i.e., framing neo-colonialism as the root causes of African irregular 
migration) by African countries against the EU actors. As mentioned in the later section of this 
chapter, having sorted out the colonial issues with Libya, after the Valletta Summit, Italy 
became the most vocal EU member, urging other EU members to stop colonizing Africa as that 
was the root cause of African irregular migration. 
6.4 Rhetoric of neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration   
Neocolonialism has been described as “the deliberate and continued survival of the colonial 
system in independent African states, by turning these states into victims of political, mental, 
economic, social, military and technical forms of domination carried out through indirect and 
subtle means that did not include direct violence.”9 Neocolonialism is, therefore, a generic term 
that combines policies or actions that shape the nature of the relationship between the former 
colonizers and formally colonized and which indirectly serve to enhance continuity of the 
colonial era.10 By 2015, all European countries that colonized Africa were EU members and 
participated in the Valletta Summit. Thus, African partners' critical rhetoric regarding  Europe's 
historical (colonial) past in the Valletta Summit was considered a critique of neo-colonialism. 
This was regardless of the reference to the term neo-colonialism itself. Instead, neo-colonialism 
was constructed by framing the EU’s political, economic, military and other forms of 
domination on African states, as part of the root causes of African irregular migration. 
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6.4.1 Africa’s critique of neo-colonialism  
As African irregular migration increased, the EU intensified its effort to form a partnership 
with African countries on migration control. The EU was also the sole financier (either through 
multilateral or bilateral mechanisms) of irregular migration control projects. Despite 
development aid, African countries still resisted co-operating. There was a growing concern 
that the migration management agenda was increasingly shifting the EU’s aid from mainstream 
development to border control programs. Also, the EU was the sole decision-maker for projects 
it funded. African governments saw the EU’s development aid as a neo-colonial tool to serve 
its interests rather than the African countries’ development priorities. When the African 
countries refused to co-operate, the EU introduced a ‘more for more approach’. This meant 
more cooperation on irregular migration control for more development aid. Many African 
countries did not like the strategy as they interpreted it as ‘less cooperation in migration control 
for less aid’ (see section 3.5 of chapter 3).  
In July 2009, the Rwandan President, Paul Kagame - during an interview with CNN about the 
development of Africa - termed foreign aid from Global North as dead aid. He further 
emphasized that colonialism should not be ignored as one of the major factors for African 
underdevelopment.   
“What we want is to be self-reliant and get zero aid. In our case, we do not want 
anybody to control us [using aid]. Nobody owns us. But we should be free to 
transact in business. And what we are talking about here is the principles of the 
process of getting rid of aid. During my term in office, I have to make sure that the 
process is on, and is effectively done so that whoever comes after me may finish 
the job. I wish I could do it sooner. Aid must do those things that will eventually 




many reasons, some of them colonialism. I agree with what President Obama said 
while in Ghana `that African people should not always talk of colonialism as the 
failure of their continent’, but that has to be factored as part of it”. 11 
The connection between the ‘inefficiency of foreign aid’ and colonialism clearly showed that 
Kagame’s speech targeted Europe. Also, by mentioning that “it is about the principles of the 
process”, Kagame highlighted his determination to move away from the EU’s foreign aid and 
hold former colonizers accountable for the effects of colonialism in Africa. By dead aid, he 
meant that most of the time, aid to Africa did not free people out of poverty; instead, it created 
more dependence on aid. Kagame used pathos by connecting his logic to Obama’s comments 
on Africa’s colonial rhetoric in explaining the necessity for decolonization. In other words, 
Kagame argued that the EU’s influence to shape the colonial rhetoric was instrumental and 
aimed to hinder Africa’s process of decolonization. To Kagame, colonialism should be 
considered part of the root cause of some of Africa's current problems. He viewed Europe’s 
attempt to ignore the historical reality as a deliberate move to avoid condemnation.  
Kagame’s rhetoric that Europe gives “development aid” to Africa with an intent to reap 
economic benefit was not far-fetched. According to the African Union (2015), the continued 
failure of African political leaders to defy outside pressures from their former colonial masters 
was one of the factors likely to speed up the current migration in the sense that it undermines 
the likelihood of forging an effective and progressive African position on migration.  
Kagame tried to challenge the target audiences: ‘the modern-colonizers’ and ‘the non-modern 
colonized,’ linked together by development aid12. He saw the minimal reference to the colonial 
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history by the EU actors as guided by the presentist's version of procedures, policies and laws, 
which confine policymakers in irregular migration to an irresistible course with inevitable 
outcomes. For a long time, the EU embarked on a relatively fixed migration control approach 
of border protection. To African countries, this presented a false notion that control measures 
were necessary and unavoidable. They further saw the underdevelopment of the continent as 
not natural but rather human-caused.  
The African countries further criticized the EU for shifting Africa's development aid from 
mainstream development projects to migration control. Although the EU saw ‘the more for 
more approach’ as an incentive and conditionality for African countries to co-operate in 
irregular migration control, African partners termed the strategy as an ill-advised policy. In 
2014, during the Umushyikirano (Rwanda’s annual national dialogue) in Kigali, Rwanda, 
Kagame critiqued the EU’s aid, saying that it was always accompanied by lies and double 
standards and hypocrisy – for which African states should not apologize. Through the lens of 
neo-colonialism, Kagame saw aid as an instrument of control when he said that, 
“But all they [Europe] do is politics. They belittle people. We are not people to 
be belittled at all. They feel they are all better than anybody. We shall never ever 
be apologetic for standing up for our rights, and there are no better people than 
us in our own country and in our affairs [applause]….. It is a tradition, of course, 
there are people who say ‘well we give you our money so we must tell you what 
to do and what to be. Well, there comes a point where I say ok, between my 
rights and what I want to be, and, your money, then you can remain with your 
money. But of course, that also tells you the truth: their hypocrisy, their double 
standards, and lies. People tell you that they can give you their money because 




having my rights. I cannot have my well-being when you dictate to me every 
day what I should do and what I should be. You can remain with your money, 
and I will have my freedom too [applause]. And I will manage my problems, 
and I will also manage the ones that you caused me. There is no problem, but 
there is a line you cannot cross”.13  
Like in 2009, Kagame repeated the rhetoric of the EU actors' control using foreign aid. Such a 
repetition indicated that even before the 2015 Valletta summit, the neo-colonial discourse was 
building. Around 2014, the critical issue around African irregular migration management 
involved the EU’s financing border surveillance and migration control project instead of 
addressing the origin of those causes. Kagame termed the conditionalities that accompanied 
the aid as insincere. Critically as he framed it, the development aid was a tool for manipulation 
that African leaders ought to resist. “...It is a tradition, of course, there are people who say well 
we give you our money, so we must tell you what to do and what to be.”  Kagame was not only 
concerned about Africa having the freedom to manage its issues, but he also acknowledged 
that some of the problems had been caused by those offering strategic aid, i.e.,  “ I will manage 
my problems, and I will manage the ones that you caused me”. He linked colonialism (as part 
of the root cause of the problem) with neo-colonialism – control through foreign aid. 
Worthwhile noting, as highlighted in the later section (in section 6.7), the EU president, 
Juncker, in his 2018 State of the Union speech to the European Parliament, responded to 
Kagame in particular on the issue of EU’s development aid to Africa. 
6.4.2 Rhetoric of the root causes of African irregular migration 
Even when the EU pursued African countries for a partnership towards migration control, there 
was already ongoing critical rhetoric of what consisted of the root causes of irregular migration. 
 




Overall, African irregular migration to Europe was constructed as people’s response to 
unlimited and unfair resources flow out of the continent to Europe. This rhetoric by African 
leaders, activists, and other influential people highlighted trade as one of the root causes of 
irregular migration. The negative terms of trade were perceived to cause impoverishment in 
the continent. 
Aminata Traoré, a former Malian minister of culture and an activist, explained the nexus 
between European exploitation (neo-colonialism) and African irregular migration. She 
presented a question to the EU that, 
 “now that you (the EU actors) have devastated the ecosystems, dulled the 
people’s mind and humiliated them, as a result, they have turned into complete 
conformists, how can you dare to tell these people they should stay at home, 
while at the same time you take everything from them, what they needed to live 
a dignified life in their countries: How? If you don’t want someone to come to 
your countries, give him the opportunity to manage his wealth himself. Don’t 
take from him that what he needs to live dignifiedly at his home, while 
simultaneously locking your doors twice. He will necessarily search for what 
you have taken from him. Yet, are the free countries of Europe capable to 
understand this?”.14  
As a Pan-Africanist, Aminata Traoré framed the EU actor as part of the root cause of African 
irregular migration. She constructed the root causes as the devastation of the ecosystem and 
the exploitation of resources by Europe.  She then connected the EU’s contribution to the root 
causes, with the inconsistency of the EU’s ‘actorness’ in two ways. First, she used ‘while 
simultaneously locking your doors twice’ to describe fortress Europe. Secondly, she critiqued 
 




normative power Europe by presenting a question, ‘Yet, are the free countries of Europe 
capable to understand this?’ The persuasiveness of  Traoré’s rhetoric was not only based on 
her conceptualization of the EU’s role in causing irregular migration but also the EU’s 
inconsistency in its normative power.  
Europe had been argued to be one of the key contributors to global warming and climatic 
change, which adversely affected the livelihoods of the global south. Yordanos Estifanos, a 
pan-Africanist and an activist, argued that irregular migration was not only a result of unfair 
and exploitative relations between Europe and Africa but also as a result of climate change. To 
Estifanos, 
 “Of the major constraints that preclude African countries from realizing a 
potential demographic dividend, climate change and resource exploitation stand 
on top. Although these factors have intensified in recent decades, they have 
always been present, embedded in historical and structural relations, which can 
be traced back to the era of the industrial revolution and colonization. Being 
confronted with increasing climate change hazards (some of which are climate-
change induced) and growing competition for African resources, mainly by 
countries in the Global North, the youth from different African countries are 
responding in different ways. Migration, both internal and international, is one 
of these responses to climate change and resource exploitation as well as skewed 
historical and prevailing twisted economic, political and power relations. 
Migration being inherently age selective, youth migration is particularly 
prominent. Consequently, many African youths question the actions and 
inactions of international actors as well as the unfairness of global economic 




migrants who are heading to countries in the Global North, however, is that they 
are irregular (another way of saying illegal) migrants”. 15  
Estifanos’ argument was seemingly an extension of Traoré's rhetoric. His argument was based 
on the increased awareness of economic exploitation climate change had caused displacement 
and forced migration. As Estifanos explained, a significant concern was how the developed 
world had contributed to climate change, which disproportionately affected the developing 
world, thereby causing irregular migrants. He further viewed both neo-colonialism and 
colonialism as the origin of this vulnerability ‘…these factors have always been present, 
embedded in historical and structural relations which can be traced back to the era of the 
industrial revolution and colonization’. The picture Estifanos created was that colonialism was 
the root cause of African irregular migration and had been sustained by neo-colonial structures. 
He concluded by urging the EU to take responsibility for contributing to the root causes of 
African irregular migration.  
“It shows that it is rather the direct responsibility of countries in the Global North to 
welcome African migrants as long as the former directly or indirectly contribute to 
migration, i.e., through climate change and resource exploitations. […] Welcoming 
African migrants into Europe is not a moral question only […]. It rather is a 
responsibility for the harm and disruption caused by undesirable consequences 
of climate change and resource exploitations that are embedded in skewed 
economic, political and power relations” 16 . 
Although Estifano’s argument appeared to address the universal audience using the term 
Global North, his target audience was Europe (the EU) that was the ultimate destination for 
irregular African migrants. He used the terms like ‘former directly and indirectly contributors’ 
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of migration to denote colonialism and neo-colonialism, respectively. Besides, he saw the EU 
actors obliged to receive African irregular migrants for being part of what he terms as the root 
cause – neo-colonialism, i.e., ‘..it rather is a responsibility for the harm and disruption caused 
by undesirable consequences of climate change and resource exploitations that are embedded 
in skewed economic, political and power relations.’ Alongside faulting the EU for being part 
of the root causes of African irregular migration, like Aminata Traoré, Estifano criticized 
normative power Europe for its fortress approach.  
“Juxtaposed against these are the governments in countries of the global north which are 
building more and more high-tech fortresses through adopting draconian anti-
immigration laws as well as intervening in the politics of periphery countries under 
the pretext of national security and, at times, under the guise of establishing 
democracy”. 17 
In summary, African partners' rhetoric always linked root causes of irregular migration to 
colonial and neo-colonial agendas. The rhetoric was further lauded by the critic of the EU’s 
normative actorness in irregular migration control.  
6.5 European rhetoric on irregular migration before the Valletta Summit  
Although there was critical rhetoric in Africa about the EU’s external actions, the EU actors 
(the EU and member states) had always pushed for border protection and the fight against 
human trafficking to manage migration. When the African irregular migration intensified (just 
before reaching its peak in 2015), European leaders were under pressure to find a more effective 
solution. For instance, Baroness Anelay, the then UK’s Minister of State for the Foreign Office, 
in a written statement, expressed that the European stance was not to support further search 
and rescue missions to save African irregular migrants entering Europe by unworthy boats, as 
 




it encouraged more people to migrate. The blame was placed on migrants for putting their lives 
in danger and, therefore, ought to be responsible for their own risks.  
“Ministers across Europe have expressed concerns that search and rescue 
operations in the Mediterranean have acted as a pull factor for illegal migration, 
encouraging people to make dangerous crossings in the expectation of rescue. This 
has led to more deaths as traffickers have exploited the situation using boats that 
are unfit to make the crossing.”. 18 19  
By 2014, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had reported more than 3000 
deaths in the Mediterranean Sea.20 Anelay’s remarks came into the limelight when she 
submitted a proposal to the EU to stop search and rescue operations in the Sea. This came a 
time when the EU had plans to initiate its search and rescue mission (Operation Triton) to 
replace Italy’s led rescue operation (Mare Nostrum). The EU’s Triton mission was far much 
underfunded compared to Italy’s Mare Nostrum. It was suggested by some agencies such as 
IOM that reducing funding for search and rescue missions would increase the number of 
migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea. Yet, the EU introduced a lesser funded Triton 
mission. Fabrice Leggeri, the head of the EU border protection agency (FRONTEX), was clear 
that the EU's mandate was not to save stranded migrants at sea but to prevent them from 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea. 
“Triton cannot be a search and rescue operation. I mean, in our operational plan, we 
cannot have provisions for proactive search and rescue action. This is not in 
FRONTEX’s mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the 
European Union” 21 [words were spoken five months before the Valletta Summit]. 
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Within Europe, the fight against human traffickers and migrant smugglers was the dominant 
rhetoric that defined the EU’s actions in irregular migration management22. By reducing the 
scope of search and rescue of operation Triton, much attention shifted to the prevention of 
departures from Libyan shores23. The rescued migrants eventually ended arriving in Europe; 
hence the search and rescue strategy did not work for the EU’s objective to prevent irregular 
migrants. This explained why Leggeri was clear that the proactive search and rescue “was not 
in FRONTEX’s mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the European 
Union.” Contrastingly, the EU’s move to reduce search and rescue was heavily criticized. 
Maurice Wren, the then chief executive of the Refugee Council, expressed 
“The only outcome of withdrawing search and rescue help will be to witness more 
people needlessly and shamefully dying on Europe’s doorstep.” 24 25 
6.6 The Africa-EU Valletta Summit  
The Africa-EU summit was held in Valletta, Malta, in November 2015. The summit involved 
heads of state from both the EU member countries and African partner countries. Top officials 
in the African Union and European Union also took part in the summit. For proper analysis, 
the speeches by different speakers were connected to form concrete rhetoric from each partner. 
In the beginning, the Maltese Prime minister Joseph Muscat expressed that African and 
European partners were expected to be honest in the discussion. As the host of the summit, he 
expressed that, 
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“..This is the first time that we see the two continents meet together to speak 
honestly.. I hope honestly.. about this phenomenon [African irregular 
migration]”.26  
Based on Muscat’s comments, all that was spoken by each partner was assumed to be an honest 
stance of each partner. The speeches were also presumed to contain what partners stood for 
and believed to be true. Right from the onset of the Valletta Summit, it was clear that both the 
African and the European partners had their list of agenda priorities. This was mentioned by 
the president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, before the first European partners’ 
premeeting session. 
This is a summit, with our African partners, about very early recognition of the root 
causes of irregular migration, about development cooperation, which should also be 
linked to the rule of law, and to the fundamental rights. It is also about sustainable 
cooperation in the fight against human trafficking. For us [the European partners], it is 
also about readmission agreements. So, there is a list of challenges from both sides.27  
 Based on Schulz’s words, each side had its well-planned issues related to African irregular 
migration. As well, each partner knew the agenda of the other. For this reason, and for clarity 
of analysis, the rhetoric of each partner was discussed separately. The first section focuses on 
the European partners’ perspective – the rhetoric of migration control and border surveillance. 
The following part consists of rhetoric by the African partners.  
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6.6.1 European rhetoric in the Valletta Summit (the rhetoric of migration control) 
After the first round of negotiations with African partners, the European partners held a side 
meeting. Afterward, the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, gave a speech that 
expressed the EU stance.  
“The purpose of our informal meeting, which took place right after the summit with 
our African partners, was to speed up the implementation of the decisions taken so 
far by the European Council. Every week, decisions are taken in Europe. This 
testifies how grave the situation is: the reintroduction of border controls or 
“technical barriers” at the borders. It is a clear demonstration that we need to regain 
control of our external border. Clearly, not as the only action but as the first and 
most important action; as a precondition for European migration policy. In this 
connection, I welcome the declaration made by Slovakia, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary today of committing 225 officials to reinforce FRONTEX and EASO. 
This is good news. It is indeed urgent to fill this gap in implementation”.28 
From Tusk’s speech, it was clear that the EU pushed for migration control mechanisms. It 
aimed to address technical barriers related to border protection measures by empowering 
FRONTEX and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Contrary to the expectations of 
the African countries, Tusk highlighted that the Valletta Summit “was to speed up the 
implementation of the decisions taken so far by the European Council.” In reality, the 
understanding was that the summit was of equal partners as opposed to African partners being 
there to implement the decisions of the European Council. Besides, he welcomed  “the 
declaration made by Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary today of committing 225 
officials to reinforce FRONTEX and EASO”. Such declaration indicated the EU’s firm stance 
in support of border control strategy. While FRONTEX was mainly concerned with preventing 
 




irregular migrants from reaching Europe through the Mediterranean Sea, EASO facilitated 
migrant control within the EU. Most significantly, the urgency to manage the migration crisis 
appeared frequently in his speech. For instance, Tusk said, “This testifies how grave the 
situation is..” and “it is indeed urgent to fill this gap in implementation.” In the same speech, 
Tusk further argued for migration control and border protection by saying that, 
“Securing our borders also requires that our rules and laws be applied. The 
European Union will stick to its international obligation in terms of asylum rights, 
but it must be clear that without registration, there will be no rights. If a migrant 
does not cooperate, there must be consequences. It is also clear that asylum seekers 
cannot decide where they will be granted asylum within the European Union. These 
are issues for the Commission and our Interior Ministers. They will need to turn 
these principles into operational reality now. Again, if we do not progress, this 
Schengen will be at stake..”. 29 
By referencing the interior ministers across the EU, the focus was to establish internal 
migration control mechanisms, chiefly implemented by the police. He also suggested that the 
migrants' non-compliance with the Dublin System would lead to revocation of asylum rights, 
deportation being the only option. According to the president of the EU Council and the 
president of the EU Commission, it was notable that the EU operated in an urgent mode to 
manage the ‘migration crisis.’ To European partners, time was a critical factor. Success meant 
achieving anything that could effectively control the migrant influx. Tusk again expressed the 
urgency by saying, 
 




“To conclude, let me repeat: The clock is ticking. We are under pressure. We need 
to act fast as a Union and in cooperation with our partners, including Turkey, and 
that also will have to move fast…”. 30 
From the European rhetoric, it was clearly visible that the EU expected African partners to 
support its border control agenda. This was evident in a speech by Tusk, who said, 
“We need to find a new form of cooperation, but today the most important thing is to find 
partners as far away as possible from Schengen. I do not doubt that we have to do 
something much more effective to reestablish our external border. Our cooperation with 
Turkey and African partners can be easier when we have Balkan states as alternative 
partners in migrant control”. 31 
The EU’s effort to find partners as far away as possible from Schengen meant using the 
southern borders of African transit countries as a virtual EU’s external border to keep off the 
irregular migrants. Other European leaders, including Louis Grech, Maltese Minister of 
European Affairs32, Muscat, Maltese Prime Minister33 and Simonetta Sommaruga, President 
of Switzerland,34 expressed border protection and the control of irregular migration as the 
central focus for the EU. The Swedish Prime minister Stefan Löfven also expressed that 
alongside the concerns about Africa’s development agenda, Europe’s agenda of irregular 
migration control needed to be considered. Although he acknowledged African partners pushed 
for a development agenda, he highlighted the EU’s main aim was irregular migration control.  
“We can find a balance between, on the one hand, cooperating with the African 
countries to enhance development, but of course, we need to discuss illegal 
migration35. We must respect the rules we have in the European Union. We do this 
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because, when our authorities question us that we cannot guarantee the security and 
the control of our borders, we need to listen. That is why we are taking that decision 
[pushing for migration control]”. 36  
From Prime minister Löfven's comments, it was apparent that he suggested that there was a 
direct link between the migration crisis and the security threat in Europe. Theresa May, the 
then Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister for Women and Equalities of 
the United Kingdom, expressed the need for the EU to enforce control measures more 
vigorously. From Theresa’s perspective, the EU’s guiding post in the Valletta Summit was 
migration control through border protection and the fight against human traffickers.  
“What we are doing in Europe and in the UK as well is ensuring that we smash the 
criminal gangs (human traffickers) that are making money out irregular migration 
and cause human misery.” 37   
Although Norway is not an EU member state, it was actively involved in the discussions as one 
of the European partners. Like other EU member states, it supported the EU’s agenda of 
migration control. In the summit, Erna Solberg, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway, 
supported the EU’s migration control agenda when she said that  
“I hope that the action plan gives us a little bit more control of migrants. This is the 
concern for all the European countries right now”. 38 
In this summit, the EU’s main objective was to manage the perceived ‘migration crisis.’ The 
EU used FRONTEX (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) to implement irregular 
migration control and surveillance of the southern borderline. To ensure effectiveness, the EU 
invited Interpol (International Police) to reinforce irregular migration control in the 
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Mediterranean Sea. Since 2011, the two agencies have joined efforts in border protection. 39 
On this basis, Interpol was one of the European partners and a proxy in the Valletta Summit. 
Although there was high irregular migration across Africa, Interpol did not attempt to hider 
asylum-seeking. Contrastingly, it fiercely came in to prevent African irregular migration to 
Europe. The Secretary-General of Interpol, Jürgen Stock, without reference to any asylum law, 
indicated strong support for the EU’s agenda in migration control. In his words,  
“One of the dimensions of the crisis we are discussing here in Valletta is organized 
crime. Organized crime groups are organizing huge profits from desperate people 
trying to leave their countries and looking for a better life. These organized crime 
groups are also involved in other criminal activities such as drug trafficking, 
wildlife crime, and money laundering. The international community has to find a 
strong response, and this summit is about taking action. Interpol has come in 
strongly to counter migrant smuggling and assist in coordinating police activities”. 
40  
From his speech, Helmut’s main concern was establishing a quick and actionable EU-Africa 
plan to stop irregular migration to Europe, which was framed as migrant smuggling and 
trafficking. ‘..The international community has to find a strong response and this summit is 
about taking action’. Coordination of Police activities was crucial in border protection both 
within Europe and alongside the southern border.  
Seemingly, the European partners were not fully prepared to handle the African rhetoric of 
the root causes. There was a division among the European partners – some members did not 
the EU border control agenda. This difference was also noted by Schulz, the president of the 
European Parliament, who specified that, 
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“The meeting is featured by two phenomena. On the one hand, the EU member 
states are divided about the migration policy within the EU, and now the African 
countries are into partnership with the European Union on the basis of the action 
plan”. 41 
Unlike the vast majority of European leaders, a few, such as the Estonian Prime Minister, Taavi 
Rõivas, expressed the need to address the root causes of African migration, including 
enhancing trade42 (an agenda that African partners firmly pushed forward, see in the later part). 
Germany, under Angela Merkel, had accepted the most migrants in Europe and had an open-
border policy. The country was not operating within the Dublin system, which had proved 
inefficient in managing the EU-wide asylum management.43 Other small EU member states 
such as Luxembourg and Lithuania had a similar course. The president of Lithuania, Dalia 
Grybauskaité, was quoted critiquing the establishment of border fences by some EU member 
states. 
“Some amendments proposed are difficult because they involve changing the 
EU’s treaty… Border fences are not the best solution for Europe and fences are 
not the best symbolism”. 44  
The Prime Minister of Luxembourg, and the head of  Luxembourg Presidency in the EU 
Council, Xavier Bettel, also acknowledged that his country was among the very few EU 
member states willing to invest in people instead of borders.  
“As the EU member states, we have to find mid-term and long-term solutions to 
African irregular migration. Luxembourg is one of the few.. few countries in Europe 
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that prefer to spend and invest money in people rather than investing in defense 
policies”. 45 
The extra emphasis by the Prime Minister of Luxembourg that only very few countries 
were willing to invest in people and root causes of African migration indicated how the 
EU at large firmly aimed to achieve the sole objective of empowering border protection 
and migration control measures. Besides, contrary to African partners, the European 
partners saw the Euro 1.8 billion offered to the EU Trust Fund for Africa as a considerable 
achievement. The amount was praised by many European leaders, including the president 
of the EU Parliament.46 47 At the end of the Valletta Summit, there were critical voices in 
Europe about the proposed action plan to address the root causes. They pointed out that 
it was unclear what really constituted ‘the root causes’ of irregular migration. 
6.6.2 African rhetoric in the Valletta Summit (critique rhetoric of neo-colonialism) 
As part of the opening speeches, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, President of the African Union 
Commission, was on an entirely different tone from that of the European leaders and the 
president of the EU Council - Tusk. The rhetoric of coloniality and the EU’s double standards 
was evident in her speech. She expressed questions about why Europe framed African irregular 
migration as a crisis. Yet, larger numbers of Europeans came to Africa during and before 
colonization, and the situation was not labeled the ‘European migration crisis’ in Africa. Zuma 
started her analogy of migration between Africa and Europe from pre-colonial times. 
“Historically, Africa has been receptive to European migration even before 
colonialization. As well, during and after the second world war, Europeans flocked 
to Africa to as far as the most southern part of Africa for commercial and settlement 
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purposes. They were welcomed, and at that time, there was no crisis of European 
migration in Africa. The challenge of African migration cannot be fixed with quick 
fixes. It needs sustainable solutions”.48 
A striking difference between Zuma’s rhetoric and that of European partners was the 
context situation. As the European partners spoke the language of the migration crisis, 
Zuma and other African representatives spoke the historical past and, in particular, the 
Europe-Africa colonial engagement. Secondly, as the European partners sought support 
from the African partners to implement mechanisms to prevent people from reaching 
Europe, Zuma had an opposite view. She faulted Europe for not honoring the principle of 
reciprocity. “Historically, Africa has been receptive to European migration even before 
colonialization… They were welcomed and at that time, there was no crisis of European 
migration in Africa”. Her tone suggested that, because of the Africa-Europe colonial 
engagement, Europe needed to be more friendly to irregular migrants rather than making 
a huge investment in border protection to stop them from reaching Europe. 
Zuma’s speech was a deconstruction of the EU’s rhetoric that African irregular migration 
was indeed a crisis “…and at that time there was no crisis of European migration in 
Africa”. Her point was that if Europeans went to Africa and the situation was not labeled 
a crisis, it should not have been a crisis when African irregular migrants went to Europe. 
Moreover, she outrightly opposed the president of the European Council, Tusk. Tusk had 
claimed that “..this testifies how grave the situation is: the reintroduction of border 
controls, or “technical barriers” at the borders. It is a clear demonstration that we need to 
regain control of our external border”. In response, Zuma declared that “..the challenge 
of African migration cannot be fixed with quick fixes. It needs sustainable solutions.” 
 




Such strong opposition by the chair of the African Union Commission showed 
contradicting motivations for each partner, i.e., the need to manage migration crisis vis-
a-vis the need to address the root causes.  
The Senegalese president and then the chairperson of the Economic Community of West 
Africa States (ECOWAS), Macky Sall, further referred to Africa-Europe colonial 
engagement. Sall represented not only his country but also the broader West African countries. 
Unlike the European partners who started their speech by framing African irregular migration 
as a crisis, Sall, just like Zuma, started his speech by highlighting the Africa-Europe historical 
engagement.  
“We are here in the spirit of dialogue and openness. [..] we are here, and the 
relationship is based on solidarity. Dialogue and migration go back to the beginning 
of time. The problem of migration is not easy. What we need to have is a global 
sustainable approach. It is only then we will be able to resolve this complex matter 
together. [..] Between African and Europe, we have a long history. We have seen 
very many shared sacrifices.. twice in one generation. We have long cooperation 
between Europe and Africa. We are very close. We are interlinked. We have 
cultural ties and linguistic ties..”. 49 [Translated from French] 
The critical point in Sall’s initial part of his speech was how colonialism interlinked 
Europe and Africa. He suggested that the current happenings (both challenge and solution 
to African irregular migration) required an understanding of Africa-Europe historical 
engagement, which led to both “cultural ties and linguistic ties.” The observable 
differences of both speakers’ opening remarks in a speech between the European and 
 




African partners showed a diverse conceptualization of the problem of irregular 
migration.  
African partners were also critical about the measures taken by the EU in migration 
control. Zuma expressed her concerns regarding the European partners' overemphasis on 
border protection. She accused the EU member states of taking a fortress Europe.  
“Part of the problem we are facing today is in part because some countries in Europe 
have taken a fortress approach. There is no part of the world that can be a fortress. 
African Union is not in support of and cannot endorse the establishment of the so-
called processing centers in Africa. The processing centers or whatever they may 
be called will become de facto detention centers that will constitute a serious 
violation of human rights and re-victimization of migrants”.50 51 
As the representative of the African Union, Zuma, strongly opposed the EU’s proposal 
for extra-territorialization of migration control as had been mentioned by Tusk, i.e., “..to 
find partners as far away as possible from Schengen...” Zuma was clear that ‘African 
Union is not in support of and cannot endorse the establishment of the so-called 
processing centers in Africa’. She was categorical that African did not support anything 
of such kind, ‘…or whatever they may be called’. Her critique of the EU’s fortress 
approach was taken was also endorsed by the President of Senegal, Sall, who mentioned. 
“We should avoid policies that involve building new barriers. That is not the way 
forward. Let us engage in a partnership that creates prosperity for both partners”.52 
Sall did not only reject the EU’s proposal for empowering control measures by asserting that 
building new barriers ‘is not the way forward’ but also redirected the EU to a notion of shared 
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prosperity.  Sameh Shukry, the head of the delegation of Egypt, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
was critical to the EU’s violation of human rights through the unlawful deportation of African 
irregular migrants. He saw unlawful deportation of migrants as an attempt by the EU to engage 
in the partnership in a coercive manner. He expressed that,  
“The solution to irregular migration is to address the challenges in a human manner 
on the bases of cooperation and partnership and shunning any coercive migrant 
return policies”.53  
Shukry’s comments seem to be addressed to Tusk, who had earlier stated that ‘the European 
Union will stick to its international obligation in terms of asylum rights, but it must be clear 
that without registration [in the Dublin System], there will be no rights. If a migrant does not 
cooperate, there must be consequences...’. As the EU Council president suggested, the 
deportation of irregular migrants would result from failure to comply with the EU’s Dublin 
System. This prompted Shukry to recommend ‘..shunning any coercive migrant return 
policies’. It is worth noting that even before the 2015 Valletta summit, the African countries 
had resisted deportation (see chapter three). 
 African leaders were certain right from the onset of the Valletta Summit. They knew they were 
coming to discuss the root causes of irregular migration. The representative of Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf, President of Liberia, was asked by journalists about the African expectation from the 
summit. He responded, 
“We came here specifically to identify what causes [African irregular] 
migration.”54 
Similar rhetoric came from Barnaba Marial Benjamin, Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation Minister of the Republic of South Sudan, who commented that  
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“I think more commitment from Europe [to address the root causes] is important; 
with such commitment, African countries will be ready to manage migration.”55  
Alongside the South Sudan minister was his Sudanese counterpart, who gave a supporting 
argument. Ibrahim Ghandour, Foreign Minister of Sudan responded to a question, 
“…But there are root causes including poverty eradication, fair trade agreements, 
climate change, and conflicts. So, we need to address the root causes in order to not 
discourage but to make everyone not think of leaving their home. […] (On the 
question of how the EU did repatriation of irregular migrants). This is against 
human rights. European countries keep telling us about human rights, and 
repatriation of people is one of these issues. So, we better deal with it on the basis 
of that… It has to be voluntary and in accordance with the international law”.56 
Ghandour’s gist of his comments was the need to address the root causes of irregular migration. 
However, to generate persuasion, he delegitimized the EU  normative actorness by highlighting 
the inconsistency between what the EU said and what it did regarding irregular migration 
control and deportation of migrants. ‘…European countries keep telling us about human rights, 
and repatriation of people is one of the issues. So, we better deal with it on the basis of that. It 
has to be voluntary and in accordance with the international law’. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and the head of the Egyptian delegation, Shukry, further reinforced the need for 
addressing the root causes of African irregular migration.  
“.. more importantly, the EU’s restrictive measures that rely mainly on 
security measures, interception and border control do not only expose 
irregular migrants to violence, discrimination, and exploitation but also fail 
to reduce the number of irregular migrants. What is needed is to address the 
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root causes of irregular migration, economic empowerment, poverty 
alleviation, trade and investment. Moreover, to address the root causes of 
irregular migratory movements, a range of strategies will be required: 
Economic development, poverty alleviation, trade and investment”.57 
In summary, contrary to the European partners who gave the presentist version of African 
irregular migration, African partners were more concerned with the historical past. As 
Europe drove the migration control agenda, Africa pushed forward the agenda of 
addressing the root causes of irregular migration. Besides, African partners delegitimized 
the EU’s migration control approach, terming it an effort to establish a fortress Europe. 
6.6.3 Demystifying root causes: A critic of the EU’s domination and lack of impartiality  
African partners did not only highlight the need to address the root causes of irregular 
migration but also clarified what those root causes entailed. Generally, root causes 
included a wide range of issues as unfair terms of trade, resource flow, climate change 
and external economic and political influence that fall under the broader meaning of neo-
colonialism as highlighted elsewhere in this study. The construction of the African 
partners' root causes portrayed the EU actors as one of the key contributors to irregular 
migration. 
The trade between Africa and Europe was heavily seen to be founded on structures of 
colonial engagement. African partners argued that resources are located in Africa, while 
industries are located in Europe. Europe would, therefore, remain a dominant partner - 
dictating the terms of engagement, some of which were detrimental to the African 
development process. The chair of the African Union, Zuma, explained what African 
 




countries termed root causes of irregular migration by referring to trade and 
industrialization.  
“Africa and Europe should be discussing beyond the raw materials and beyond trade 
but industrialization. This is what will create jobs. We have to industrialize and 
modernize our continent; otherwise, young people will continue to go elsewhere. 
[…] climate change is another issue. It is a shared responsibility. Africa contributes 
the least and suffers most”. 58 
She termed climate change as a root cause of African irregular migration and framed the EU to 
be part of the root causes, i.e., ‘…Africa contributes the least and suffers most’. In other words, 
part of the root causes of African irregular migration was pollution by the EU member states.  
Her attempt to link Africa’s low industrialization and modernization to irregular migration 
management was a well-calculated strategy of diverting attention from the border protection 
mechanisms heavily embarked by the EU. She aimed to introduce a different agenda of 
unbalanced trade and economic relations between the two continents59. The use of phrases like 
‘We have to..’ indicated a shared role between Europe and Africa. Zuma supported the 
prevailing rhetoric of neo-colonialism and twisted economic relations and faulted the EU’s 
actorness in irregular migration control. To generate persuasiveness of her rhetoric, she 
combined the critic of the EU normative identity and Africa's industrialization proposal. In this 
case, she viewed African irregular migrants as a phenomenon predestined to remain when she 
said that ( i.e.,‘…otherwise young people will continue to go elsewhere’) unless the continent 
is industrialized. 
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The president of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, gave a speech highlighting an intervention strategy in 
solving the root causes of African irregular migration. Like Zuma, he saw African irregular 
migrants as people who follow the direction of resources from Africa to Europe.  He said,  
 “The issue of irregular migration can be resolved through development; 
harmonious development of Africa. Resources are in the north. In the south, 
there is nothing. It seems to me that it is impossible to put an end to this 
[irregular migration] overnight”. 60 
Itno’s view that resources were in Europe while nothing was left in Africa resonated with 
Africa's dominant rhetoric that Europe had contributed to Africa’s underdevelopment through 
neo-colonialism, which set structures for the uncontrolled flow of resources. Besides, the 
rhetoric by the Chadian president aligned with a vast critical scholarship on the negative impact 
of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on Africa. 61 
In his speech, Sally, the president of Senegal and ECOWAS, presented neo-colonial rhetoric 
more profoundly by elaborating on the flow of natural resources from Africa to Europe. Sally 
was principally focused on the impact of the Africa-EU trade and the benefits of natural 
resources in Africa. 
“One of the causes of poverty in Africa, and a cause of irregular migration is trade. 
Until we have a fair pay for our natural resources in Africa, we will continue to be 
dependent and irregular migration will continue. We have to ensure that there is a 
fair payment not just for our natural resources but also, most importantly, 
processing of these commodities on our continent would provide a greater added 
value than merely exporting raw materials. Local processing would create jobs on 
African soil. This is the agenda we have been fighting for everywhere, including 
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from the G7, G20, to the United Nations. We also raised the same issue in this 
Summit, saying that it is not only about fair pay, but we also have to combat tax 
evasion because many different multinationals try using different ways to avoid 
taxes. In Africa, we have a lot of huge lost revenue, the fraudulent flow of money 
from Africa to Europe, which is estimated at $ 60 billion a year”. 62 [Translated 
from French] 
Sall’s key point was the unfair terms of engagement between Africa and Europe. He addressed 
neo-colonialism in various ways. First, he criticized Western multinationals for not only paying 
peanuts for natural resources but also transporting those resources to Europe for processing, 
therefore, failing to create job opportunities in Africa. Besides, a more critical issue was tax 
evasion and the illicit flow of money from Africa. Such framing of rhetoric portrayed Europe 
to be in a continuous state of looting resources from Africa through multinational corporations. 
He repeatedly emphasized on the uncontrolled flow of resources from Africa to Europe, urging 
that Africa can do well even without (EU’s) foreign aid if the resource flow issue was 
adequately addressed.  
“If we were to cut tax evasion and repatriate those resources back in Africa, it would 
enable us to avoid reliance on foreign aid. It would also enable us to reimburse our 
external debts. These are issues that have to be addressed together with other 
security issues such as terrorism.” 63 [Translated from French]. 
From his speech, Sall brought in another perspective of neo-colonialism: Africa’s reliance 
on foreign assistance rather than its own resources. This resonated with rhetoric presented 
by Kagame, the President of Rwanda, in 2014 (as highlighted in the earlier section) that 
“what we want is to be self-reliant and get zero aid. In our case, we do not want anybody 
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to control us [using aid]..” Here, Sall suggested that if the EU-Africa partnership was to 
manage the problem of African irregular migration sustainably, then it must work to 
manage resource flow to Europe and reduce Africa’s overreliance on EU’s development 
aid. It would also enable clearance of the huge external debt that African countries 
possess. As mentioned in chapter three, Senegal was one of the African countries that 
withdrew their input in joint migration control with the EU. One of the reasons why 
African countries did not comply was the belief that the EU relocated funds from 
mainstream development to migration control projects, including border surveillance in 
the transit regions. The rhetoric by Zuma as the chair of the African Commission and the 
president of Senegal, and the then chair of ECOWAS was applauded by other African 
leaders, including Kadré Dérisé Ouedraogo, the Secretary-General of ECOWAS64 and 
Salaheddine Mezouar, Head of the delegation and the  Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Morocco65. 
One issue that remained unmentioned by the European partners and that Zuma termed as a root 
cause of African migration was the unlawful military intervention by Western countries in 
Africa. According to the proponents of decolonization, unwarranted military intervention is 
another element of neo-colonialism. Zuma highlighted that, 
“The African Union expresses its concern about the militarization of its shore and 
its airspace and a tendency to resolve to military actions as a solution to the problem 
we are facing without international authority and the consent of the neutral 
agencies.” 66 
By bringing into the scene the agenda of militarization, Zuma referred to the military 
intervention partly by the EU members in Libya that caused destabilization of the country and 
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produced irregular migrants. Her rhetoric was as well a critic of the EU’s ‘normative power’, 
portraying military intervention in that case as not a force for good. Surprisingly, as the 
European leaders questioned the concept of ‘addressing the root causes’ of irregular migration, 
the African leaders maintained that there existed a link between the causes of African irregular 
migration to imbalanced relations. Further, they created an unfavorable situation for the 
European partners to pursue the border protection agenda by questioning the EU’s compliance 
with international law, thereby exposing its double-standards and inconsistency in its external 
actions. 
Eventually, both partners signed the EU Trust Fund for Africa. Unlike the European partners 
who praised the signing of Euros 1.8 billion and termed it a huge achievement, African 
partners saw it as far less than enough to make any significant change. For instance, Samura 
Kamara, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister of Sierra Leone saw the 
pledged amount as insufficient for any tangible development.  
“The money offered is not enough…There is a need to add more.. It is not enough 
because the problems are big”.67 68 
At the end of the Valletta Summit, Barnaba, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
Minister of the Republic of South Sudan commented that  
“Of course, the fund offered is not enough.. What is one billion Euro? More 
commitment from Europe is important.”69 
Based on how the African partners constructed the root causes of irregular migration, i.e., 
poverty and underdevelopment, the expectation was higher. The rhetorical question by 
Barnaba Marial, ‘What is one billion Euro?’ showed how much more commitment African 
leaders expected from the EU actors. However, it is important to note that the EU took note 
 
67 European Commission (2015aa). 
68 European Commission (2015ar). 




of these critical voices regarding the funding. Although the EU-Africa partnership initially 
signed the Valletta Action Plan with the EU pledging 1.8 billion Euros, later, the EU increased 
the amount to 4.7 billion Euros70. 
In summary, African partners were able to present their interests, i.e., the agenda of addressing 
the root causes and opposed that migration control. Even then, African leaders doubted how 
the fund would be put into use. After the signing of the agreement, the main concern was 
implementation. For instance, Abdoulie Jobe, Minister for Trade in the Gambia, also said that, 
 “EU Trust fund for Africa is just a tool that should be assessed through the 
projects implemented. [..] The challenge is the aspect of implementation. We hope 
the implementation will be swift”.71 
The same comments were echoed by William Lacy Swing, the Director-general, International 
Organization for Migration (IOM)72 and Jan Eliasson, the UN Deputy Secretary-General.73 
They saw the summit as the beginning of a new engagement between Africa and Europe.  
6.6.4 From rhetorical action to rhetorical entrapment in the Valletta Summit 
In rhetorical action, a researcher should demonstrate the ‘constructive potential’ of rhetoric to 
shape the opponent's behavior. A crucial point of the analysis is bringing out precisely how 
rhetorical action led to entrapment. The analytics entails assessing how the rhetoric of root 
causes by African partners during the Valletta Summit resulted in entrapment and hence the 
EU policy change. In such a case, the focus of analysis shifts from the persuasiveness of the 
speakers’ rhetoric to ‘the assessment of being persuaded,’ i.e., the reception of African rhetoric 
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by the European partners. A key feature in rhetorical entrapment is understanding how the 
opponent frames community norms concerning his own normative identity and behavior74.  
As mentioned in the theory chapter, rhetorical action does not always lead to entrapment. As 
well, rhetorical action becomes a form of learning when entrapment occurs. The notable 
differences between the interlocutors do not solely reveal rhetorical entrapment. Therefore, the 
framing of the concept of addressing the root causes by the African partners and highlighting 
the inconsistencies within the EU’s normative actorness in migration management was not by 
itself enough to prove rhetorical entrapment. It required the analysis of the understanding of 
how the EU felt compelled to accept the persuasion. Looking at rhetorical entrapment from a 
different angle, the concern was whether there was a strong enough commitment to the 
community norms (i.e., those of the EU-Africa partnership) for the EU to feel persuaded to 
change its migration policy. Another factor was the EU’s need to realign its external actions to 
retain its identity as a normative actor. The combination of these two rhetorical elements 
demonstrates rhetorical entrapment. 
Like had been observed by the European Parliament president, experts of the EU-Africa 
relations noted the differences in the partners’ interests and expectations during the summit. 
As the EU made an effort to re-energize the co-operation with African partners on migration 
control measures, the African countries were determined on non-control measures. Denis Tull, 
an expert of EU-Africa relations, once commented that, 
 “We should not pretend there is a common interest here. What is being called 
‘co-operation’ by the EU is seen very differently by African countries”. 75 
 
74 Kratochvil et al., (2006); Splidsboel-Hansen, (2006) 
75 Financial Times (2016). 





As a learning phase, the European partners had been confronted with a new policy alternative. 
In his speech, Bettel, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg and the then head of the Luxembourg 
Presidency in the European Council, expressed an observation that the EU felt compelled by 
the African states to shift its migration policies.  
“Europe is experiencing its greatest migration crisis since the second world war. It is 
important for us to be meeting now because we [the European Union] are currently at 
a critical turning point. The European Union finds itself compelled to redefine its 
policy for border management, with regard to receiving migrants and refugees, while 
remaining faithful to the values of the Union and which define us as the European 
Union. Europe wants to remain open and faithful to its values".76 77 
Although Bettel expressed the EU’s urgent need to manage the migration crisis, he also noted 
a strong persuasion from the African partners. The rhetorical action was achieving entrapment: 
the EU could neither deny the accusations of human rights violations in migration control and 
migrants’ deportation nor deny that addressing the root causes was a more sustainable solution. 
Nevertheless, the European partners knew that framing the concept of the root causes 
wholesomely served African partners' interests. Bettel noted that ‘We (the European Union) 
are currently at a critical turning point.’ In this critical turning point, the EU could not defend 
itself against the accusations or reject the rhetoric of the root causes. Throughout the Valletta 
summit, the European partners did not oppose the allegation of human rights violations for 
taking what African partners considered a fortress approach. The EU leaders also did not 
oppose the logic of African rhetoric of addressing the root causes. The EU was left with no 
option other than changing its policy, or else it would have demonstrated more double standards 
between its normative principles and its actions.  
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The entrapment was evident in Bettel’s words when he pointed out that, ‘the European Union 
finds itself compelled to redefine its policy for border management…’ this statement placed the 
EU as the target of rhetorical action. The statement, ‘the European Union finds itself compelled 
to…’ by Bettel cannot be understood as ‘the African partners compel the EU to redefine its 
policy for border management.’ In comparison, the latter statement translates to rhetorical 
action while the former indicates rhetorical entrapment. As the head of the Luxembourg 
Presidency in the European council, his expression of the EU’s feeling of entrapment 
represented that of the broader EU.  
Another evidence of rhetorical entrapment was the EU’s need to stick to its normative values 
and principles. Bettel further indicated that ‘the European Union finds [..] while remaining 
faithful to the values of the Union and which define us as the European Union. Europe wants 
to remain open and faithful to its values’. The over-emphasis on the term ‘the EU want to 
remain faithful to its values’ showed both the EU’s need to align its normative identity with its 
actions within the EU-Africa partnership framework and comply with the international norms 
and values of migration management.  
 There were other voices that expressed a sense of the EU entrapment. Speaking to the press at 
the end of the 2015 Valletta Summit on migration, the spokesperson of the European 
Commission said: 
“The EU is constantly analyzing these issues with its African partners. Based on 
the results of these different work strands [development projects to address the root 
causes of African irregular migration], it will be decided in what form this joint 
analysis will be ultimately presented”.78 
 





The idea of addressing the root causes had emerged out of a controversy. As noted by the 
spokesperson of the European Commission, the agenda that was conceived rhetorically became 
the agenda of the following EU-Africa summit in Abidjan.  
Due to the unceasing influence, the EU surrendered to the rhetoric that irregular migration was 
a shared responsibility. When the Summit ended, more voices from Europe accentuated that 
the key issue in the African irregular migration management was strengthening cooperation by 
addressing everyone’s interests. The Italian undersecretary of foreign affairs, Benedetto Della 
Vedova, noted 
“the sense of this summit is to take the discussion to a political level and to show 
that we are aware that there is a mutual interest and we (the EU) are ready to 
intervene”.79 
It was at the political level where the reflection of speech character, as the medium of ideas, 
happened. Rhetorical action was acknowledged - the summit had taken the discussion to a 
political level rather than the conventional technocratic approach. The managing director of the 
European External Action Services and the EU’s diplomatic service, Lotte Knudsen, also 
highlighted that 
“there is a recognition of collective responsibility. It is not just an EU problem 
or an African problem”.80  
Within the context of the root causes, Knudsen’s rhetoric indicated shifting perspective by the 
EU to take responsibility on its part as opposed to solely migration control that it had firmly 
pushed forward. Similar rhetoric came from Paolo Magri, 81 one of the participants in the 
summit. Magri noted 
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“after years of debate about migration, we are finally going beyond the tip of the 
iceberg, which is the emergency of rescuing [African] people in the sea, and we are 
looking at its deep roots, such as underdevelopment and economic disparity.”82   
As a member of the Europe Policy Group, del World Economic Forum and the Strategic 
Committee of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the rhetoric by Magri’s as well as other 
European leaders such as Bettel and Knudsen, indicated the EU’s readiness to a new 
intervention approach of addressing what African countries referred to as root causes of 
irregular migration.   
6.7 The EU rhetorical adaptation in Parliament 
Rhetorical entrapment leads to adaptation. After the Valletta summit, the EU took note of the 
African partners' critical rhetoric about its inconsistency in its normative actorness. In her 
speech on the EU-Africa irregular migration partnership to the European Parliament, the EU's 
High Representative and vice president, Mogherini, highlighted that the EU’s needed to 
consider the facts and the running rhetoric on African irregular migration.  
“I believe we have a serious responsibility as Europeans to look at the facts. 
Many times, in particular, when electoral debates get heated or when political 
confrontations turn even more heated than electoral debates, we have the 
tendency to say a lot, without necessarily looking at the facts”. 83 
 Mogherini acknowledged that much of what was said about irregular migration within the EU 
was based on political propaganda to advance different actors' political mirage. She highlighted 
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two facts about the management of African migration control. The first fact she highlighted 
was that  
“there are no shortcuts when we deal with the issue of migration. […] There are 
no shortcuts, there is a complexity that needs to be faced as it is”.84 
 The shortcut, in this case, was the border protection approach that the EU actors had embarked 
on. The second fact was the stories about irregular migration that the EU had finally accepted 
to consider, that is, the narrative behind the numbers entering the EU irregularly. 
“The second fact is that the measures we have finally, finally, started to put in 
place are starting to show the first results. I believe we must never forget the 
starting point, the fundamentals, and go back to basics, which is the human 
dimension of the phenomenon.”85 
As the first fact highlighted the need for the EU to face reality and the complexity of African 
irregular migration without taking shortcuts such as border protection, the second fact showed 
that the right path to migration management rested upon addressing the root causes. More 
importantly, by overemphasizing that ‘the measures we have finally, finally, started to put in 
place,’ showed that the EU already initiated the new policy of addressing the root causes of 
irregular migration, and African partners were cooperating as expected.  She further echoed 
the critic by the African partners concerning the detrimental effects of the EU’s migration 
control actions,  
“I have heard myself - and I believe many of you have done the same - stories 
from detention camps in Libya. When we speak to migrants or aid workers in 
Lampedusa, you hear things no one should hear. I have seen myself the images of men 







is a new form of slavery and we are facing with this a tragedy that none of us can 
underplay or ignore”.86 
Her emphasis on listening to what was happening in Africa and acting on it indicated that, 
whether political or non-political, rhetoric relating to the African irregular migration had 
always reached the relevant policymakers in the EU. A lot of rhetoric were critical to the EU’s 
external actions in migration management in Africa. Some rhetoric (as indicated in the earlier 
sections) questioned the EU’s role in creating the root causes through colonialism. Others 
faulted the perpetual and unfair economic and political dominance of EU actors (neo-
colonialism), while others related to the violation of human rights in immigration control. 
Mogherini connected these rhetorical narratives and saw the EU’s necessity to change its 
actions to protect its normative identity. 
“We have internal contradictions in the European Union, and I am sure you will 
hear more from President [of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker]…We need consistency and coherence. We need the Member States to 
invest in this approach, consistently and with coherence. I was glad to see that 
many of them [the EU members states] are realizing now how important it is to 
invest in these partnerships...”.87 
Her rhetoric showed acknowledgment of critical rhetoric against the EU’s identity as a 
normative power. She demonstrated an already rhetorically entrapped need to adapt to the new 
norms when she termed the EU’s external actorness on irregular migration control to lack 
consistency and coherence as a global normative actor. Although she acknowledged that many 
member states had already realized the necessity to invest in the renewed partnership, it was 
apparent that a few were still yet. To promote the EU’s identity as a normative power, she 
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recommended a shift from the conventional migration control mechanisms to addressing the 
root causes.  
 “I believe that the time when we had the illusion of managing migration flows 
only through border management is gone. We have now finally understood not 
only that we need to act as Europeans, all together, but also that we need to act 
on what we all usually define as the root causes: poverty, climate change, lack of 
democratic spaces, violations of human rights, opportunities for life”.88 
Surprisingly, the EU had considered the views and the priorities of its African partner countries 
and the critical rhetoric that persuaded the EU to address those causes. By mentioning that ‘we 
(the EU) have now finally understood’, it clearly exhibited that the idea of addressing the root 
causes of African irregular migration did not originate from the EU. Indeed, it was out of 
struggle that the EU actors made to understand African interests. A policy briefing released by 
the European parliament in 2016 showed the EU having successfully conceded to the influence 
of African partner countries. 
 “[Irregular] migration has always been closely related to economic and social 
development, but has only recently become part of mainstream development 
thinking and international policy. The political stakes are high in the quest to 
adapt to new levels of migratory pressure, not only in the EU but also on the 
global agenda, which recently saw a rise in migration-related issues”.89 
In this case, the EU saw irregular migration as not just a conventional security issue but also 
an issue that could be addressed through promoting mainstream development. In 2016, the EU 
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accepted that the repositioning of the irregular migration agenda was motivated by political 
forces from outside. The EU had already started adapting by shifting its migration policy. 
“The EU and its member States have reshaped their external policies, including 
development cooperation, to place more focus on migration-related issues. 
Widely used in this context, political rhetoric on 'addressing root causes of 
migration' has been questioned by academics as creating unrealistic 
expectations”.90 
The EU further showed acknowledgment of rhetoric of root causes by shifting the language of 
development aid. This was after considering the African partner countries’ critic of the EU’s 
use of aid and the associated conditionalities to manage African irregular migration. The 
European Parliament was keen not to use the concept of helping African partner countries to 
manage irregular migration using aid.  
 “A complex interaction between aid and migration also exists, which is far from 
a simple one-way causality.[…] A more global approach to cooperation with 
third countries, such as the EU's already well-established assistance focusing on 
good governance, infrastructure, rural development and strengthening 
resilience, as well as going beyond development assistance to include trade and 
investment, appears promising in terms of deterring migration”.91 
The EU’s acceptance that there was a need to go beyond traditional development to trade and 
investment in irregular migration management was evidence of a changing policy. It strongly 
correlated with the African partner countries’ rhetoric of trade and neo-colonialism. As stated 
in the earlier section, the African rhetoric held that trade manifested as a one-direction flow of 
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wealth, and irregular migrants were the people who followed wealth to Europe. Talking about 
the establishment of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, Mogherini held that:  
“One year ago, or two years ago, it was all about the European crisis on 
migration. I think that today we have managed - again, finally we are starting to 
see the results - managed to put in place some elements of an intelligent policy 
based on a partnership that our African partners recognize as useful, that our 
international partners starting from IOM, UNHCR and the UN system, recognize as 
right”.92 
Mogherini’s remarks, in this case, indicated the EU’s full adaptation to the rhetoric of 
addressing the root causes and compliance to the international norms, and complete 
acceptance by the African partner countries to co-operate in irregular migration 
management. More practically, such harmonized synergy renewed partnership was 
successful due to the EU’s consideration of what African partners recognized as useful. 
Further, Mogherini restated the need for the EU to shift from the notion of giving Africa aid 
to taking part in shared responsibility establishing. This was a precondition for realizing the 
concept of a genuine partnership. 
“We definitely need to use this money [the EU Trust fund for Africa] in a sense 
of partnership with our African friends and I believe the next EU-African Union 
Summit in Abidjan, at the end of November, will be exactly this: moving from 
the concept of aid to the concept of partnership, working together, facing 
together common challenges and taking advantage together of common 
opportunities. And also working together on common issues we have close to 
 




our heart: multilateralism, a certain way to understand security and peace, 
climate change, the multilateral agenda.”93 
A year after the Valletta Summit, in November 2016, the 5th African Union – European Union 
Summit on investing in youths for a sustainable future was held in Abidjan. The summit 
convened leaders from 55 African countries and 28 European countries. A press release by the 
European Commission emphasized the outcome of the 2015 Valletta Summit that:  
“European and African leaders reaffirmed their strong political commitment to 
address the root causes of irregular migration in a spirit of genuine partnership 
and shared responsibility during the Valletta Summit, and in full respect of 
international laws and human rights, as well as creating legal pathways for 
migration.”94  
Unlike the language of helping, which was mainly used by the European partners before the 
Valletta Summit, there was a gradual change to using the language of shared responsibility.  
The idea of shifting from the concept of ‘development aid to Africa’ or ‘helping Africa’ to the 
concept of ‘genuine partnership’ was not just a random choice of words by Mogherini. Rather, 
it signified an EU’s ideological shift in the future relationship with Africa. This ideological 
shift was restated by the president of the European Commission, Juncker, during his 2018 State 
of the Union speech to the European Parliament. He said,  
“To speak of the future, one must speak of Africa – Europe's twin continent. We 
need to invest more in our relationship with the nations of this great and noble 
continent. And we have to stop seeing this relationship through the sole prism 
of development aid. Such an approach is beyond inadequate, humiliatingly so. 
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Africa does not need charity; it needs true and fair partnerships. And Europe 
needs this partnership just as much. In preparing my speech today, I spoke to 
my African friends, notably Paul Kagame, the Chairperson of the African 
Union. We agreed that donor-recipient relations are a thing of the past. We 
agreed that reciprocal commitments are the way forward. We want to build a 
new partnership with Africa. Today, we are proposing a new Alliance for 
Sustainable Investment and Jobs between Europe and Africa.[..] We want to 
create a framework that brings more private investment to Africa. [..] Trade 
between Africa and Europe is not insignificant 36% of Africa's trade is with the 
European Union. This compares to 16% for China and 6% for the United States.  
But this is not enough. I believe we should develop the numerous European-
African trade agreements into a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as 
an economic partnership between equals”.95 
In this speech, Juncker gave a strong emphasis on the newly reconstructed EU-Africa relations. 
He expressed the commitment to address unequal partnership, including through trade that had 
affected African negatively. Like Mogherini, Juncker urged the European parliamentarians and 
the member states to stop the traditional form of relations founded on ‘giving development 
aid.’ By reaffirming the rhetoric of African leaders on foreign aid and explicitly mentioning 
the Rwandan President (then as AU chairman), Kagame, Juncker wanted to convince African 
Partners that the EU had reformed. Kagame was mentioned because of his critical stance on 
the EU’s control of African Partners through aid. 
The formal introduction of the new rhetoric by the African partner countries was also 
accentuated by the European Parliament communication to the Council that,  
 




“The new rhetoric, with 'root causes of migration' at its core, was fully deployed 
in 2015 in the joint Valletta action plan, which also emphasizes the development 
benefits of migration. The plan was accompanied by the launch of the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular 
migration and displaced persons in Africa, based on resources coming mainly 
from EU development instruments, the European Development Fund in 
particular, providing €3.7 billion from a total €4.1 billion”.96 
As an internal communication that aimed to address the EU parliament, it could be understood 
that the rhetoric of addressing the root causes of African migration did not emerge from the 
EU institutions. As demonstrated elsewhere, the rhetoric of the root causes of irregular 
migration among African countries started as early as 2008 and had been growing. Still, within 
the EU, it was termed as the new rhetoric that emerged from the 2015 Valletta Summit. 
Correspondingly, it was a significant achievement for the African partners that the European 
Council acknowledged the root causes of African irregular migration were a shared 
responsibility between African and European partners. The European Council posted on its 
website that,  
“The summit recognized that migration is a shared responsibility of countries of 
origin, transit and destination. The EU and Africa worked in a spirit of 
partnership to find common solutions to challenges of mutual interest”.97 
A similar argument was put forward in the EU parliament by Udo Bullmann. In November 
2018, Bullmann, when addressing the European Parliament in response to a question on what 
precise measures should Europe take to control Africa irregular migration, said:  
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“When factors such as poverty, social inequalities, lack of education and 
environmental degradation exist, irregular migration becomes inevitable.[…] 
The only way forward is to tackle the root causes that push people to risk their lives in 
the Sahel region and the Mediterranean Sea. […] We have, however, to stop seeing the 
Africa-EU relationship from the sole prism of development aid, which remains crucial 
for the poorest people and countries. Africa needs a true and balanced partnership 
based on ownership and responsibility. This is what we expect from the new 
External Investment Plan for Africa and neighbourhood countries adopted by 
EU in 2016, which call to promote sustainable investments in Africa. We should 
stop exploiting the African natural resources without investing in capacity 
building in areas such as education, skill development, infrastructures and 
democracy”.98 
Bullmann’s remarks were not isolated random thoughts. It signified the EU’s changing policy 
dimension. In his State of the Union speech, Juncker, the European Commission President, 
addressed the European Parliament and explained the EU’s intentions in irregular migration 
management. The EU was committed to establishing lasting stability creating employment 
opportunities in local communities99. The European Parliament highlighted in one of the policy 
briefs that one of the root causes of African irregular migration include, 
“Geographical and historical factors: this set of explanatory variables relates to 
the geographic distance between sending and receiving countries, common 
language, or colonial past.”100 
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The attempt to link, among other issues, the colonial past and the irregular migration was a big 
stride in adapting to the dominant African rhetoric that colonial-related issues were part of the 
root cause of the vulnerability and irregular migration.  
The critical rhetoric of neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration later 
broadened to political forums in Europe. Italy, having had an agreement to compensate Libya 
over the colonial injustice, aided in magnifying the rhetoric of colonialism and African 
irregular migration. In 2017, Italy accused EU actors of continuing neo-colonialism. The Italian 
Deputy Prime Minister, Luigi Di Maio, while on a visit to the Abruzzo region in central Italy, 
accused France and other EU member states of prolonging African colonization leaving 
African people with no option other than to migrate to Europe irregularly. In his words:  
"The EU should sanction France and all countries like France that impoverish 
Africa and make these people leave because Africans should be in Africa, not 
at the bottom of the Mediterranean. If people are leaving today, it's because of 
European countries, France above all has never stopped colonizing dozens of 
African countries."101 
Di Maio’s remarks resulted from Italy’s frustration due to the overwhelming influx of African 
irregular migrants landing on its shores each passing day. These remarks showed that part of 
the EU community acknowledged the rhetoric of injustices of colonialism and neo-colonialism 
in Africa despite the spirited refutation by the majority. Having accepted Ghaddafi's demands 
to compensate Libya (its only colony) for colonial injustice in return for co-operation towards 
migration control, Italy stood to have satisfactorily cleared itself from a possible implication 
by the colonial rhetoric. In any case, Africa’s rhetoric of colonialism could only place Italy in 
an advantageous position against its rivals within the EU.   
 




6.9. Summary of the findings chapter  
Based on the above evidence, it was apparent that within Africa, there was no clear-cut 
approach to challenge what they considered as ‘Eurocentric normative power Europe’. Few 
African countries (transit countries) like Libya used irregular migration to generate blackmail 
against the former colonizers. In the 2015 Valletta Summit, the vast majority of African states 
used some rationality that neo-colonialism was part of the root causes of African irregular 
migration. The two mechanisms of linking the rhetoric of coloniality to African irregular 
migration created persuasion against the EU partners. The two elements of rhetorical action 
can be summarized as: 
•  Rhetorical issues  
• Spaces of rhetoric 
Rhetorical issues: (colonialism and neo-colonialism) 
African partner countries used the rhetoric of colonialism and neo-colonialism to influence the 
EU’s migration policy change. In comparison, the rhetoric of neo-colonialism (the unfair 
economic and political influence) was more influential in the EU’s policy change than that of 
colonialism for two major reasons. First, issues such as trade and climate change that fall under 
neo-colonialism made logic to all the EU actors. Secondly, these issues were connected to other 
global issues such as human rights and sustainable development. The persistent calls to address 
the injustices of neo-colonialism by African leaders had subsequently shaped public opinion of 
the larger EU-Africa society. In addition, the anti-neo-colonial rhetoric had become a popular 
discourse in African, thereby mobilizing a strong influence to compel the EU actors. As in the 
case of Libya, despite colonialism having no connection to irregular migration, it still generated 
a persuasive power enough to entrap Italy.  




Prior to the 2015 Valletta Summit, the effectiveness of the formation of colonial rhetoric 
underpinned African leaders' use of different spaces. Such a strategy aimed to establish what 
Nyers and Rygiel describe as new ways of being political and new versions of politics.102 One 
form of space was ‘the venues of interaction between the African and European partners’- the 
most critical was the Valletta Summit. However, the place of rhetoric did not affect the content 
of rhetoric. Despite different physical audiences and rhetorical situations, the target audience 

















































CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction  
The chapter discusses the findings of the research question: how did African partner countries 
participate in influencing the EU’s migration policy change to addressing the root causes of 
African irregular migration? Guided by rhetorical action, the chapter discusses how the 
rhetoric of root causes was turned into a powerful normative persuasion to influence the EU 
policy change. Within specific social settings, commitment and harmonized interests to 
maintain community norms and values generate collective identity. Following 
Schimmelfennig’s rhetorical action framework, actors who can link their interests with 
community norms and standards of legitimacy are well-positioned to shame their opponents by 
highlighting non-conformant behavior. Through rhetorical action, they alter the direction of 
engagement, which would not have been possible within the pre-existing power arrangements.  
The EU-Africa partnership was presumed to be guided by the norm of mutual interests. It also 
provided a good institutional environment through which both European and African partners, 
as members, expressed the legitimacy of their preferences. Since 2006, African partners saw 
the EU-funded migration control projects as an EU’s mission to serve only its interest. 
However, being aware that the African partner countries did not possess adequate material 
bargaining power to divert the EU’s actions, they founded their rhetorical claims about: 
• The historical past of the Africa-Europe engagement, i.e., the rhetoric of colonialism 
and neo-colonialism. 
• The inconsistencies and double standards within the EU’s normative actorness in the 
irregular migration control, i.e., the critical rhetoric of the EU’s normative identity. 
• The constitutive norms and values of the partnership framework, i.e., the rhetoric of 




Rhetorical entrapment occurred when the EU could neither defend its inconsistencies in the 
light of its identity as a normative power nor openly oppose the African partners’ rhetoric 
without losing its credibility within the partnership framework. It enlightens why scholars 
suggest that the EU’s migration policy change was influenced by exogenous actors using 
exogenous issues (see Andersson, 2016; Fulvio, 2016). Rhetorical action and the opponent’s 
adaptation or failure to adapt is an interactive process. As a normative critique, rhetorical action 
starts by exposing the actor’s lack of interest in upholding the community values. When actors 
go rhetorically strategic, they bring exogenous issues into the scene and problematize the 
identities and interests of the EU (see, Schimmelfennig, 2003:69). 
In an environment of shared history, the normative meaning goes beyond the literal definition 
of the norm to include the historical and socialization context (Van Leeuwen, 2018; 2017). The 
rhetoric of colonialism and neo-colonialism by the African countries started long before the 
2015 Valletta Summit. As early as 2008, they started disregarding partnership norms by 
implicitly refusing to participate in joint irregular migration control. At the same time, they 
questioned the EU’s contribution to the causes of migration. By so doing, they established the 
concept of root causes of irregular migration. 
African partners unanimously lauded the construction of root causes based on colonial 
historicity. They demonstrated dissatisfaction in the EU’s irregular control programs by 
embarking on the rhetoric that historical and systematic causes outside the migration domain 
constituted the root causes of irregular migration. The historicization of the root causes 
heightened the differences in the migration management approaches between African and 
European partners in the Valletta Summit. First, African partners delegitimized the migration 
control measures as unlawful. Secondly, by capitalizing on root causes, they partially placed 
blame on the EU actors. The struggle between the two partners created an appropriate 




of neo-colonialism as the root causes of irregular migration was a powerful tool to influence 
the EU since it was applied unilaterally by all African partners at the continental and national 
levels. It combined both the policy proposal and a critique of the EU’s actions and inactions in 
migration control. Simultaneously, African partners underrated incompetences related to 
governance in their own countries and how they constituted the root causes of African irregular 
migration. This indicated that the construction of root causes was not neutral but strategic. 
African partners were aware that the EU had a well-established identity as a ‘normative power’ 
and would be unwilling to suffer reputation costs by demonstrating a stance inconsistent with 
its identity as a force for good.  
The EU actors, on the other hand, were aware that most African countries were unhappy with 
the approach to border surveillance and migration control (Chou, 2012; Chou and Gibert, 2012; 
Parkes, 2017; Van Criekinge, 2008). Indeed, the EU experienced difficulties establishing 
migration control agreements with the African partners. Both multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations on irregular migration control were featured by strong resistance from the African 
partners. Even when the EU managed to enter into agreements with African partner countries, 
most of them stalled without significant achievement (Parkes, 2017). At other times, some 
African partner countries made them deliberately fail through direct non-compliance. 
In the following sections, the discussion is based on the argument that the EU did not change 
its migration policy to tackle the root causes due to the unworking relationship in irregular 
migration control. Instead, the policy shift resulted from rhetorical action by African countries. 
Nonetheless, the unworking agreements between the European and African partners 
significantly aided the construction of the root causes of African irregular migration and helped 




7.2 Persuasion through the rhetoric of colonialism – a strategy of blackmailing 
In rhetorical action, a key strategy to win the target audiences is to connect with their world of 
reality (Wiethoff, 2018). Libya was the first African country to strategically use African 
irregular migrants to persuade the EU actors to meet Libya’s demands. Essentially, Gaddafi 
referenced issues outside the values and norms of partnership. For example, he highlighted the 
racial and cultural differences between African irregular migrants heading Europe and the 
Europeans. He knew well that irregular migrants had been highly securitized in Europe and 
that Italy’s main objective was to keep off migrants. Being aware of this Italy’s perception of 
irregular migrants, his reference of African irregular migrants as black, Muslim, dangerous and 
uncivilized aligned with security discourse in Europe. Indeed, this strategy worked to make his 
colonial rhetoric more appealing to European audiences. When judged using the EU’s 
normative principles (as well as the norms of the Libya-Italy partnership), Gaddafi’s effort to 
link African irregular migration to the colonial agenda was a form of blackmail. His rhetorical 
strategy generated persuasion through racial prejudice by presenting irregular migrants as an 
unbearable risk to the future of the EU. 
The foundation of any action applied in the Libya-Italy partnership was supposed to connect 
to the global norms. Prejudice and bias against irregular migrants are against the universally 
accepted norms. Correspondingly, such racial comments were against the norms and values of 
the EU-Africa partnership on migration control. Gaddafi’s rhetoric did not align with universal 
principles, or the Libya-Italy shared values or even the agenda of irregular migration control. 
To the universal audience, Gaddafi’s rhetoric was unfounded. Gaddafi’s rhetoric on the 
securitization of irregular migrants, however, was contextually valid since it connected to the 




the real Italy's motivation for irregular migration control. In this case, what can be interpreted 
as blackmail, had the potential, and indeed it generated a strong persuasive power against Italy.  
Most notably, blackmail was Gaddafi’s strategy to bring Italy closer to the discussion of 
colonialism. In rhetorical action, argumentation is different from formal logic. Rhetoric takes 
a discursive approach in that it brings an agent to adhere to others, whereas logic is a mere 
calculation as per the values and norms previously set forth. Logical reasoning is impersonal, 
while rhetorical action is based on the hierarchies of socialized norms and much attention is 
given to the agent (Sillince, 2002; 2005). The persuasion of Gaddafi’s rhetoric was derived 
from the convergence between argumentation and the logic that the EU already perceived 
irregular migrants as a threat to national and social security in Europe. No matter how irrelevant 
colonial history was in the context of irregular migration management, Italy could not refute 
Gaddafi’s argumentation about the logic of colonial injustices.  
Even though Libya managed to justify its political goal based on blackmail, it was able to drive 
the idea of unsorted injustice related to coloniality to gain legitimacy. The incontestable 
argument of Italy’s colonial injustice served as a warrant for the validity of Libya’s claim for 
compensation within the partnership framework. Since Italy’s interest was irregular migration 
control, based on the principle of mutual interests, Libya’s interest was as well, in accordance 
with broader community norms. As put forward by Miskimmon et al., “a less powerful speaker 
can stimulate a powerful actor by asking a targeted audience to justify the disconnection 
between its narrative and understanding of self-identity and the seemingly contradictory actions 
or inactions” (Miskimmon et al., 2014:10, see also, Roselle et al., 2014; Crilley, 2015). In 
particular, the EU and Italy had less influence to forge a workable relationship with Libya 
without meeting Gaddafi’s demands. Additionally, since it was a time of crisis that required an 
actionable partnership, Italy could not dare Gaddafi justify the link between compensation for 




Gaddafi's reference to the colonial rhetoric can best be explained as ‘possessing a narrative’ 
rather than ‘being a narrative.’ In international affairs, the understanding of events is 
contextually constructed and depends on the audience's interpretation (Ryan, 2005). It was 
clear to both Italy and Libya that the colonial agenda was far separate from the theme of 
partnership – irregular migration control. Libya did not frame colonialism as the root cause of 
either the migration of Libyans or other African migrants. Instead, Gaddafi possessed the 
grievances of colonial injustice irrespective of whether Italy needed a migration control 
partnership or not. It was notable indeed that Gaddafi arrived in Italy for ‘negotiation of 
irregular migration control’ wearing the emblem of Omar Al-Mukhtar, one of Libya’s famous 
anti-colonialist. He was also accompanied by Al-Mukhtar’s son (Fetouri, 2019). In this case, 
rhetorical action using a ‘possessed narrative’ constituted high persuasiveness to redirect the 
Italy-Libya negotiation's top agenda from irregular migration control to compensation for 
colonial injustices. 
Any attempt by Italy to reject Libya’s colonial rhetoric would have had implications. It would 
have openly denied that colonialism did not occur or Italy’s colonial actions were not harmful. 
Either way, it would have demonstrated inconsistency based on the universal understanding of 
colonialism and violation of human rights, thereby losing credibility. Italy would not have a 
legitimate argument to defend itself from compensating Libya and would have demonstrated 
double standards for accepting that colonialism led to a loss of life and property but was not 
willing to pay. Italy got rhetorically entrapped. Even when it was clear that Libya was driving 
its egoistic preferences, Italy could not defend itself or generate a credible counterargument 
within the partnership.  
Rhetorical entrapment is said to have occurred when a rhetorical strategy emerges successful, 
i.e., when the interlocutor has been cornered and compelled to claim a stance that otherwise, 




stance to form a true partnership with Libya. Due to Italy’s inability to denounce partnership 
norms and values, Gaddafi was able to constitute and reconstitute Libya’s identity as a victim 
of colonization to establish the Italy-Libya partnership that would maximumly serve his 
interests. 
Even after the removal of Gaddafi from power in 2010, the unrecognized Libyan government 
had presented a similar threat to the EU: that Europe would turn black due to African irregular 
migration unless the EU offered more resources and political recognition (Andersson, 2016). 
Another case was that of the Spain-Morocco partnership. Spain feared that if migrants managed 
to cross to Europe through Morocco, it was because the Moroccan government wanted them to 
pass by selectively opening and closing its borders. Mauritania was as well a key EU’s partner 
in the African migration control that ever used its relevance in migration control to threaten the 
EU to meet its political recognition demands. After the 2006 military coup d’état, the migration 
crisis intensified, and the EU was eventually compelled to start negotiations with the unelected 
Mauritanian government (Frowd, 2014; Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart, 2010). Although 
blackmail was not the dominant rhetorical approach that resulted in the EU migration policy 
change in 2015, still, it contributed to setting up the political rhetoric of colonialism in the EU-
Africa mobility framework. 
7.3 Formation and expression of neo-colonial rhetoric and root causes of African 
migration 
Unlike the Libya-Italy partnership or other EU-North Africa countries, whose persuasion was 
featured by blackmail, a newer form of rhetorical action occurred later. The second form of 
rhetoric involved neocolonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration. The rhetoric 
was led by pan-Africanists and state leaders who claimed that the causes of Africa’s irregular 




Unlike rhetorical action through blackmailing, which was spontaneous, the rhetoric of 
neocolonialism developed over time. African partner countries started gradually developing 
rhetoric and eventually incorporated rhetoric in the migration control partnership framework. 
For instance, the pathos in Kagame’s critical rhetoric concerning neo-colonial-based Africa-
EU relations lured the EU actors to reconsider their contribution to under-development in 
Africa. Although the colonial rhetoric was not based on statistical facts, the argument was 
critically catchy and connected to the EU normative principles. Such a rhetorical persuasion 
makes the audience get into deep thinking, searching the speaker’s main point. “But lacking 
self-evidence that can be imposed on everyone, a hypothesis, to be accepted, must be supported 
by good reasons, recognized as such by other people, members of the same community. The 
status of knowledge thus ceases to be impersonal because every scientific thought becomes a 
human one, i.e., fallible, situated in and subjected to controversy” (Boger, 2005:196).  
African leaders were aware that the EU actors had prioritized migration control projects, which 
at times ran counter to Africa’s development agenda. Strong rhetoric against the EU-funded 
migration control projects showed the EU’s aid to Africa was not perceived as genuine but 
rather instrumental. Interestingly, contrary to the mainstream studies, which suggested that 
African countries were more interested in migrants reaching European labor markets, rhetoric 
by African partners, including during the Valletta Summit, did not frame African irregular 
migrants as a labor force in Europe. Within the partnership, it would have been assumed that 
partners would comply with the shared norms to maintain a positive reputation as genuine 
partners. However, this being a social engagement, open conditionalities could not apply; 
instead, social influence became the means of persuasion. African partners were chiefly 
concerned with the EU’s need to acknowledge the root causes of irregular migration and 
contribute to addressing them. The neo-colonial rhetoric described the Africa-EU partnership 




European counterparts - that the EU actors accepted an unlimited flow of material resources 
from Africa, while at the same time, they restricted irregular migrants from reaching their 
territory. 
Africa’s neo-colonial rhetoric maintained that African irregular migrants were victims of unfair 
global political and economic structures. From a Marxist perspective, such rhetoric established 
a critic that any attempt to examine colonialism as the root cause, alone, considering its long-
term consequences, would hinder understanding the broader context within which those 
conditions for irregular migration were systematically reproduced. While the African leaders 
placed neo-colonialism at the center stage in constructing irregular migrants, they also 
suggested remedial action: the EU needed to take part in the responsibility and act accordingly. 
The logic was that tackling the root causes involved replacing inappropriate economic 
structures, rules and procedures with the right ones. In rhetorical action, although rhetors try 
not to offer specific details of the proposed policies, they must narrow their audience’s range 
of choices to redirect them to a specific policy direction. By capitalizing on the rhetoric of root 
causes, African partners eliminated a wide range of migration control options that the EU 
would have otherwise opted for. 
7.4 The 2015 Valletta Summit: a space for social recognition and validation of the 
rhetoric of root causes of irregular migration 
The 2015 Valletta Summit provided a platform for EU-Africa diplomatic interaction and was 
featured by contestation of migration management approach between the African and European 
partners. The fluid meaning of the root causes put forth by African partners opened the floor 
for rhetorical contestation. As noted in the earlier section, the meaning of the root causes 
included historical issues directly or indirectly linked to the present manifestation of irregular 
migration. The African partners strongly supported the rhetoric of unbalanced economic 




of the African countries, commonly known as neo-colonialism. African leaders argued that 
irregular migration could only be solved by re-designing economic structures that would 
eventually enhance Africa's industrialization. Instead of examining the conditions through 
which joint migration control was to be achieved, African partners delegitimized the EU 
migration control actions in the partnership framework. As a result, there was a re-
conceptualization of irregular migration management norms through social recognition of 
mutual interest and shared responsibility.  
African partners gathered influence by connecting the rhetoric of root causes to a critic of the 
EU’s identity as a normative actor. By doing so, they delegitimized the EU actions by 
establishing the subjectivity of self (the EU’s) within the partnership framework. The fact that 
the summit was held during a migration crisis was not a concern to African partners. Unlike 
the EU partners, who expected some level of deliberations on control measures at least to 
manage the crisis, African partners operated in post-crisis mode – not constrained by the 
urgency to control irregular migration. Despite the critic that the EU actors had contributed to 
the underdevelopment of Africa, there was no counterargument from the EU partners. 
Eventually, rhetorical entrapment led to validating a new norm of addressing the root causes 
of irregular migration. 
To understand the EU’s migration policy change, it is essential to clarify how rhetorical action 
during the 2015 Valletta Summit led to the validation of the root cause of irregular migration. 
Depending on how the rhetorical action is conducted, it can culminate in either mutual 
recognition based on the principles and structures of socialization or create more conflict 
(Sillince et al., 2012). In rhetorical action, social validation consists of validity claiming 
generated through political engagement. The degree of integration between the actors involved 




the possibilities of social recognition of a norm (ibid). Social recognition translates to a 
negotiated validity claim, such as referencing a particular norm, to justify an intervention 
approach (Fierke, 2010). The validation of the African rhetoric by the EU actors occurred 
through social recognition, without any reference to the universal laws. 
7.5 Rhetorical entrapment: a learning experience for the European partners 
The recognition of the root causes of irregular migration started right at the Valletta meeting 
and signified a process of social learning for the EU partners. In rhetorical action, social 
learning differs from the conventional cognitive approach of learning that aims to fill a 
knowledge vacuum. Social learning is a process of gaining transformative knowledge through 
which the learning agent reconstructs and redefines concepts and approaches (see, Nedergaard, 
2005; Klindt, 2011). The persuasiveness of African rhetoric increased the shared understanding 
of addressing the root causes of irregular migration to the extent that the EU actors initiated a 
self-reflection process, including situating themselves as part of the root causes. In this regard, 
policy learning led to a policy change. 
Identifying the impact of rhetoric on the target audiences, be they elites or the general public, 
requires examining opinions, attitudes and behavior before and after rhetoric reaches them. 
One way of understanding the effects of rhetoric is by analyzing the sensitivity of cultural and 
political contexts that compels the rhetors to drive audiences towards certain understandings of 
rhetorical dimensions (Miskimmon et al., 2014:9ff). Another dimension is understanding how 
audiences consume political information and attribute credibility to rhetoric. This is achieved 
by examining the nature of discussions within the target audience’s political and non-political 
spaces, such as legislative spaces and media (see Lees-Marshment, 2009: Chapter 2). Once 
these processes have been taken into account, the researcher can identify the diffusion of 




Based on the Valletta Summit and the period after, I argue that the European partners were not 
merely passive recipients of neocolonial rhetoric. They soberly understood the critical message 
and internalized it. The internalization of neocolonial rhetoric took place in both political 
spaces such as political debates/forums within Europe and non-political (legislative) spaces 
such as the EU parliament. Other spaces of re-affirming the migration policy shift included the 
EU-Africa summits in the following years. These venues were some of the spaces where the 
EU actors expressed new engagement norms with African partners. Learning (i.e., resulted 
from rhetorical entrapment) was also evidenced in contemporary debates on the EU foreign 
actions in irregular migration control.  
The issues, referred to by African partners as neo-colonialism, were later decently articulated 
in the EU parliament. The EU leadership spearheaded rhetoric of addressing the root causes of  
African irregular migration while highlighting the existing inadequacies within the 
international system that produced Africa's marginalization, forcing people to migrate 
irregularly. The mentioning of the root causes of irregular migration in the EU parliament was 
a genuine expression by the EU actors of re-constructed values and norms of engagement 
within the EU-Africa mobility framework. The learning process was partly catalyzed by 
increased securitization of irregular migrants, where irregular migration was labeled as an 
invasion or African exodus. Besides, the 2015 migration crisis increased the EU’s attention to 
rhetoric by African partners expressing the classical questions about the EU-Africa relations' 
impartiality and the root causes of African irregular migration. The rhetoric of root causes got 
adequate attention in the European political spaces. However, Italy took the colonial rhetoric 
outside of the EU parliament in a radical approach. It accused the EU actors at large and some 





Political actors have varying abilities to construct rhetoric, sometimes even those that can work 
against them. Moreover, political actors have many identities and can apply them based on the 
context (Miskimmon et al., 2014:5). In the European political spaces, Salvini (the Italian prime 
minister) and Luigi De Maio (the deputy prime minister) condemned France and other former 
colonizers for maintaining colonialism – which they termed the root cause of African irregular 
migration. I thus argue that unlike in the seemingly orderly rhetoric in the EU parliament, Italy's 
fierce colonial rhetoric was instrumental. As mentioned elsewhere, Italy had already agreed to 
compensate Libya for colonial injustices. Matteo Salvini aimed to promote Italy’s identity as a 
moral actor for agreeing to compensate Libya for colonial injustices. They aimed to 
demonstrate what other EU members needed to do. Italy colonized only one African country - 
Libya. Already having established an agreement to compensate for colonial injustice, no 
European country could have accused Italy of being part of the root causes of African 
migration, which Italy condemned. Interestingly, France had colonized most of the countries 
in west and central Africa that were major home countries of African irregular migrants. 
The construction of a high-power rhetoric by Italy originated from two sources. First, Italy was 
the EU’s migration gate. According to the Dublin system, irregular migrants were to be 
returned to the country of entrance for asylum processing, where many ended up being returned 
to Italy. Italy’s political leadership saw the African rhetoric of managing the root causes of 
irregular migration as a sustainable way of getting rid of the migration pressure. The failure of 
the Dublin System led to other EU member states refuse to share the refugee burden leaving 
Italy overburdened with irregular migrants. Secondly, the European migration crisis created a 
favorable domestic and international political environment for quick policy learning. Italy was 
strategic to use political debates to articulate the colonial rhetoric. In other words, the political 
contestation about the refugee crisis made the colonial rhetoric more pronounced and 




Italy’s rhetoric that the EU member states were part of the root cause of African irregular 
migration through neo-colonialism had such a powerful effect that France considered the 
rhetoric inappropriate and summoned the Italian ambassador in France. While in Burkina Faso, 
the French President, Emanuel Macron, reassured that the French mission in Africa was not to 
propagate colonialism or neo-colonialism. But, when anti-French colonial and neo-colonialism 
rhetoric intensified in Francophone countries, France threatened to withdraw its military from 
the peacekeeping mission in West Africa.  
7.6 The EU policy change  
Rhetorical action is discursive and observable through the language-in-use and social 
recognition. As a form of social engagement, rhetorical action is meant to yield social change. 
African partners' main achievement was the EU’s social recognition that the root causes were 
a shared responsibility and the consequent shift in policy instruments. After the Valletta 
Summit, there was a crucial positive correspondence from the European partners. Rather than 
seeing competing rhetoric during the Valletta Summit, which could have created continued 
antagonism and struggle between the African and European partners, the EU realigned its 
migration policy accordingly. 
Understanding the dynamics of a policy continuity or a change requires demonstrating how the 
target audience responds to political rhetoric. The EU’s adaptation occurred in two ways: first, 
through positive rhetorical response. It accepted that the root causes of African irregular 
migration were a shared problem and a shared responsibility. In her speech on the EU-Africa 
migration partnership to the European Parliament, the EU's High Representative and vice 
president, Mogherini, retaliated the rhetoric of root causes. Mogherini used what Leach (2000) 
refers to as epideictic rhetoric - a form of rhetoric that focuses on whether an action deserves 




reason she opted to emphasize the EU’s need to examine facts was to distinguish fallacies 
(which are commonly considered meaningless in an argument) from rhetoric that reflected 
reality.  
The second form of adaptation was non-rhetorical transformation, i.e., the EU established the 
EU Trust Fund for Africa, whose primary objective was addressing the root causes of African 
irregular migration. Policies are integral to rhetorical narratives (Boswell, 2011). As argued by 
Nicoll and Edwards (2004), a rhetor persuades a particular audience to take a specific policy 
action because there would otherwise be many policy dimensions at their disposal to address a 
policy challenge under concern. One way of examining the effect of rhetorical persuasion is by 
identifying adherence among the audience to establish an action that aligns with the admired 
position (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Perelman, 1979, 1971). As the Vice president 
of the EU Commission, Mogherini understood that her arguments were not only required to be 
adequate in clarifying the new EU’s policy shift as featured by the EU Trust Fund for Africa 
but also to bring the EU parliamentarians to that particular position. Mogherini used normative 
power jargon, such as consistency and coherence, to express the EU's reformed role in irregular 
migration control. She also chose to apply the rhetorical scheme of association by connecting 
the EU’s identity with normative actions. Mogherini’s address aimed to re-affirm the African 
partners that the EU policymaking had considered what Africa considered to be valuable in 
their development process. The re-affirmation of the EU’s acceptance of the newly 
reconstructed reality of tackling the root causes was even louder in a speech by Juncker, the 
EU Commission president. In other words, she used non-political language and within 
regulated disputation to highlight the EU’s renewed consistency in its foreign actions.   
A policy shift is ultimately evident in policy documents and media releases. In rhetorical action, 
policy texts operate simultaneously as text and discourses. As such, rhetorical action perceive 




systematically generates the objects that actors speak about (Klindt, 2011; Winton, 2013). Text 
of the EU press release showed a shift in the discourse of the EU-Africa partnership on 
migration management. By viewing changed policy text as both rhetoric and discourse, the 
rhetorical correspondence by the European partners was not a mere talk. The EU’s migration 
policy confirmed a strong willingness to work with African partners in implementing irregular 
migration management-projects funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa. 
7.7 Advancing knowledge: ‘the postcolonial others’ influencing the normative power 
Europe 
In world politics, the EU is referred to as a normative power and is considered an actor that 
‘shapes the conceptions of the normal.’ Most studies portray the EU as a norm shaper or a force 
for good (Manners 2002; Pace, 2011). In his work, ‘Constructing the self and changing others: 
Reconsidering Normative Power Europe,’ Diez presents several ways the EU constructs the 
duality of ‘self ’ and ‘the other’ in international affairs. One way of othering is through the 
representation of others as inferior. Secondly, by representing them as violating the universal 
principles (Diez, 2005). Based on this study, African partners rhetorically expressed that the 
EU partners looked down upon them despite being partners. They saw the EU’s attempt to off-
load all human rights violations to African countries as a way of labeling them as inferior.  
The rhetoric by African partners described the EU-Africa partnership on migration 
management as not of equals. Morrice put forward that irregular migration is a key area where 
“global inequalities and colonial relations of domination become reproduced and cemented in 
the process” (Morrice, 2019:25). African Partners’ rhetoric indicated an effort to overcome this 
domination. Such resistance by the post-colonial others and rhetorical action against the EU 




“NPE is not the post-imperial, non-colonial normative discourse it pretends to be. 
Its intellectual origins and false claims of universality have detrimental effects on 
the African decolonial project. Within Africa–EU relations, NPE intervenes to 
capitalize on EU–AU institutional similarities to reinforce European normativity” 
(Staeger, 2016: 981-2).      
In this regard, the scholarship of NPE experiences one significant weakness. Scholars concede 
that the EU is still not a perfect global actor but one in the process of self-construction (Diez, 
2013). Such understanding leaves an open question: if the internal systems of self-construction 
fail, can ‘post-colonial others’ influence the EU to comply with the global norms? This study 
has filled the knowledge gap by presenting a case of irregular migration management where 
the EU internal mechanisms did not deliver normative actorness. A perspective answer is yes 
- ‘the post-colonial other’ can influence the EU to comply with international norms. This is 
also the answer to the research question: African partners indeed contributed significantly to 
influence the EU’s migration policy shift. They did so through rhetorical action. It is 
generalizable that ‘the post-colonial other’ can resist the EU’s influence and, in turn, influence 
the EU for a positive change. However, such generalization is limited to irregular migration 
management. However, the EU's effort to reposition its action to match its normative principles 
is not a weakness. It is progress towards establishing itself as a legitimate normative power to 
‘the others’.  
7.8 Summary of the discussion chapter 
While most rhetorical action cases are concerned about the EU and the potential members, this 
study aimed at explaining the 2015 EU migration policy shift and how African partner 
countries acted as agents of change. The African partners used rhetorical action as a political 
strategy to articulate their interests by highlighting the root causes of irregular migration and 




As early as 2008, soon after the EU initiated the effort to reach out to African countries for 
irregular migration control, African leaders started linking colonialism and neo-colonialism to 
irregular migration management. Italy’s need for a migration control partnership with Libya 
gave Libya a perfect opportunity to revisit the colonial agenda. After rhetorically entrapping 
Italy, Libya persuaded Italy to commit to compensating for colonial injustice. Later, after 2016, 
Italy was the most vocal EU member to echo the African countries' rhetoric that colonialism 
was the root cause of African irregular migration. The second rhetoric connected neo-
colonialism and the root cause of irregular migration while it criticized the EU actions. The 
rhetoric was amplified through unworking migration control agreements between African 
partner countries and the EU actors. 
During the 2015 Valletta Summit, it was clear that the African and European partners were 
pushing for different issues. On the one hand, the European partners made an effort to revisit 
the migration control mechanisms and sought support from Africa countries to manage borders. 
The EU leadership framed the situation as a crisis that required an urgent solution. On the other 
hand, rhetoric by the African partners had two perspectives. First, it re-directed the Summit’s 
agenda to historical issues using colonial rhetoric. African partners claimed that the economic 
relationship with Europe was exploitative and was the root cause of African irregular 
migration. The strategy of influence by the African partners explained the relations between 
two distinct and reinforcing processes. They voiced out what constituted the root causes of 
African irregular migration and rejected that the 2015 migration issue was indeed a crisis. 
Secondly, African partners delegitimized the EU's external actions in irregular migration 
control and criticized the EU’s identity as a normative power. As a normative power, the EU’s 
identity came into the spotlight for the fortress approach to migration management I had taken. 
African leaders criticized the EU for many deaths of migrants on its doors and the asylum 




member states was its failure to process asylum applications and unlawful deportation of 
migrants. Nonetheless, the EU’s framing of the 2015 influx as a migration crisis enhanced the 
effectiveness of the African rhetoric of addressing the root causes.  
It is necessary to understand that the target audiences were not always readily waiting for any 
rhetoric directed to them. To generate a strong, convincing and credible persuasion, African 
leaders chose a combination of pathos, ethos and logos to bring together the rhetoric of neo-
colonial structures, the root causes of irregular migration and delegitimization of the EU actions 
in irregular migration control. Finally, having no other alternative, the EU agreed to take an 
abstract proposal of addressing the root causes of African irregular migration and established 
the European Trust Fund for Africa.  
In specific contexts, such as in irregular migration management, ‘the post-colonial others’ are 
seemingly determined to decolonize by instrumentally pursuing material self-interests in the 
cases where the EU actions contradict the community norms and values. Although ‘the post-
colonial other’ have had a collective identity with the EU actors through partnership 
agreements, it would not be expected that any actor's preferences would change. The EU’s 
acceptance of root causes as a shared responsibility was an attempt to rejuvenate the legitimacy 







































CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
8.1 Conclusion 
 
This study informs on the EU-Africa relation in irregular migration management. It viewed the 
EU from a  normative position and the African partners as resistants or recipients of the EU 
norms. It examined how African partner countries contributed to influencing the EU’s 
migration policy change. It did so by examining the role of ‘ideational’ factors comprised of 
rational utility (self-interests) and community norms and values. The study drew upon 
rhetorical action and rhetorical analysis to study the persuasive power of African partners. The 
rhetorical analysis enabled examining how African partners, within the EU-Africa migration 
control partnership, assembled powerful colonial rhetoric to influence the EU policy change. 
African partners generated persuasiveness by linking rhetoric of coloniality and root causes of 
African irregular migration. In all the cases, the persuasive power of rhetoric was contained in 
the premises and figures of speech, including ethos, pathos and logos. Another gist of 
persuasion was the rhetorical situation, which functioned expressively by involving the 
audience in the broader public environment.  
The study concludes that the EU migration policy shift from ‘control measures’ to ‘addressing 
the root causes of African migration’ did not emerge from the EU’s internal decision-making 
processes. Rather, the EU was highly influenced by African partner countries through 
rhetorical action. In this case, Rhetorical action involved a combination of rhetorical narratives, 
including system narrative, issue narrative and identity narrative, to form mega rhetoric. 
The study traced Africa’s effort to influence the EU’s change of its external actorness in 
migration control since 2008 when the EU-Africa partnership on irregular migration control 
took shape. However, this persuasion process remained somehow unnoticed in the migration 




migration policy shift. The persuasiveness among African partner countries can be put into two 
categories. The first form involved blackmail and was demonstrated by the Italy-Libya 
partnership on irregular migration control. Libya demanded Italy to compensate it for colonial 
injustice as a prerequisite to forming a partnership on irregular migration control. Although 
compensation for colonialism had no connection with any migration control requirements, 
Libya successfully used it to persuade Italy to the extent that Italy could not avoid the logic of 
compensation for colonialism without demonstrating double standards. Italy thus became 
rhetorically entrapped and shifted its terms of engagement to align with Libya’s demands. 
Essentially, Gaddafi brought in issues such as racial and religious differences that fell outside 
the values and norms of partnership to influence Italy. The study has termed such possession 
of a narrative as blackmail against Italy. However, even blackmail-based rhetorical practices 
contained some degree of rationality concerning colonial rhetoric, credible enough to generate 
a powerful persuasion against Italy.  
The second form of persuasion went beyond blackmailing and framed neo-colonialism as the 
root cause of African irregular migration. This was the dominant rhetoric among African 
partner countries. African statesmen and heads of government claimed the existence of 
colonial-based structures which sustained the unrestrained flow of wealth from Africa to 
Europe, leaving the continent impoverished and people vulnerable. They, therefore, 
constructed African irregular migrants to Europe as victims of neo-colonialism and people who 
follow wealth. Such construction implied that the EU actors (and especially the former 
colonizers) were part and parcel of the root causes of irregular migration. In 2015, when the 
migration crisis was at its peak, the neo-colonial rhetoric became more prevalent in political 
forums.  
The 2015 Valletta Summit was a venue where African and European partners met with 




attributed to the persuasiveness of the successfully constructed colonial rhetoric. Secondly, the 
Valletta Summit coincided with the time when the EU was heavily criticized for violating 
asylum protection and migrants' rights. As a result, the EU’s identity as a normative power was 
delegitimized. The EU actors could not reject that there existed neo-colonialism - dominance 
and economic imbalance that was disadvantageous to the African partner countries and had a 
potentially harmful effect on the African people. Moreover, they could not deny that migration 
control approaches, such as border surveillance and protection of violated asylum law.  
The EU’s inability to decline the delegitimization of NPE or defend its apparent inconsistency 
and double standards in upholding the shared norms is what this study refers to as rhetorical 
entrapment. Indeed, any EU’s attempt to counter-argue would have put it in a worse state of 
self-contradiction. At the end of the Valletta Summit, the EU announced a policy shift from 
control measures to addressing the root causes of African irregular migration. Even after the 
Valletta Summit, there was a strong voice from the EU top leadership that the EU had 
considered the rhetoric from Africa partner countries and was willing to align its external 
actorness in irregular migration management with Africa’s development priorities. This 
explains why the main objective of the EU Africa Trust Fund was to address the root causes of 
African irregular migration. 
Scholars of international relations see the EU’s ability to influence ‘the post-colonial others’ 
to emerge from the internal coherence of its ideas. From the normative power Europe 
perspective, the role of ‘the others’ is marginally considered, or they are depicted as ‘passively 
influenced’. However, this study has offered a different perspective: that in irregular migration 
management, an area where the EU experiences deficiency in normative practices, ‘the post-







The future of the Africa-EU partnership on migration management depends on how both 
partners can establish structures of sustainability. The failures in the past joint migration control 
projects resulted from African partner countries’ belief that the EU pushed its interest to keep 
off the irregular migrants without considering their development priorities hence withdrew 
their input. Eventually, much of the EU’s ‘foreign aid’ to Africa was spent on control measures 
and did not establish an effective long-term solution to manage African irregular migration. As 
shown in this study, African partners expressed their development priorities that relate to the 
root causes. The EU, being conscious of the emerging principle of shared migration problem 
and shared responsibility, ought to shift development aid from pursuing its geo-strategic 
interests in Africa, especially that run counter with the development agendas of the African 
countries and focus more on mutual interests of the partnership. 
According to Africa’s decolonization rhetoric, the primary root causes of irregular migration 
included the exploitation of natural resources in Africa, the negative effect of climate change 
and the imbalance in the Africa-EU trade. These are development areas where African partner 
countries felt disempowered and where the EU partners are seen to demonstrate unfairness in 
their relations with Africa. Europe and Africa, therefore, need to redesign the economic 
agreement to reflect a true partnership featured with shared responsibility, non-domination and 
non-partisanship. To achieve this, the study recommends that the EU requires to work with 
Africa as equal development partners instead of imposing ‘what it thinks is necessary for 
African development.’ In the long-term, this move would build the legitimacy of the EU 
external actions in Africa, including those related to irregular migration management. It also 
builds ownership of the EU-funded development projects by the African countries. Further, a 




simply because it is available and has to be used. Since the root causes are a shared 
responsibility, each partner needs to play its role. 
The EU has strongly proclaimed itself as a normative power and human rights defender. 
Considering the high number of irregular migrants dying at the Mediterranean Sea while 
seeking asylum in Europe, the EU’s identity as a normative power has become a point of 
ridicule by ‘the others’. While the EU focuses on the fortress Europe approach, it erodes its 
normative power to influence ‘the other’ regarding human rights in other domains. The EU 
needs to improve its internal migration and asylum management systems to enhance 
compliance with the asylum law and its normative principles to maintain its identity as a force 
for good.  
The scope of this study was limited to the EU-Africa partnership on irregular migration 
management. There is a need for further research on how and to what extent the ‘post-colonial 
others’ can leverage the EU in other social-economic and political domains. The study also did 
not examine how the projects funded through the EU Trust Fund for Africa, in reality, 
addressed the root causes of African irregular migration.  There is a need for further research 
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